Reno v. Koray

• Citation: 115 S.Ct. 2021,515 U.S. 50,132 L.Ed.2d 46
• Decision Date: 05 June 1995
• Docket Number: 94790
• Parties: Janet RENO, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners, v. Ziya K. KORAY
• Court: United States Supreme Court

515 U.S. 50

115 S.Ct. 2021

132 L.Ed.2d 46

Janet RENO, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners,

v Ziya K. KORAY.

No. 94-790.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 5, 1995.

Syllabus ^*

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), a defendant generally must "be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences." Before respondent's federal sentence commenced, he was "released" on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and ordered confined to a community treatment center. After his prison sentence began, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) relied on its established policy in refusing to credit toward his sentence the time he had spent at the treatment center. He exhausted his administrative remedies and then filed a federal habeas petition. A District Court denied his petition on the ground that his stay at the center was not "official detention" under § 3585(b). In reversing, the Court of Appeals declined to defer to BOP's view that time spent under highly restrictive conditions while "released" on bail is not "official detention" because a "released" defendant is not subject to BOP's control. It reasoned instead that "official detention" includes time spent under conditions of "jail-type confinement."

Held: The time respondent spent at the treatment center while "released" on bail was not "official detention" within the meaning of § 3585(b). Pp. ____.

(a) Viewed in isolation, the phrase "official detention" could either refer, as the Government contends, to a court order detaining a defendant and committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement, or, as respondent argues, to the restrictive conditions of his release on bail under an "official" order that significantly curtailed his liberty. Examination of the phrase in light of the context in which it is used, however, reveals that the Government's interpretation is correct. P. ____.

(b) The "official detention" language must be construed in conjunction with the Bail Reform Act of 1984, since § 3585(b) provides credit only for presentence restraints on liberty and since it is the Bail Reform Act which authorizes federal courts to place such restraints on a defendant's liberty. That Act provides a court with only two choices: It may either "release" a defendant on bail, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), or order him "detained" without bail, § 3142(e). A defendant suffers "detention" only when committed to the Attorney General's custody, § 3142(i)(2); a defendant admitted to bail, even on restrictive conditions like respondent was, see § 3142(c), is "released." Pp. ____.

(c) Section 3585(a) and related sentencing provisions confirm the view that § 3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were detained in a penal or correctional facility and subject to BOP's control. The context and history of § 3585(b) also support this reading. The provision reduces a defendant's "imprisonment" by the amount of time spent in "official detention" before his sentence, strongly suggesting that the presentence "detention" period must be equivalent to the "imprisonment" itself. And nothing suggests that when Congress replaced § 3568 with § 3585(b), it substituted the phrase "official detention" for "in custody" because it disagreed with the Courts of Appeals' uniform rule that § 3568 denied credit to defendants released on bail. To the contrary, Congress presumably made the change to conform the credit statute to the nomenclature used in related sentencing provisions and in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Pp. ____.

(d) In an internal guideline, BOP likewise has interpreted the phrase "official detention" to require credit only for a defendant's time spent under a § 3142 "detention order." This is the most natural reading of the phrase, and the internal guideline of the agency charged with administering the credit statute is entitled to some deference where it is a permissible construction of the statute. Pp. ____.

(e) In contrast, respondent's reading of "official detention" is plausible only if the phrase is read in isolation. But even then, it is not the only plausible interpretation. Respondent correctly notes that a defendant "released" to a treatment center could be subject to restraints which do not materially differ from those imposed on a "detained" defendant who is assigned to a treatment center as part of his sentence. However, that fact does not undercut the important distinction between all defendants "detained" and all defendants "released" on bail: The former always remain completely subject to BOP's control. The Court of Appeals' alternative construction would require a fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances of confinement in each case to determine whether a defendant "released" on bail was subjected to "jail-type confinement." On the other hand, the Government's construction provides both it and a defendant with clear notice of the consequences of a "release" or "detention" order. Finally, the rule of lenity does not apply here. A statute is not "ambiguous" for purposes of the rule merely because there is a division of judicial authority over its proper construction. Rather, the rule applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, this Court can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. That is not this case. Pp. ____.

21 F.3d 558, reversed and remanded.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Miguel A. Estrada, Washington, DC, for petitioners.

Irwin Rochman, New York City, for respondent.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) provides that a defendant generally must "be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences." Before the commencement of respondent's federal sentence, a federal magistrate judge "released" him on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and ordered him confined to a community treatment center. The question presented is whether respondent was in "official detention," and thus entitled to a sentence credit under § 3585(b), during the time he spent at the treatment center. We hold that he was not.

On April 23, 1991, respondent Ziya Koray was arrested for laundering monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). On June 18, 1991, he pleaded guilty to that charge in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. One week later, on June 25, 1991, a federal magistrate judge entered a "release order" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), ordering respondent released on bail, pending sentencing, into the custody of the Pretrial Services Agency. The order required that he be "confined to [the] premises" of a Volunteers of America community treatment center without "authoriz[ation] to leave for any reason unless accompanied" by a Government special agent. On October 22, 1991, the District Court sentenced respondent to 41 months' imprisonment. Respondent remained at the Volunteers of America facility until November 25, 1991, the day he reported to the Allenwood Federal Prison Camp to serve his sentence.

Respondent requested the Bureau of Prisons (BOP or Bureau) to credit toward his sentence of imprisonment the approximately 150 days he spent at the Volunteers of America community treatment center between June 25 and November 25, 1991. Relying on its established policy, BOP refused to grant the requested credit. After exhausting his administrative remedies, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585 for the time he spent at the community treatment center. The District Court denied the petition, finding that respondent's stay at the center did not constitute "official detention" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 21 F.3d 558 (1994). It acknowledged that the overwhelming majority of the Courts of Appeals "have concluded that section 3585 . . . does not require the Bureau to credit presentenced defendants whose bail conditions allowed them to be confined outside of Bureau of Prison[s] facilities." Id., at 561. The Court declined, however, to defer to the Bureau's view—that time spent under highly restrictive conditions while "released" on bail is not " 'official detention' " under § 3585(b) because a " 'released' " defendant is not subject to the Bureau's control. 21 F.3d, at 562-565. Instead, the Court reasoned that § 3585(b)'s " 'official detention' " language need not be read "as if it provided 'official detention by the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons,' " since "there is nothing in the statute which requires or suggests that a defendant must be under the detention of the Bureau," and since "[a] court may 'detain' a person as 'official[ly]' as the Attorney General." 21 F.3d, at 563-564. Concluding that " 'official detention' for purposes of credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585 includes time spent under conditions of jail-type confinement," 21 F.3d, at 567, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination whether respondent was in "jail-type confinement" during his stay at the Volunteers of America community treatment center.

We granted the Government's petition for certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether a federal prisoner is entitled to credit against his sentence under § 3585(b) for time when he was "released" on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984.¹ 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 787, 130 L.Ed.2d 779 (1995). We now reverse.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3585 determines when a federal sentence of imprisonment commences...