516 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1975), 74-2353, United States v. Kehoe
|Citation:||516 F.2d 78|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cornelius J. KEHOE and Ray K. Bullock, Defendants-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||July 16, 1975|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|
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Anthony J. P. Farris, U. S. Atty., Henry J. Novak, Jr., James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Attys., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert A. Hall, Houston, Tex., for Kehoe.
Richard Haynes, Randy Schaffer, Houston, Tex., for Bullock.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before BELL, THORNBERRY and GEE, Circuit Judges.
THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:
Presented for decision in this § 3731 appeal is a question expressly left open by the Supreme Court in its recent double jeopardy trilogy. In Serfass v. United States, 1975, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265, the Court declined to "intimate any view concerning the case put by the Solicitor General, of 'a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to the trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeopardy before raising the defense.' " 420 U.S. at 394, 95 S.Ct. at 1065, 43 L.Ed.2d at 277. In this case we conclude, first, that Kehoe and Bullock allowed themselves to be placed in jeopardy for tactical reasons, and second, that because of their decision they are not entitled to claim the protection of the double jeopardy clause. Accordingly, we assume jurisdiction of the appeal and reverse the judgment of the district court.
On January 18, 1973 the grand jury named appellees in an eleven-count indictment charging a number of persons with participation in an alleged loan kickback scheme. On May 14, 1973 a superseding eleven-count indictment was handed down by the grand jury. This indictment, as well as the one that it superseded, alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1006. 1 Also on May 14, however, Kehoe and Bullock alone were charged in a single count indictment with embezzling certain land from a savings association in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 657. 2 Appellees pleaded not guilty to
the embezzlement charge, and on October 29, 1973 a jury was empanelled and trial began. After the government had presented its case-in-chief, appellees moved for a "judgment of acquittal" on the ground, inter alia, that the indictment failed "to charge an offense against the laws of the United States of America since real property cannot be the subject of an embezzlement under the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 657." In a memorandum opinion reviewing the permissible reach of § 657, Judge Bue announced his decision to grant appellees' motion "on the grounds that the indictment failed to state an offense against the United States of America." 3 Shortly thereafter the government procured a new indictment against appellees for the same transaction made the subject of the previous indictment; this time, however, the grand jury charged Kehoe and Bullock with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006. Appellees promptly moved to dismiss this indictment, arguing, inter alia, that Judge Bue had acquitted them in the earlier trial and that a second trial arising out of the same transaction would put them twice in jeopardy. After a hearing, Judge Seals sustained the double jeopardy contention and dismissed the second indictment. The United States now seeks to appeal that ruling.
The government may appeal an adverse judgment in a criminal case only when authorized by statute. United States v. Sanges, 1892, 144 U.S. 310, 12 S.Ct. 609, 36 L.Ed. 445. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 provides that:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information . . . except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
Here Judge Seals dismissed the second indictment because he felt that after Judge Bue's ruling on the first indictment, the double jeopardy clause barred further prosecution. Hence, our resolution of the double jeopardy issue will control not only the jurisdictional question but the merits as well. 4 With that in mind, we proceed to the main issue on appeal: Does the double jeopardy clause bar the government from further prosecuting Kehoe and Bullock?
Judge Bue expressly denominated his judgment an acquittal, rather than a dismissal of the indictment. Nevertheless, although "(i)t is, of course, settled that 'a verdict of acquittal . . . is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.' . . . (t)he word (acquittal) . . . has no talismanic qualities for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Serfass v. United States, supra, 420 U.S. 392, 95 S.Ct. at 1064, 43 L.Ed.2d at 276. In short, as the Supreme Court noted in a related context, "the trial judge's characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action for purposes of our appellate jurisdiction." United States v. Jorn, 1971, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7, 91 S.Ct. 547, 553 n.7, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 552 n.7. It follows that we must examine Judge Bue's ruling and properly characterize it for purposes of the double jeopardy clause.
Kehoe and Bullock were of course not acquitted on the general issue by the jury. The primary factfinder made no determination of their guilt or innocence. In certain circumstances, however, the trial judge even in a jury trial may find facts in a manner that will, by a doctrine similar to collateral estoppel, act as an acquittal. 5 Thus, if Judge Bue based his ruling upon facts that went to the general issue of the case, Kehoe and Bullock were in substance, as well as in name, acquitted. The constitutional rule against further prosecution after an acquittal would then come into play to prevent us from assuming jurisdiction. 6
A reading of Judge Bue's opinion reveals that except perhaps for one brief passage he was clearly discussing only the legal sufficiency of the indictment and not the facts of the case before him. Hence, appellees' argument on this point turns entirely on one ambiguous statement, quoted below:
This Court was aware of and concerned with the fine distinctions being made when the motion for judgment of acquittal was urged by defendants at the close of the Government's case. Had the evidence shown that the property was sold by and for the benefit of Surety Savings with the defendants in their fiduciary capacities diverting the consideration of such sale for their own benefit, an indictment alleging embezzlement might have been proper. However, the circumstances of this case, accepted as true for purposes of this motion, showed that the alleged consideration never was intended to flow to Surety but only to the defendants. Although the defendants ostensibly deprived Surety Savings of real estate holdings, no funds, credits or securities belonging to Surety were taken. While this distinction is a fine one, it is one that is critical to the offense of embezzlement.
App. at 265. Appellees apparently contend that Judge Bue found that, if other evidence had been introduced, the prosecution could have obtained a conviction under the indictment as it then stood, despite the fact that it alleged embezzlement of real property. The government argues, on the other hand, that this passage was simply a hypothetical situation
posited by the trial judge in which the defendants could properly have been indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 657. We think that the government is essentially correct.
First, it is doubtful whether the judge intended to make findings of fact; he clearly states that certain facts will simply be "accepted as true for purposes of this motion." Second, Judge Bue concluded only that "an indictment alleging embezzlement might have been proper," and not that an indictment alleging embezzlement of land might be permissible. Therefore, even if he did intend in this passage to make formal findings, the resulting comments were not necessary to the stated ground for granting appellees' motion i. e., that the indictment in question failed to state an offense and thus do not constitute findings of fact binding on this court. Compare United States v. Esposito, 7 Cir. 1974, 492 F.2d 6, 9, cert. denied 414 U.S. 1135, 94 S.Ct. 879, 38 L.Ed.2d 760 (1974), 7 with United States v. Sorenson, 7 Cir. 1974, 504 F.2d 406; United States v. Jaramillo, 8 Cir. 1975, 510 F.2d 808. In these circumstances Judge Bue's ruling can only be characterized as purely legal and hence not an acquittal. There was no conclusion on innocence or guilt. Consequently, since the rule forbidding further proceedings after an acquittal is inapplicable here, we must now consider whether the double jeopardy clause prohibits further prosecution of defendants who procure the mid-trial dismissal of the indictment on the ground that it fails to state an offense.
The recent Supreme Court double jeopardy triology does not supply a direct answer. In United States v. Wilson, 1975, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232, the trial judge dismissed the indictment on speedy trial grounds after a jury had found Wilson guilty of converting union funds to his own use. Relying on United States v. Sisson, supra, the Court of Appeals rebuffed the government's attempt to appeal that ruling. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Marshall carefully reviewed the legislative history of the new § 3731 and concluded that "Congress was determined to avoid creating nonconstitutional bars to the Government's right to appeal." 420 U.S. at 339, 95 S.Ct. at 1019, 43 L.Ed.2d at 239. Proceeding then to an examination of the scope of the double jeopardy clause...
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