Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Weinberger

Decision Date08 August 1975
Docket NumberNo. 74-2154,74-2154
Citation517 F.2d 329
PartiesMOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL OF GREATER MIAMI, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Caspar WEINBERGER, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and Blue Crossof Florida, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., Robert N. Reynolds, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., David Cohen, App. Section, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellants.

Kelly, Black, Black & Kenny, P. A., Miami, Fla., for Blue Cross.

James G. Roth, Miami, Fla., Burton A. Schwalb, Washington, D. C., Lewis I. Horwitz, Miami Beach, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and GODBOLD and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:

This case arises from an attempt by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to recoup $6.3 million from Mount Sinai Medical Center ("the hospital"). This amount was allegedly paid to Mount Sinai for medically unnecessary services and hospital stays provided to beneficiaries under the Medicare hospital insurance system from 1966 to 1971. Before HEW could commence recoupment by putting into effect a partial freeze on future payments to Mount Sinai to offset the amount claimed, the hospital sued for temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the freeze.

HEW's attempt to recoup the funds was based on its theory that the government has a common law right to recoup monies paid out illegally. The District Court granted temporary relief. Later, after hearing and on cross motions for summary judgment, it accepted Mount Sinai's principal defense that the complex statutory and administrative scheme governing the Medicare program had abrogated the government's right to recoup, and it granted a permanent injunction. 376 F.Supp. 1099 (S.D.Fla., 1974). HEW appeals. We reverse on the recoupment issue and remand for further proceedings. 1

Mount Sinai is a major provider of services under the Medicare program, the largest in the southeast and, measured in terms of cost of services, more than twice as large as the second largest provider in its state. From 60 to 70 percent of Mount Sinai's patient-days and total billings are now attributable to Medicare.

Allegations of wrongdoing by Mount Sinai in operation of the Medicare program were made in 1972. HEW subjected to review by a peer review committee of doctors a sample consisting of the charts of 710 patients from a single year. The statistical results of the committee's determinations of medically unnecessary hospital stays and ancillary services drawn from this sample were then applied to all years in question, producing a calculated, as opposed to actual, overpayment figure of $6.3 million.

I. The Medicare system

Federal Health Insurance for the Aged, popularly known as Medicare, was enacted by Congress in Title I of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, P.L. 89-97, §§ 101-122, 79 Stat. 286, July 30, 1965, as Subchapter XVIII of the Social Security Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ll (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395pp (Supp.III). 2 The system contains two substantively distinct parts, one providing insurance for hospital and related post-hospital services, known as Part A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i-2 (Supp.III), the other providing insurance for supplementary medical services, primarily physicians' services, known as Part B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w (Supp.III). This case concerns Part A. 3

Under Part A, the hospital insurance program, persons aged 65 and older, § 1395c, 4 receive essential hospital services, § 1395d, paid for from a trust fund financed by wage taxes on employees and self-employers, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1401(b), 3101(b) and 3111(b) (1970), the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, § 1395i. The hospital services are paid for directly by the government. However, only those hospitals and other institutions that qualify as "providers of services" under § 1395x(u), 5 incorporating § 1395x(e), (j), and (o ), and that are accredited under § 1395bb, are eligible to receive payments under the program, § 1395f(a). They can do so only after entering into agreements with the Secretary of HEW meeting the requirements of § 1395cc(a), § 1395f(a). They must agree, among other things, not to charge a Medicare beneficiary for any services received under the program, § 1395cc(a) (1)(A), other than for co-insurance and deductibles provided for in § 1395cc(a) (2)(A), but instead to look only to the government for compensation. Payment for services is based on the reasonable cost of such services, § 1395f(b), as determined pursuant to § 1395x(v) and the appropriate regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 405.401 et seq.

Day-by-day administration of the Medicare program is handled by "fiscal intermediaries." These are private, nongovernment entities, frequently health and accident insurance companies (including "Blue Cross" organizations) nominated by a provider or group of providers. They enter into contracts with HEW and serve as HEW's agent for many functions, such as hospital audits, information dissemination, and fund disbursement, § 1395h. Defendant Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., is the fiscal intermediary between Mount Sinai and HEW and also agent for HEW. Defendants Blue Cross and the Secretary of HEW will be referred to collectively as "HEW."

Providing services to a beneficiary raises two important and distinct issues: (1) whether the services provided are covered by § 1395d and not excluded by § 1395y; and (2) whether the amount paid for the services is the "reasonable cost" under § 1395x(v). 6 Each issue is resolved under distinct procedures. In resolving the question before us we must consider the bearing of these separate procedures on a recoupment section that makes no distinction between cost questions and coverage questions.

A. Coverage determinations

The issues in coverage determinations are defined by §§ 1395d and 1395y. Section 1395d defines the benefits covered by Medicare: in-patient hospital services, post-hospital extended care services and post-hospital home health services with annual day or visit limits for each, § 1395d(a)(1)-(3). Section 1395y defines exclusions from the general definition of scope of benefits in § 1395d. The most important as a practical matter are the exclusions from coverage of services "which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury . . . ," § 1395y(a)(1), or which are for "custodial care," § 1395y(a)(9). The instant case involves services found by HEW not to be covered because not medically necessary under § 1395y(a)(1).

The parties primarily concerned with coverage determinations are HEW and the beneficiary. In theory the provider's interest is slight because the coverage determination merely has the effect of resolving who shall pay it for the services, Medicare or the individual. The administrative procedures for making the coverage determination reflect these theoretical interests, for only the beneficiary has a right to hearing and judicial review under the statute, §§ 1395ff(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2), and the regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.701 et seq., see particularly §§ 405.702, -.710, -.720, -.730 and -.750. 7 As a practical matter, however, the provider is greatly concerned about who its debtor is. The alternative debtors are the government and a private individual who may be hard to find, harder to collect from, and impossible to placate if collection from him is necessary.

B. Cost determinations

The issues in cost determinations are defined by § 1395x(v) and the regulations pursuant thereto, 20 C.F.R. § 405.401 et seq. The rules for what constitutes reasonable cost have a substantial impact on when and how the reasonable cost determinations can be made. The general rule is that Medicare will cover all costs of covered individuals, and no costs of individuals not covered, 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.454(a)(1) and (b)(1). The costs of a hospital department or service allocable to Medicare beneficiaries is based on the proportion of charges made with respect to Medicare beneficiaries to all charges for hospital services, 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.452(a), (b) and (e)(1). This computation of the proportion of charges can be made only at the end of some fiscal period. Thus, the final determination of the reasonable costs for any given service can be finally determined only at the end of the fiscal year during which the service was supplied. HEW is required to make periodic interim payments in the meantime, not less frequently than monthly, § 1395g, to meet hospitals' liquidity needs, 20 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(1). These payments are approximations of what HEW and the hospital expect will be properly chargeable to Medicare. The fiscal intermediary audits the accounts of each hospital on an annual basis to determine how much the hospital should have been paid. Subsequent payments for the following year's services are adjusted to compensate for prior payments that were above or below the amounts actually owed, § 1395g and 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.451(b)(1) and 405.454(a) and (f).

Section 1395g is limited in its impact to cost redeterminations and does not touch coverage problems. Despite its general references to "overpayments," similar to § 1395gg(b), consideration of the Medicare Act as a whole shows that this section has much more limited scope than is contended for by the government. The District Court's opinion on this question correctly analyzes the statutory scheme. 376 F.Supp. at 1127-1129. Congress chose to pay providers only the "reasonable cost" of services, to be determined at the end of each fiscal year. Lump sum annual payments made long after services were rendered would be inadequate in light of hospitals' liquidity needs, so Congress authorized interim estimated payments to providers to be paid at least monthly with subsequent adjustments for overpayments...

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