Montana v. Egelhoff

Decision Date13 June 1996
Docket Number95566
Citation135 L.Ed.2d 361,116 S.Ct. 2013,518 U.S. 37
PartiesMONTANA v. EGELHOFF
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Montana.

No. 95-566.

Argued March 20, 1996

Decided June 13, 1996

Syllabus

On trial for two counts of deliberate homicide-defined by Montana law as "purposely" or "knowingly" causing another's death-respondent claimed that extreme intoxication had rendered him physically incapable of committing the murders and accounted for his inability to recall the events of the night in question. After being instructed, pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. Section(s) 45-2-203, that respondent's "intoxicated condition'' could not be considered ``in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense," the jury found respondent guilty. In reversing, the Supreme Court of Montana reasoned that respondent had a right, under the Due Process Clause, to present and have the jury consider ``all relevant evidence'' to rebut the State's evidence on all elements of the offense charged, and that evidence of his voluntary intoxication was ``clearly relevant'' to the issue whether he acted knowingly and purposely. Because Section(s) 45-2-203 prevented the jury from considering that evidence, the court concluded that the State had been relieved of part of its burden of proof and that respondent had therefore been denied due process.

Held: The judgment is reversed.

272 Mont. 114, 900 P. 2d 260, reversed.

Justice Scalia, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, concluded that Section(s) 45-2-203 does not violate the Due Process Clause. Pp. 3-19.

(a) The State Supreme Court's proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to introduce all relevant evidence is indefensible. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 410; Fed. Rule Evid. 403; Fed. Rule Evid. 802. The Clause does place limits upon restriction of the right to introduce evidence, but only where the restriction ``offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'' See Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201-202. Respondent has failed to meet the heavy burden of establishing that a defendant's right to have a jury consider voluntary intoxication evidence in determining whether he possesses the requisite mental state is a "fundamental principle of justice." The primary guide in making such a determination, historical practice, gives respondent little support. It was firmly established at common law that a defendant's voluntary intoxication provided neither an ``excuse'' nor a ``justification'' for his crimes; the common law's stern rejection of inebriation as a defense must be understood as also precluding a defendant from arguing that, because of his intoxication, he could not have possessed the mens rea necessary to commit the crime. The justifications for this common-law rule persist to this day, and have only been strengthened by modern research. Although a rule allowing a jury to consider evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication where relevant to mens rea has gained considerable acceptance since the 19th century, it is of too recent vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent allegiance to qualify as fundamental, especially since it displaces a lengthy common-law tradition which remains supported by valid justifications. Pp. 3-13.

(b) None of this Court's cases on which the Supreme Court of Montana's conclusion purportedly rested undermines the principle that a State can limit the introduction of relevant evidence for a ``valid'' reason, as Montana has. The Due Process Clause does not bar States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 89, n. 5. Pp. 14-19.

Justice Ginsburg concluded that Section(s) 45-2-203 should not be categorized as simply an evidentiary rule. Rather, Section(s) 45-2-203 embodies a legislative judgment regarding the circumstances under which individuals may be held criminally responsible for their actions. The provision judges equally culpable a person who commits an act stone sober, and one who engages in the same conduct after voluntary intoxication has reduced the actor's capacity for self-control. Comprehended as a measure redefining mens rea, Section(s) 45-2-203 encounters no constitutional shoal. States have broad authority to define the elements of criminal offenses in light of evolving perceptions of the extent to which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime. Defining mens rea to eliminate the exculpatory value of voluntary intoxication does not offend a fundamental principle of justice, given the lengthy common-law tradition, and the adherence of a significant minority of the States to that position today. Pp. 1-5.

Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join.

We consider in this case whether the Due Process Clause is violated by Montana Code Annotated Section(s) 45-2-203, which provides, in relevant part, that voluntary intoxication "may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of [a criminal] offense."

I.

In July 1992, while camping out in the Yaak region of northwestern Montana to pick mushrooms, respondent made friends with Roberta Pavola and John Christenson, who were doing the same. On Sunday, July 12, the three sold the mushrooms they had collected and spent the rest of the day and evening drinking, in bars and at a private party in Troy, Montana. Some time after 9 p.m., they left the party in Christenson's 1974 Ford Galaxy station wagon. The drinking binge apparently continued, as respondent was seen buying beer at 9:20 p.m. and recalled "sitting on a hill or a bank passing a bottle of Black Velvet back and forth" with Christenson. 272 Mont. 114, 118, 900 P. 2d 260, 262 (1995).

At about midnight that night, officers of the Lincoln County, Montana, sheriff's department, responding to reports of a possible drunk driver, discovered Christenson's station wagon stuck in a ditch along U. S. Highway 2. In the front seat were Pavola and Christenson, each dead from a single gunshot to the head. In the rear of the car lay respondent, alive and yelling obscenities. His blood-alcohol content measured .36 percent over one hour later. On the floor of the car, near the brake pedal, lay respondent's .38 caliber handgun, with four loaded rounds and two empty casings; respondent had gunshot residue on his hands.

Respondent was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide, a crime defined by Montana law as "purposely" or "knowingly" causing the death of another human being. Mont. Code Ann. Section(s) 45-5-102 (1995). A portion of the jury charge, uncontested here, instructed that "[a] person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result," and that "[a] person acts knowingly when he is aware of his conduct or when he is aware under the circumstances his conduct constitutes a crime; or, when he is aware there exists the high probability that his conduct will cause a specific result." App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a. Respondent's defense at trial was that an unidentified fourth person must have committed the murders; his own extreme intoxication, he claimed, had rendered him physically incapable of committing the murders, and accounted for his inability to recall the events of the night of July 12. Although respondent was allowed to make this use of the evidence that he was intoxicated, the jury was instructed, pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. Section(s) 45-2-203 (1995), that it could not consider respondent's "intoxicated condition . . . in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense." App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. The jury found respondent guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced him to 84 years' imprisonment.

The Supreme Court of Montana reversed. It reasoned (1) that respondent "had a due process right to present and have considered by the jury all relevant evidence to rebut the State's evidence on all elements of the offense charged," 272 Mont., at 125, 900 P. 2d, at 266, and (2) that evidence of respondent's voluntary intoxication was "clear[ly] . . . relevant to the issue of whether [respondent] acted knowingly and purposely," id., at 122, 900 P. 2d, at 265. Because Section(s) 45-2-203 prevented the jury from considering that evidence with regard to that issue, the court concluded that the State had been "relieved of part of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged," id., at 124, 900 P. 2d, at 266, and that respondent had therefore been denied due process. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. ___ (1995).

II.

The cornerstone of the Montana Supreme Court's judgment was the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to present and have considered by the jury "all relevant evidence to rebut the State's evidence on all elements of the...

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