U.S. v. Canestri, 1138

• Citation: 518 F.2d 269
• Decision Date: 30 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 1138,D,1138
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James V. CANESTRI, Appellant. ocket 75-1143.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 269

518 F.2d 269

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James V. CANESTRI, Appellant.

No. 1138, Docket 75-1143.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued June 20, 1975.

Decided June 30, 1975.

Thomas F. Maxwell, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., D. Conn., Bridgeport, Conn. (Peter C. Dorsey, U. S. Atty., D. Conn., on the brief), for appellee.

Ira B. Grudberg, New Haven, Conn. (Jacobs, Jacobs & Grudberg, New Haven, Conn., on the brief), for appellant.

Before LUMBARD, GIBBONS, ^* and GURFEIN, Circuit Judges.

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:

James V. Canestri appeals from a judgment of conviction entered March 17, 1975, in the District of Connecticut (Zampano, J.) following a trial at which a jury found him guilty of three counts of possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Canestri was sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 months in prison on each count. On appeal he argues that the district court erred in not suppressing as evidence the three unregistered firearms involved in this case. United States v. Canestri, 376 F.Supp. 1149 (D.Conn.1974). We affirm.

On October 16, 1972, Anthony Mezzonotte of Orange, Connecticut, reported to the police that his home had been burglarized and that 18 valuable antique guns had been taken. Three days later the Orange police department sought a warrant to search the home of Joseph Canestri, the teenage brother of the defendant in this case. In the affidavit presented to the magistrate to justify the issuance of the search warrant, two officers of the Orange police department recited (1) that the robbery described above had occurred, and that certain guns, which they described, had been taken; (2) that an informant known to one of the officers had seen antique handguns on the Canestri premises (four of which were described and noted as fitting the descriptions of four of the stolen guns); (3) that a fellow officer had advised the two affiants that Joseph Canestri had been found to be in possession of stolen property on an earlier occasion that year; (4) that a reliable informant, who had furnished information leading to convictions in the past, had seen three handguns similar to those taken from the Mezzonotte home in the possession of Kenneth Davis; and (5) that Kenneth Davis and Joseph Canestri were known to be friends and associates. On the basis of this affidavit a judge of the Connecticut Circuit Court issued search warrants authorizing the search of both the Canestri and Davis homes.

When the police officers arrived at the Canestri home, they were admitted by Mrs. Canestri, the mother of the defendant and Joseph Canestri. In the course of their search the officers found narcotics paraphernalia in Joseph's room. In the basement the officers encountered a locked room. After breaking into the room they found some seventy guns including the three guns that were seized as contraband and that were the subject of the motion to suppress. ¹ In addition to those three guns, the officers seized one knife and five guns that had been listed by the National Crime Information Computer Center as having been stolen and one other gun that they thought was contraband.

I.

Canestri contends first that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not provide probable cause for a magistrate to believe that the stolen antique guns were at the Canestri home because the affidavit failed to establish the reliability of the first unidentified informant who claimed to have seen the guns there. Canestri places principal reliance on Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), ² where the Supreme Court held that a magistrate cannot properly issue a search warrant based on information given to the police by an unidentified informant unless "the magistrate (is) informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the (guns) were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' " 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1514.

Here there is no problem with the first part of the Aguilar test; the informant stated that he personally saw the four guns at the Canestri home. Canestri claims, however, that the affidavit fails to meet the second part of the Aguilar test because it "completely fails, directly or indirectly, to provide a basis for a finding of reliability" as to the informant. We disagree.

The affidavit states that the informant was known to one of the officers for a period of two years, but the informant is not described as reliable or trustworthy. However, the use or nonuse of the word "reliable" to modify the word "informant" does not alone make an affidavit either sufficient or insufficient. The issue is whether all the information contained in the affidavit is sufficient to allow a magistrate to conclude that the informant's information is reliable. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). See also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). Likewise, the failure to give details about the reliability of information given by the informant to the police in the past is not relevant. The issue is whether the present information is reliable. United States v. Harris, supra, 403 U.S. at 581-82, 91 S.Ct. 2075.

Here we agree with Judge Zampano that the affidavit contained sufficient corroboration of the first informant's statement such that the magistrate could conclude that the informant was reliable. First, the informant described four of the antique guns that he saw at the Canestri home. The descriptions were almost identical with those of four of the guns taken from the Mezzonotte residence. ³ The Supreme Court has recognized that when an informant provides information to the police which matches information that the police have gathered on their own, it is evidence that the informant is reliable. Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. at 417-18, 89 S.Ct. 584, discussing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). See United States v. Cummings, 507 F.2d 324, 329 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827, 95 S.Ct. 46, 42 L.Ed.2d 51 (1974); United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 963, 92 S.Ct. 1171, 31 L.Ed.2d 239 (1972).

Second, in this case the affidavit revealed that the officers had been informed by a fellow officer that Joseph Canestri had been found in possession of stolen property on an earlier occasion in that same year. While an officer's knowledge of the reputation of the object of a search is not alone enough to justify the issuance of a warrant, Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. at 418-19, 89 S.Ct. 584, when the affidavit recites the basis for the reputation reported by the officer, it is a factor that can be taken into account along with others. United States v. Harris, supra, 403 U.S. at 581, 91 S.Ct. 2075, discussing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).

Third, the affidavit revealed that a known associate of Canestri's had also been seen (by the informant who had previously given reliable information to the police and whose reliability was not challenged here) with guns that appeared to match some of those taken from Mezzonotte.

In light of these three factors, we agree with the district court that the affidavit was sufficient to justify the issuance of the search warrant by the Connecticut Circuit judge. In such a situation, the Supreme Court noted in Aguilar, it is appropriate to give "substantial deference to judicial determinations of probable cause." 378 U.S. at 111, 84 S.Ct. at 1512. The affidavit was sufficient to justify the issuance of the search warrant. See United States v. Viggiano, 433 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938, 91 S.Ct. 934, 28 L.Ed.2d 219 (1971). ⁴

II.

On its face the search warrant directed the officers to search the entire Canestri house. In the course of the search the officers learned that a locked storeroom in one end of the basement of the house was used by James Canestri (the defendant, whose brother Joseph was the object of the search). Mrs. Canestri, the mother of James and Joseph, claimed that she did not have a key to the storeroom.

Canestri argues that the police had no right to search the storeroom. He compares his situation to that of a hotel guest or tenant and notes that an innkeeper or landlord could not authorize the search of a guest's or tenant's premises. He goes further and claims that the warrant which described the premises to be searched as the Canestri home somehow did not include the storeroom once Mrs. Canestri told the police that she did not have a key to it and that it was used by "Jimmy." We disagree.

The warrant directed that the entire house be searched. As the district court noted, to exclude the storeroom from the scope of the warrant "on the facts of this case, would be to suggest that the purposes of a search warrant could be frustrated by the mere declaration of the owner of a one-family residence that one of the rooms therein 'belongs' to a party not named in the warrant." 376 F.Supp. at 1153. Such a result would clearly be inappropriate. See United States v. Jordan, 349 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1965); Walker v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 327 F.2d 597, 600 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 1635, 12 L.Ed.2d 500 (1964).

Moreover, as the district court found, a locked storeroom is a natural and logical place to hide stolen guns, and, despite Canestri's assertions to the contrary, there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing which showed that Joseph Canestri did not have access to the storeroom.

The storeroom was part of the premises that the officers were directed to search. Under ...