Libretti v. U.S.

Decision Date07 November 1995
Docket Number947427
PartiesJoseph LIBRETTI, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus *

During petitioner Libretti's trial on federal drug and related charges, he entered into a plea agreement with the Government, whereby, among other things, he pleaded guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C. § 848; agreed to surrender numerous items of his property to the Government under § 853, which provides for criminal forfeiture of drug-tainted property; and waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. At the colloquy on the plea agreement, the trial judge explained the consequences of Libretti's waiver of the latter right, but did not expressly advise him as to the existence and scope of his right under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) to a jury determination of forfeitability. After sentencing Libretti to imprisonment and other penalties, the judge entered a forfeiture order as to the property in question despite Libretti's objection to what he saw as a failure to find any factual basis for the entire forfeiture. The Court of Appeals rejected both of Libretti's challenges to the forfeiture order, ruling that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) does not require a district court to ascertain a factual basis for a stipulated forfeiture of assets and that Libretti had waived his Rule 31(e) right to a jury determination of forfeitability.

Held:

1. Rule 11(f)—which forbids a court to enter judgment upon ''a plea of guilty'' without assuring that there is ''a factual basis'' for the plea—does not require a district court to inquire into the factual basis for a stipulated forfeiture of assets embodied in a plea agreement. Pp. 362-368.

(a) The Rule's plain language precludes its application to a forfeiture provision contained in a plea agreement. The Rule applies only to ''a plea of guilty,'' which refers to a defendant's admission of guilt of a substantive criminal offense as charged in an indictment and his waiver of the right to a jury determination on that charge. See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 762-763, 102 L.Ed.2d 927. In contrast, forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following a plea of guilty, and thus falls outside Rule 11(f)'s scope. That forfeiture operates as punishment for criminal conduct, not as a separate substantive offense, is demonstrated by the text of the relevant statutory provisions, see, e.g., §§ 848(a) and 853(a), by legislative history, and by this Court's precedents, see, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2766, ----, 125 L.Ed.2d 441. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 628, n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2654, n. 5, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 distinguished. In light of such weighty authority, the Court is not persuaded by Libretti's insistence that the forfeiture for which § 853 provides is, in essence, a hybrid that shares elements of both a substantive charge and a criminal punishment. Pp. 362-364.

(b) Libretti's policy arguments for construing Rule 11(f) to reach asset forfeiture provisions of plea agreements—that the Rule's factual basis inquiry (1) is essential to ensuring that a forfeiture agreement is knowing and voluntary, (2) will protect against government overreaching, and (3) is necessary to ensure that the rights of thirdparty claimants are fully protected—are rejected. Pp. 364-365.

(c) The District Court did not rest its forfeiture order solely on the stipulation contained in the plea agreement. There is ample evidence that the District Judge both understood the statutory requisites for criminal forfe iture and concluded that they were satisfied on the facts at the time the sentence was imposed. Pp. 365-368.

2. On the facts of this case, Libretti's waiver of a jury determination as to the forfeitability of his property under Rule 31(e)—which provides that, ''[i]f the indictment ... alleges that ... property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the ... property''—was plainly adequate. That waiver was accomplished by the plea agreement, in which Libretti agreed to forfeiture and waived his right to a jury trial, together with the plea colloquy, which made it abundantly clear that the plea agreement would end any proceedings before the jury and would lead directly to sentencing by the court. Accordingly, Libretti cannot now complain that he did not receive the Rule 31(e) special verdict. The Court rejects his argument that the Rule 31(e) right to a jury determination of forfeitability has both a constitutional and a statutory foundation, and cannot be waived absent specific advice from the district court as to the existence and scope of this right and an express, written waiver. Given that the right, as an aspect of sentencing, does not fall within the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of guilt or innocence, see, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2420, 91 L.Ed.2d 67, but is merely statutory in origin, the plea agreement need not make specific reference to Rule 31(e). Nor must the district court specifically advise a defendant that a guilty plea will result in waiver of the Rule 31(e) right, since that right is not among the information that must be communicated to a defendant under Rule 11(c) in order to ensure that a guilty plea is valid. Pp. 368-369.

38 F.3d 523 (C.A.10 1994), affirmed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and II-A of which were joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., Parts II-B and II-C of which were joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., and Parts III and IV of which were joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ. SOUTER, J., and GINSBURG, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Sara Sun Beale, appointed by the Court, Durham, NC, for petitioner.

Malcolm Stewart, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.1

Petitioner Joseph Libretti pleaded guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 84 Stat. 1265, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 ed. and Supp. V), and agreed to forfeit numerous items of his property to the Government. We must decide whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) requires the District Court to determine whether a factual basis exists for a stipulated asset forfeiture embodied in a plea agreement, and whether the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) right to a special jury verdict on forfeiture can only be waived following specific advice from the District Court as to the existence and scope of this right and an express, written waiver.

I

In May 1992, Joseph Libretti was charged in a multicount superseding indictment with violations of various federal drug, firearms, and money-laundering laws. Included in the indictment was a count alleging that Libretti engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, by operating a cocaine and marijuana distribution organization in Wyoming and Colorado from 1984 to 1992. Conviction under § 848 subjects a defendant to, among other penalties, ''the forfeiture prescribed in section 853.'' 2 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). Accordingly, the indictment further allege d that the Government was entitled to forfeiture of property that was obtained from or used to facilitate Libretti's drug offenses, including but not limited to various assets specified in the indictment. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(c)(2) (''No judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture'').

Trial began in September 1992. The Government presented testimony from 18 witnesses, including several individuals who had purchased cocaine or marijuana from Libretti, to establish Libretti's involvement in the possession and distribution of considerable amounts of narcotics. The testimony also reflected Libretti's purchase of a home, an automobile, and dozens of automatic and semiautomatic weapons during a time when he had only modest sources of legitimate income. Finally, the testimony revealed that Libretti stored large amounts of money and drugs in safety deposit boxes and storage facilities away from his home.

Following four days of testimony, Libretti and the Government entered into a plea agreement, by the terms of which Libretti agreed to plead guilty to the CCE count of the indictment (count 6). The Government in return agreed not to pursue additional charges against Libretti and to recommend that he be sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 20 years' imprisonment. Paragraph 10 of the plea agreement provided that Libretti would

''transfer his right, title, and interest in all of his assets to the Division of Criminal Investigation of the Wyoming Attorney General including, but not limited to: all real estate; all personal property, including guns, the computer, and every other item now in the possession of the United States; all bank accounts, investments, retirement accounts, cash, cashier's checks, travelers checks and funds of any kind.''

Two other paragraphs of the plea agreement also made reference to the contemplated forfeiture. Paragraph 2 described the maximum statutory penalty for the offense to which Libretti agreed to plead guilty, which included ''forfeiture of all known assets as prescribed in 21 U.S.C. § 853 and assets which are discovered at any later time up to $1,500,000.'' In paragraph 9, Libretti agreed to ''identify a ll assets that were used to facilitate his criminal activity'' and to ''provide complete financial disclosure forms requiring the listing of assets and...

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