Weathers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
| Citation | 52 F.3d 329 |
| Decision Date | 20 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-3158,94-3158 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Cornelius WEATHERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Before WOOD, FLAUM and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
On May 6, 1993, Cornelius Weathers filed suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, alleging that Bethlehem Steel Corporation ("Bethlehem") failed to employ him as a combustion craft technician on account of his race and that Bethlehem retaliated against him for filing a civil rights complaint with his union. Bethlehem moved for summary judgment; the district court granted the motion and the case was dismissed. Mr. Weathers appeals and we affirm.
Pursuant to the district court's Local Rule 56.1, Bethlehem filed a "Statement of Material Facts" in support of its motion for summary judgment. Rather than file a "Statement of Genuine Issues" to controvert Bethlehem's factual assertions, as required by Local Rule 56.1, Mr. Weathers instead filed an unsupported "Motion to Deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." After the district court struck this motion, Mr. Weathers sought, and was granted, three extensions of time to file a proper response to Bethlehem's summary judgment motion. The deadline established by the third extension was May 31, 1994. This date passed without Mr. Weathers filing a response. On June 2, 1994, Mr. Weathers moved for a fourth extension of time. The district court denied this motion, and Mr. Weathers filed two additional, unsuccessful motions for extensions of time. On June 22, 1994, the district court ruled that Mr. Weathers's dilatory conduct compelled it to find that he had waived the right to respond to Bethlehem's summary judgment motion. Therefore, per Local Rule 56.1, the district court assumed that the facts set forth in Bethlehem's Statement of Material Facts existed without controversy, to the extent that they were supported by the record. 1 Thereafter, on June 28, 1994, Mr. Weathers finally filed his response. Citing its June 22, 1994 Order, the district court struck the response. Then, acting on the basis of the undisputed facts set forth by Bethlehem, the district court granted Bethlehem's motion for summary judgment.
The relevant facts giving rise to this litigation, as set forth in Bethlehem's motion for summary judgment and supported by the record, are as follows. In March 1989, Mr. Weathers, an African American, submitted an application for employment at Bethlehem as a combustion craft technician. At this time, Mr. Weathers understood that he would have to receive a passing score on a qualifying exam before he was eligible for the position. Mr. Weathers took and failed the qualifying exam twice before finally passing it on July 24, 1989. Pursuant to Bethlehem's application policy, applications remain active for only six months from the date that the application is initially submitted, regardless of when the applicant passes the qualifying exam. After six months, the application becomes inactive and the applicant must submit a new application at a time when Bethlehem is seeking applicants in order to be considered for future openings. Passing test scores, however, are valid indefinitely and an applicant is not required to retake the qualifying exam unless Bethlehem implements a new examination.
On July 19 and 20, 1989, Bethlehem made offers of employment to two white applicants, Messrs. Pfauth and Powers. These individuals had already passed the qualifying exam by this date and were thus eligible for immediate employment. As Mr. Weathers did not pass the exam until July 24, 1989, he was ineligible for employment at this time. Unfortunately for Mr. Weathers, these two hires satisfied Bethlehem's combustion craft technician requirements for the balance of the period during which his application remained active--until mid-September 1989. The applications of at least five white individuals expired in this same manner during this general time frame.
In August 1990, nearly a year after Mr. Weathers's application had expired, Bethlehem hired another white individual, Mr. McIntosh, as a combustion craft technician. Mr. McIntosh had previously been employed at Bethlehem and had already passed a qualifying exam. Since the time of Mr. McIntosh's employment, however, Bethlehem had revised the qualifying exam. Mr. McIntosh was thus required to take and pass the new exam before he was eligible for the 1990 position. Then, on April 1, 1991, Bethlehem again implemented a new qualifying exam for the combustion craft technician position. Everyone seeking a combustion craft technician position from this date forward was required to take the new exam, regardless of whether they had passed an older version of the exam, unless they were already employed by Bethlehem in that position.
Mr. Weathers later applied for a position as a general laborer at Bethlehem and he was hired in that regard in October 1991. Thereafter, in early 1992, Bethlehem posted a vacancy for a combustion craft technician position. Mr. Weathers filed a new application for the position and learned at that time that he had to take the new qualifying exam. Mr. Weathers then took and failed the new exam in February 1992. Mr. Weathers did not attempt to retake the exam after that date.
In August 1992, Mr. Weathers submitted a civil rights complaint with his union. Then, on October 20, 1992, Mr. Weathers filed a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC. Three months later, Mr. Weathers attempted to amend this charge to add a claim for retaliation. On May 6, 1993, after he had learned that the EEOC would not pursue his claim, Mr. Weathers filed this suit in the district court.
On appeal, Mr. Weathers primarily raises the following contentions: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant his last three requests for extensions of time and also when it subsequently refused to consider his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) the district court erroneously granted Bethlehem's motion for summary judgment. Bethlehem, on the other hand, argues that Mr. Weathers's appeal is frivolous and that it should accordingly be awarded the costs and attorneys fees it incurred in the defense of this appeal.
We will uphold a district court's strict enforcement of its local rules, and reverse only where it is evident that the district court has abused its discretion. Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 567-68 (7th Cir.1992) (). We review a grant of summary judgment by considering all factual issues in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (herein Mr. Weathers) and determining de novo whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact requiring submission of the case to the finder of fact or whether judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir.1992). Moreover, "[t]his standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues." Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir.1993) (citations omitted).
Mr. Weathers argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his fourth, fifth, and sixth motions for extensions of time and by subsequently refusing to consider his response to Bethlehem's summary judgment motion. Our review of this matter convinces us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in regard to any of these decisions.
After the district court had granted Mr. Weathers's third motion for an extension of time, a response to Bethlehem's summary judgment motion was due on May 31, 1994. Mr. Weathers missed that deadline and, instead, filed a fourth motion for an extension of time on June 2, 1994--requesting an additional five days. This motion was not granted, and the five days came and went. Then, on June 10, 1994, Mr. Weathers requested another extension--to and including June 10, 1994. The motion was not granted, and the remainder of June 10 passed without any further word from Mr. Weathers. Finally, on June 16, 1994, Mr. Weathers moved for his sixth and last extension of time--to and including June 21, 1994. This motion was not granted, and June 21 likewise passed without a response from Mr. Weathers. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Mr. Weathers's last three motions for extensions of time. The district court had already granted three extensions and, furthermore, every one of these last three motions was filed later than the filing date requested in each preceding motion.
On June 28, 1994, Mr. Weathers did finally file a response to Bethlehem's motion for summary judgment. A week beforehand, however, the district court had announced in an order that it would no longer consider any response filed by Mr. Weathers in light of his "extraordinarily dilatory conduct." The district court, in an order dated August 18, 1994, accordingly decided Bethlehem's motion for summary judgment without reference to Mr. Weathers's response. We note that Local Rule 7.1(a) clearly states that the "[f]ailure to file an answer brief or reply brief within the time prescribed may subject the motion to summary ruling." Moreover, Local Rule 56.1 states that, in the context of deciding a summary judgment motion, "the court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist...
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