515 F.Supp. 627 (D.Md. 1981), Crim. Y-80-0253, United States v. Brainer
| Citation | 515 F.Supp. 627 |
| Party Name | United States v. Brainer |
| Case Date | June 04, 1981 |
| Court | United States District Courts, 4th Circuit, U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
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Russell T. Baker, Jr., U. S. Atty., D. Md., and Steven A. Allen, Asst. U. S. Atty., D. Md., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.
Gerald A. Kroop, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOSEPH H. YOUNG, District Judge.
The defendant, William Brainer, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in this case for lack of a speedy trial. He made no allegation that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment but relied entirely upon the lack of compliance with the statutorily mandated time limits set forth in the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended, 18 U.S.C. ss 3161 et seq. (hereinafter, the "Act"). Specifically, the defendant asserted that his trial on the scheduled date would result in a violation of 18 U.S.C. s 3161(c) (1) which, according to its terms, would have required the trial to commence within seventy days from the date the defendant appeared before a judicial officer of this court. In its response, the government conceded that the defendant's trial did not begin within the time prescribed by the Act, but argued that the motion to dismiss the indictment should be denied for the reason that the Speedy Trial Act is an unconstitutional legislative encroachment on the Judiciary and violates the principle of separation of powers. For the reasons set forth below, this Court denied the motion of the defendant who was then found guilty in a jury-waived trial on the basis of a stipulated set of facts.
The defendant was indicted on July 2, 1980, along with three other defendants, on the basis of his alleged participation in a violation of federal narcotics laws. This particular defendant was charged solely in Count One of the five count indictment, that count charging all four defendants with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marihuana and methaqualone in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846. The defendant was not apprehended until January 19, 1981. In the meantime, one of the co-defendants, Richard C. Way, had pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment as part of an agreement with the government to testify at the trial(s) of the other defendants. The other two co-defendants, Clifford A. Goad and Edward J. Audy, were acquitted in a trial by jury.
Following the apprehension of defendant Brainer in the State of Washington on January 19, 1981, he was transported to the District of Maryland where he first appeared before a judicial officer on January 30, 1981, at which time bail was set. The defendant was arraigned on February 13, 1981, and trial was scheduled to begin on April 20, 1981.
The Speedy Trial Act provides that a criminal defendant must be brought to trial within seventy days from the date he has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending:
"(c)(1) In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs."
18 U.S.C. s 3161(c)(1). Failure to comply with these time dictates calls for mandatory sanctions under the terms of the Act. Section 3162(a)(2) expressly provides, in relevant part:
"(2) If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant."
Under the circumstances of defendant Brainer's proceedings, the last date on which his trial could have started without violating the terms of the Speedy Trial Act
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was April 10, 1981 (seventy days after the initial appearance on January 30, 1981). The trial, which was scheduled for April 20, 1981, could not be commenced by that date because of previously scheduled matters before this Court. Furthermore, there were no periods of delay in this case which could be excluded under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. s 3161(h) so as to bring the April 20, 1981 date within the time limits of the statute.
Although the terms of the Speedy Trial Act call for the dismissal of the indictment in this case, that drastic result is not compelled because the Act itself constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment upon the Judiciary.
The constitutional principle of the separation of powers is implicit in the basic structure of our Constitution. The doctrine has been recognized from the founding days of our government and the Framers fully approved Montesquieu's view that the maintenance of independence as between the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial Branches provided a security for the people. Madison in the Convention, 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 56. Five of the Federalist Papers, numbers 47 through 51, were devoted to an exploration of the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle has continued to maintain its vitality as a "basic concept" in our constitutional scheme of government. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3105, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); see also, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-123, 96 S.Ct. 612, 682-684, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 442-443, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2789-2790, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977).
The separation of powers within the government was never intended, nor has it proven to be, complete. A system of checks and balances was included in the scheme to prevent one branch from predominating. See Federalist Paper No. 51. In interpreting the separation of powers doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for a "pragmatic, flexible approach" which focuses on "the proper balance between the coordinate branches." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra at 442-443, 97 S.Ct. 2789-2790. The Court's approach rejects the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority between the three branches and, instead, requires consideration of the extent to which a branch is prevented from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. When the potential for disruption is present, the Court then requires a balancing of the interest involved. Ibid.
Determination of the precise boundaries of constitutional authority committed to the individual branches of the government presents a formidable task. The complexity of interests at stake in any conflict arising between the branches counsels caution and careful deliberation, for our constitutional system functions best in an atmosphere of institutional accord. However, when the assertion of authority by one branch interferes with the claim of institutional independence by another branch, it becomes the province and duty of the Judiciary to define the respective spheres of power. United States v. Nixon, supra at 704-705, 94 S.Ct. at 3105-3106. This task, neither simple nor always welcome, is nonetheless compelled by our constitutional scheme. As the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), stated:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."
369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. at 706. In the instant case, this Court is faced with the "delicate exercise" of determining if Congress, in enacting the Speedy Trial Act, has intruded upon the constitutional autonomy of the Judiciary.
The doctrine of separation of powers clearly contemplates a zone of judicial power which must be free from interference by
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either the Legislative or Executive Branches. The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison). Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. Unlike the powers conferred to the Legislative and Executive Branches under Articles I and II, Article III does not delve into any specific enumeration or description of what constitutes the elements of the constitutional power. However, the judicial power, like the executive and legislative powers, possesses constitutional boundaries which can neither be exceeded by the possessor of the power nor intruded upon by one of the other branches. For instance, it is clear that Congress has the power to regulate the executions of federal court judgments, Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825), but it is equally evident that Congress cannot compel Article III courts to render advisory opinions. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 409, 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792).
Assuming arguendo that Congress has the power to abolish the lower federal courts entirely through a complete withdrawal of jurisdiction, see, Hart, "The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic," 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1362 (1953), having established such courts, Congress cannot unduly interfere with purely judicial functions. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 45 S.Ct. 18, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924); see also, Notes, "Separation of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence," 26 Hastings L.Rev. 1059, 1065-66 (1975). In Klein, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an obvious attempt by Congress to influence, through its power over jurisdiction, the substantive outcome of cases pending...
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