Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston

Citation516 So.2d 509
PartiesREINHARDT MOTORS, INC. v. Randolph BOSTON. 85-6.
Decision Date03 October 1986
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Roger S. Morrow of Whitesell, Morrow & Romine, Montgomery, for appellant.

Robert D. Segall and Lee H. Copeland of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, Montgomery, for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment based on a jury award in favor of Plaintiff Boston in a suit for fraud against Reinhardt Motors. These are the facts, viewing the evidence most favorably toward the plaintiff: Boston noticed that his car was losing engine coolant, and took the car to Reinhardt Motors for repairs. Boston had taken his car to Reinhardt several times before for routine maintenance and trusted the people who worked there.

One of the mechanics looked at the car and suggested that there might be a problem with the engine head. Boston talked to the shop supervisor, Mr. Reinhardt, who recommended that he have the head gasket replaced before any work was done on the head to see if that would correct the problem. Boston purchased the necessary parts, but the mechanics at the shop were too busy to perform the repairs at that time. Boston returned a few days later to have the repairs made on his car.

When he returned, Boston was told that replacing the head gasket would be of no use because his engine head was cracked. The mechanic removed the engine head and showed Boston four marks along the sides, which he explained were the visible cracks in the engine head. Boston questioned the mechanic and Mr. Reinhardt about this, but then agreed to their replacing the engine head.

Boston took the old engine head to an auto parts shop to discover why it had cracked. He was informed there that the part was not cracked, and that the markings that he was shown were in fact factory markings that had been placed there at the time of manufacture. When Boston called Mr. Reinhardt to complain, he was assailed with insulting and abusive language.

Boston brought this suit, claiming fraud and suppression of material facts. The suit was tried before a jury, which found in Boston's favor and awarded compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $100,480. The trial judge refused Defendant's motions for directed verdict at the close of Plaintiff's case, at the close of Defendant's case, and at the close of all the evidence. In addition, the trial judge denied Reinhardt's alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, as well as a motion for remittitur. Reinhardt Motors appeals, alleging twelve grounds of reversible error.

Defendant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to submit the count for fraud to the jury. Primarily, it argues "that any statements made by Defendant's employees were mere expressions of opinion that would not support an action for fraud." Defendant cites two recent cases as support for its proposition, both of which are readily distinguishable from the case at bar.

The first case, Jones v. McGuffin, 454 So.2d 509 (Ala.1984), involved a suit for misrepresentation against a structural engineer. The McGuffins conditioned their purchase of a certain home upon a favorable report by a structural engineer. Jones, the engineer, inspected the home, noted several cracks in the walls, but stated that "in his opinion" the house was in excellent structural condition. Within months of having moved into the house, the McGuffins had to spend over $12,000 to repair the foundation of the house. The Court held that "mere statements of opinion are not material facts upon which actions for legal fraud can be maintained." 454 So.2d at 512.

The second case relied upon by Defendant is Reynolds v. Fowler Pest Control & Insulation, Inc., 479 So.2d 1185 (Ala.1985), in which a similar situation occurred. As a part of the Veterans' Administration financing for the purchase of a new home, the Reynoldses had the house inspected for termite damage. The report noted the presence of termites, but made no notation of any damage, only that corrective measures had been taken. Shortly after moving into the house, the Reynoldses discovered that the house had substantial termite damage. Fowler was able to escape liability because of several disclaimers which accompanied its report.

Both of those cases are distinguishable from the situation here presented. Unlike Therefore, these assertions were not "mere expressions of opinion"; they were statements of objective facts, which the jury was authorized to believe were made by experts who knew that they were false and that they were made with the intent to deceive.

those two cases, where, after visual inspections, written reports were submitted estimating the condition of invisible portions of homes, the Defendant here was able to dismantle and observe every angle of the engine head. If there had been any question as to the condition of the part, the Defendant could easily have subjected it to several inexpensive tests. Also, unlike the defendants in those two cases, the Defendant here, rather than reporting that it believed a condition did not exist, Defendant's employees here affirmatively stated that there were cracks in the engine head, and even pointed to factory markings on the part and asserted that they were cracks.

Defendant's second allegation of error is that there was insufficient evidence to submit to the jury a count based on suppression of material facts. It is undisputed that Defendant did not inform Plaintiff that it was impossible upon visible inspection to state with certainty that the engine head was cracked, or that there were several inexpensive tests which could have been conducted to determine whether the head was cracked. On the contrary, Defendant stated positively that the head was cracked. There was sufficient evidence to allow the count based on suppression of material facts to go to the jury. § 6-5-102, Code 1975.

The third allegation of error involves the issue of damages for mental anguish, which the trial court allowed to go to the jury. Defendant here argues that damages for mental anguish are not appropriate in a tort such as this. In support of this proposition, Defendant cites Hayes v. Newton Bros. Lumber Co., 481 So.2d 1123 (Ala.1985), and B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hughes, 239 Ala. 373, 194 So. 842 (1940), both of which quote from Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Martini, 2 Ala.App. 652, 657, 56 So. 830, 832 (1911).

Both Hayes and B.F. Goodrich state the general rule that the law will not allow recovery of damages for mental distress where the tort results in mere injury to property. While this is the general rule, there is a well established exception. Where the injury to property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely, mental suffering may be recoverable. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hughes, supra. See, also, Holcombe v. Whitaker, 294 Ala. 430, 318 So.2d 289 (1975) ("the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish"); Dawsey v. Newton, 244 Ala. 661, 15 So.2d 271 (1943) ("When a trespass to property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely, mental suffering may be compensated for when it is a proximate consequence."); Smith & Gaston Funeral Directors v. Wilson, 262 Ala. 401, 79 So.2d 48 (1955) ("That mental anguish is recoverable in an action of trespass to property committed 'under circumstances of insult or contumely' is well recognized").

This Court pointed out in Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Henderson, 371 So.2d 899 (Ala.1979), that "[t]he general measure of recovery for fraud includes all damages within the contemplation of the parties or which are the necessary or natural and proximate consequences of the wrong. This is a factual determination to be made by the jury." Whether the tort is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely is a question properly left to the determination of the jury. Dawsey v. Newton, supra.

Moreover, the restrictive language of the general rule ("when the tort results in mere injury to property") is material to our inquiry. Although Boston's automobile was the underlying subject of Reinhardt's intentional misrepresentation, the tort did not result in mere injury to the property. The tort and its consequent injury were committed not upon Boston's car, but upon him personally. The replacement of the engine head, though unnecessary under the To be sure, the evidence discloses that it was primarily because of Defendant's rude and insulting language and treatment to which Boston was subjected, accompanied by the resultant unnecessary cost of repair, that this action was pursued. Boston presented evidence which, if believed by a jury, would support the claim for damages for mental anguish. Therefore, the trial judge was correct in submitting that issue to the jury.

circumstances, did not result in injury to Boston's property.

Next, Defendant alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. As support for its position, Defendant cites Hall Motor Co. v. Furman, 285 Ala. 499, 234 So.2d 37 (1970), and several other cases, all of which stand for the proposition that punitive damages will not lie unless the fraud is perpetrated "grossly, maliciously, oppressively, and with an intent to deceive."

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to determine that an intentional fraud was committed. "The Court [has] recognized that, if the misrepresentation is shown to have been made knowing that it is false, then the law permits punitive damages by way of punishment." Big Three Motors, Inc. v. Smith, 412 So.2d 1222, at 1224 (Ala.1982).

Defendant's next two allegations of error concern the admission into evidence of two of Plaintiff's...

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  • City of Tyler v. Likes, 95-1014
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • February 13, 1998
    ...that mental anguish is recoverable for "willful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence"), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the injury "is committed under circumstances of insu......
  • Morris Concrete, Inc. v. Warrick
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    • May 23, 2003
    ...damage to property if the damage to the property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely. See Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986). We "Under Alabama law, it is well established that damages for mental anguish are not recoverable in tort where the ......
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    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama
    • September 24, 2020
    ...property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely, mental suffering may be recoverable." Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Bos. , 516 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. 1986). "The known, intentional and willful violation of the law and of plaintiffs’ rights in and of itself is legal insult, cont......
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