Campbell v. Clinton

Decision Date08 June 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 99-1072 PLF.,Civ.A. 99-1072 PLF.
PartiesTom CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William Jefferson CLINTON, President of the United States, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Jules Lobel, Michael Ratner, Franklin Siegel, William Goodman, Jennifer Green, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City, James Robert Klimaski, Klimaski & Smith, Washington, DC, H. Lee Halterman, Oakland, CA, Joel E. Starr, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.

Andrea Gail Cohen, U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Federal Programs Branch, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

Since March 24, 1999, the United States has been participating in an air offensive launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Plaintiffs, twenty-six members of the United States House of Representatives, seek a declaration that the President has violated the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541, et seq., by involving the United States in the air offensive without congressional authorization. The defendant is the President of the United States, who has filed a motion to dismiss this action. Upon full consideration of the defendant's motion, plaintiffs' opposition, the defendant's reply and the arguments presented by counsel at the hearing held on June 3, 1999, and for the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs do not have standing to raise these claims. The motion to dismiss therefore will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework

The War Powers Clause of the United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to "declare War...." U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Congress' power to declare war works in conjunction with the authority granted to the President under the Constitution to act as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." U.S. Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution does not further delineate the precise scope of the powers granted to the executive and legislative branches, but clearly the Framers intended to give each of the two branches a role in the conduct of foreign affairs. Essentially, Congress would declare war and raise and financially maintain armies, while the President would conduct wars.

In 1973, over President Richard Nixon's veto, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541, et. seq., in order to "fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a). The purpose of the resolution was to ensure that the "constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).

The War Powers Resolution provides, inter alia, that "[i]n the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the President shall submit within 48 hours" to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a written report setting forth the circumstances necessitating the introduction of forces, the constitutional and legislative authority to introduce the forces and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a). The President also is required to submit periodic reports, at least every six months, for as long as the forces remain engaged in hostilities. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c).

Within sixty calendar days after the President either submits a report pursuant to Section 1543(a) or is required to have submitted a report, the President must terminate the use of the United States Armed Forces described in Section 1543 unless Congress (1) has declared war or has provided specific authorization for the use of such forces, (2) has extended by law the sixty-day time period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). The President may extend the sixty day period an additional thirty days if he determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that the continued use of forces for the additional time is necessary to safely remove the United States Armed Forces. Id. The War Powers Resolution also sets forth a mechanism so that both houses of Congress are required to give priority consideration to any resolution or bill that would provide the President with the authorization described above. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545, 1546, 1546a.

Finally, the War Powers Resolution explicitly provides that authority to introduce forces into hostilities shall not be inferred "from any provision of law ... including any provision contained in any appropriations Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of [the War Powers Resolution]," or "from any treaty ... unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of [the War Powers Resolution]." 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (emphasis added).

B. Conflict with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Kosovo, a region of Serbia, historically has been inhabited both by ethnic Albanians and by ethnic Serbs. See Def's Motion to Hold in Abeyance, Att. A (Declaration of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas R. Pickering) at ¶ 3. The region gained a considerable degree of autonomy through the 1970's, and by the late 1980's ethnic Albanians constituted an "overwhelming majority of the population in Kosovo." Id. at ¶ 4. When Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia in the late 1980's, he abolished the autonomous status of the province, and Kosovo's ethnic Albanians began taking various non-violent measures to resist Milosevic and the authoritarian rule of Serbia. Id. at ¶ 5. In early 1998, Serbia launched a crackdown in Kosovo, killing dozens of ethnic Albanians and causing thousands to flee the Kosovo region. Id. at ¶ 8.

Throughout 1998 and into the beginning of 1999, the United States in partnership with NATO member countries and other allies sought a diplomatic resolution to the conflict between the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Milosevic's government, and it imposed various economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an effort to force a resolution. See Pickering Declaration at ¶¶ 11-14. After the massacre of forty-five ethnic Albanian civilians in January 1999, diplomatic efforts intensified, and the Kosovo Albanians and representatives of the Serbian government participated in peace negotiations in Rambouillet, France in February 1999. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15. On March 15, 1999, the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the interim agreement that had been proposed in Rambouillet, but three days later negotiations were suspended because the Serbian delegation refused to accept the interim agreement. Id. at ¶ 17. By March 19, 1999, the tempo of the repressive offensive by Milosevic's armed units had intensified. Id. at ¶ 18. Milosevic's forces drove thousands of ethnic Albanians from their homes and villages, summarily executed some, displaced others and burned many of their villages. Id.

On March 21, 1999, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke made a final diplomatic effort to persuade the Milosevic government to accept the interim agreement, but he failed in that mission and departed Belgrade on March 23, 1999, without having achieved any progress towards a diplomatic resolution. Pickering Declaration at ¶ 19. That day, March 23, 1999, the Senate passed by a vote of 58 to 41 a concurrent resolution authorizing the President to "conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)." S.Con.Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).

The next day, March 24, 1999, United States Armed Forces in coalition with NATO allies began a series of air strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 8; Pickering Declaration at ¶ 19. That same day, by a vote of 424 to 1, the House of Representatives passed a resolution stating that it "supports the members of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and recognizes their professionalism, dedication, patriotism, and courage." H.R.Res. 130, 106th Cong. (1999).

Two days later, President Clinton sent identical letters to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and...

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