Henderson v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1996
• Docket Number: 95232
• Parties: HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

517 U.S. 654

116 S.Ct. 1638

134 L.Ed.2d 880

HENDERSON

v UNITED STATES

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

No. 95-232.

Argued March 19, 1996

Decided May 20, 1996

Syllabus ^*

Petitioner Henderson filed this suit under the Suits in Admiralty Act for injuries he received as a seaman aboard a vessel owned by the United States. He accomplished service on the United States in the manner and within the time allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which sets an extendable 120-day period for service. Service on the Attorney General occurred 47 days after the complaint was filed, but service on the United States Attorney, though timely under Rule 4's extendable deadline, took 147 days. The United States moved to dismiss the action, arguing that although the time and manner of service satisfied Rule 4's requirements, Henderson had failed to serve process ``forthwith'' as required by Section(s) 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act. The District Court dismissed Henderson's complaint for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, based on Circuit precedent holding that Section(s) 2's service ``forthwith'' requirement conditions the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity and is therefore a jurisdictional prerequisite. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The Suits in Admiralty Act's ``forthwith'' instruction for service of process has been superseded by Rule 4. Pp. 6-19.

(a) Rule 4's regime conflicts irreconcilably with Section(s) 2's service ``forthwith'' instruction. The Federal Rules convey a clear message that complaints are not to be dismissed if served within 120 days, or within such additional time as the court may allow, but Section(s) 2's ``forthwith'' instruction is indicative of a far shorter time. The Government urges that the conflict dissolves if one reads Rule 4 as establishing not an affirmative right to serve a complaint within 120 days, but an outer boundary for timely service. Reading Rule 4 in its historical context, however, leads to the conclusion that the 120-day provision operates as an irreducible allowance. Pp. 6-9.

(b) In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress ordered that, in matters of "practice and procedure," 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 2072(a), the Federal Rules shall govern, and "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect," Section(s) 2072(b). Correspondingly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 provides that the Rules cannot be construed to extend or limit federal jurisdiction. Section 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act contains a broad waiver of sovereign immunity in its first sentence, but this does not mean, as the United States asserts, that Section(s) 2 in its entirety is ``jurisdictional.'' Several of Section(s) 2's provisions, notably its generous venue and transfer provisions, as well as its service provision, are not sensibly typed "substantive" or "jurisdictional." Instead, they have a distinctly facilitative, "procedural" cast, dealing with case processing, not substantive rights or consent to suit. The service "forthwith" prescription is not made "substantive" or "jurisdictional" by its inclusion-along with broad venue choices-in Section(s) 2. The prescription is best characterized as a rule of procedure, of the kind Rule 4 supersedes. A plaintiff like Henderson, on commencement of an action under the Suits in Admiralty Act, must resort to Rule 4 for instructions on service of process. In that Rule, one finds instructions governing, inter alia, form and issuance of the summons, service of the summons together with the complaint, who may serve process, and proof of service. The Rule also describes how service shall or may be effected on various categories of defendants. It is uncontested that all these prescriptions apply in Suits in Admiralty Act cases, just as they apply in other federal cases. There is no reason why the prescription governing time for service is not, as is the whole of Rule 4, a nonjurisdictional rule governing "practice and procedure" in federal cases, see 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 2072(a), consistent with the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 82, and rendering provisions like the Suits in Admiralty Act's service "forthwith" requirement "of no further force or effect," Section(s) 2072(b). Pp. 9-19. 51 F. 3d 574, reversed and remanded.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, J., joined.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the period allowed for service of process in a civil action commenced by a seaman injured aboard a vessel owned by the United States. Recovery in such cases is governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. Section(s) 741 et seq., which broadly waives the Government's sovereign immunity. See Section(s) 742 (money judgments); Section(s) 743 (costs and interest). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows 120 days to effect service of the summons and timely filed complaint, a period extendable by the court. The Suits in Admiralty Act, however, instructs that service shall be made "forthwith." Section(s) 742. The question presented is whether the Act's "forthwith" instruction for service of process has been superseded by the Federal Rule.

In the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. Section(s) 2071 et seq., Congress ordered that, in matters of "practice and procedure," Section(s) 2072(a), the Federal Rules shall govern, and "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect," Section(s) 2072(b). We hold that, in actions arising under federal law, commenced in compliance with the governing statute of limitations, the manner and timing of serving process are generally nonjurisdictional matters of "procedure" controlled by the Federal Rules.

I

On August 27, 1991, petitioner Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a vessel owned and operated by the United States. On April 8, 1993, after exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States, pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, as amended, 46 U. S. C. App. Section(s) 741 et seq. ¹ Under that Act, suits of the kind Henderson commenced "may be brought . . . within two years after the cause of action arises." Section(s) 745. Henderson brought his action well within that time period. He commenced suit, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 instructs, simply "by filing a complaint with the court." ²

Having timely filed his complaint, Henderson attempted to follow the Federal Rules on service. It is undisputed that the following Rules, and nothing in the Suits in Admiralty Act, furnished the immediately relevant instructions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) (1988) provided: "Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who shall be responsible for prompt service of the summons and a copy of the complaint." Rule 4(b) provided: "The summons shall be signed by the clerk, [and] be under the seal of the court." Rule 4(d) stated: "The summons and complaint shall be served together." ³

A series of slips occurred in obtaining the summons required by Rule 4. Henderson's counsel requested the appropriate summons forms and file-stamped copies of the complaint on April 8, 1993, the day he filed Henderson's complaint. But the court clerk did not respond immediately. Counsel eventually obtained the forms on April 21, 1993, and completed and returned them to the clerk. On May 4, counsel received the summons mailed to him from the clerk's office, and on May 19, counsel sent the summons and complaint, by certified mail, to the Attorney General, ⁴ who received them on May 25.

Service on the local United States Attorney took longer. On May 25, Henderson's counsel forwarded the summons and complaint, as received from the clerk, to a "constable" with a request to effect service. On June 1, the constable's office returned the documents, informing Henderson's counsel that the summons was not in proper form, because it lacked the court's seal. Counsel thereupon wrote to the court clerk requesting new summons forms with the appropriate court seal. Counsel repeated this request on August 19; ultimately, on August 25, Henderson's counsel received the properly sealed summons.

Once again, Henderson's counsel requested the constable's service and, on August 30, moved for an extension of time to serve the United States Attorney. ⁵ The court granted the motion, extending the time for service until September 15. The United States Attorney received personal service of the summons and complaint, in proper form, on September 3, 1993.

Thus, the Attorney General received the complaint 47 days after Henderson filed suit, and the United States Attorney was personally served 148 days after Henderson commenced the action by filing his complaint with the court. On November 17, 1993, the United States moved to dismiss the action. The grounds for, and disposition of, that motion led to Henderson's petition for certiorari.

The United States has never maintained that it lacked notice of Henderson's complaint within the 2-year limitation period prescribed for Suits in Admiralty Act claims. See 46 U. S. C. App. Section(s) 745; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39 (counsel for United States acknowledged that service on Attorney General gave Government actual notice three months before 2-year limitation period ended). ⁶ Nor has the Government asserted any prejudice to the presentation of its defense stemming from the delayed service of the summons and complaint. And the manner and timing of service, it appears beyond debate, satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (titled "Su...