Washington v. State

• Citation: 52 S.E. 910,124 Ga. 423
• Parties: WASHINGTON v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 21 December 1905
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

52 S.E. 910

124 Ga. 423

WASHINGTON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 21, 1905

Syllabus by the Court.

The ruling made in Keller v. State, 31 S.E. 92, 102 Ga 506, that the woman seduced is not an accomplice in the crime of her own seduction, within the meaning of the word "accomplice" as used in section 991 of the Penal Code of 1895, is, upon a review of that case approved and adhered to.

Where upon the trial of a criminal case, the court fully and correctly instructed the jury as to the presumption of the innocence of the accused, the burden upon the state to prove his guilt to the moral and reasonable satisfaction of the jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, and as to the meaning of a reasonable doubt, there was no error in charging the jury that, if the state had shown to their "satisfaction" the facts necessary to constitute the offense charged in the indictment, they should find the accused guilty, without informing them, in this immediate connection, "what should constitute satisfaction, or what amount of proof would create a state of mind and conscience covered by the word 'satisfaction,' or to what extent the evidence should go to bring the mind of the jury to the state of satisfaction."

Upon the trial of one charged with the crime of seduction, the test by which to determine whether the woman was virtuous at the time of her alleged seduction is physical, not moral chastity.

The charge of the court did not fail to differentiate the offense of fornication from the offense of seduction, and, if more specific instructions as to the nature of the lesser offense were desired by the accused, he should have made a timely and appropriate request for the same. The charge did not, in effect, instruct the jury that, if they were satisfied that the accused was guilty of the offense of fornication, they should find him guilty of seduction.

The charge of the court, that the jury should arrive at their verdict "solely from the evidence and the law and by nothing else," considered in the connection in which it was given, was not erroneous.

The fact that the instructions of the court in reference to the prisoner's statement were given at the conclusion, instead of elsewhere in the charge, is not ground for an exception.

Before a written statement by a witness, contradictory of his testimony in the case, can be proved against him, it must, if in existence, be shown to him, or read in his hearing, unless it be a written statement made under oath in connection with some judicial proceeding.

There was no error in allowing the woman alleged to have been seduced to testify that her love for the accused caused her to yield to the sexual intercourse.

The defendant's signture to pleas in abatement which had been filed in the case by him, and which had been passed upon and disposed of by the court, could not, by mere reason of the filing of such pleas, be shown to the jury by his counsel as standards of the genuine handwriting of the accused, with which to compare the handwriting and signature of a letter introduced in evidence by the state as having been written by the accused, for the purpose of determining, by such comparison, whether he really wrote or signed such a letter.

The fact that the woman alleged to have been seduced sat in the presence of the jury and wept during the argument of counsel for the state is not cause for a new trial, when no objection was made to this at the time it occurred, and the court was not requested to take any action whatever in reference to the matter.

Evidence as to the good character of the accused, offered after verdict to support a motion for a new trial, is not cause for granting such motion.

Affidavits introduced upon the hearing of a motion for a new trial, purporting to contain newly discovered evidence which is nowhere referred to in such motion, cannot be considered by the court.

There is no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a new trial because of alleged newly discovered evidence, introduced upon the hearing of the motion, when such evidence is merely cumulative of evidence introduced upon the trial of the case, or impeaching in its nature, and all of it is contradicted by affidavits introduced by the opposite party.

A letter received by the accused since the trial, purporting to have been written to him by the woman alleged to have been seduced, in which it was stated that he was not guilty of having seduced her, but another named person was, even if proved to have been written by her, would afford no cause for granting a new trial.

The evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict, and there was no error in refusing to grant a new trial.

Error from Superior Court, Butts County; E. J. Reagan, Judge.

Jeffie Washington was convicted of seduction, and brings error. Affirmed.

See 50 S.E. 920.

T. J. Dempsey and R. L. Berner, for plaintiff in error.

O. H. B. Bloodworth, Sol. Gen., for the State.

FISH C.J.

Jeffie Washington was convicted of the crime of seduction, and brought the case here for review by excepting to the overruling of his motion for a new trial.

1. "The victim of a seduction is not an 'accomplice' to the offense committed, in the sense in which the word just quoted is used in section 991 of the Penal Code of 1895, requiring the testimony of at least two witnesses to convict of a felony, or corroborating circumstances, 'where the only witness is an accomplice." This ruling was made by a full bench in Keller v. State, 102 Ga. 506, 31 S.E. 92. In the present case leave was granted to review that decision, but upon a careful re-examination of the question we are thoroughly satisfied of the correctness of the ruling then made, and now adhere to the same. In addition to what was said on the subject in the Keller Case, it is very clear to our minds that, when the crime of seduction is committed, the woman who is seduced and induced to yield to the lustful embraces of the man, by his persuasions and promises of marriage or other false and fraudulent means employed by him, is not an accomplice to the crime, but obviously a victim of the seducer. We do not see how she can be an accomplice in a crime the very gist of which consists in persuasions and promises, or other false and fraudulent means, directed against herself. Can she plot and plan, persuade and promise, for the purpose of overcoming her own will and accomplishing her own ruin? Can she employ false and fraudulent means upon herself? Clearly, as to the crime of seduction, she cannot be an accomplice. The statutes of some of the states in reference to the crime of seduction contain a provision that a person cannot be convicted of this offense upon the uncorroborated testimony of the woman who is claimed to have been seduced. 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. 243. The authority cited by the plaintiff in error, to the effect that the testimony of the woman alleged to have been seduced must be corroborated, is the decision of a court in a state where the statute so requires. There is no such statute in this state.

2. The court instructed the jury as follows: "The state is not confined to the day named in the indictment, necessarily; but if the state has shown to your satisfaction that he seduced her, that she was a virtuous unmarried female, and that it was in this county within four years prior to the finding of the indictment, and that he seduced her by persuasions and promises of marriage to yield to his lustful embraces and let him have carnal knowledge of her--if the state has shown this to your satisfaction, you should find him guilty of seduction." The error assigned upon this instruction is that it did not inform the jury "what should constitute satisfaction, or what amount of proof would create a state of mind and conscience covered by the word 'satisfaction,' or to what extent the evidence should go to bring the mind of the jury to the state of satisfaction." There is no merit in this exception. It appears from the charge of the court in the record that the jury were fully and correctly instructed as to the presumption of the innocence of the accused, the burden upon the state to prove his guilt to the moral and reasonable satisfaction of the jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, and as to the meaning of a reasonable doubt. In view of these instructions, the jury evidently must have understood the court's use of the words "to your satisfaction" to mean to their satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. The court having fully instructed the jury as to the degree of conviction of the guilt of the accused which the evidence must produce in their minds before they would be authorized to convict him, the jury were obliged to understand, when the court charged them that certain things must be shown to their satisfaction before they could convict, that the proof in reference thereto must produce this requisite degree of mental conviction before a verdict of guilty could be rendered.

3. The court instructed the jury that it was a question for them to determine, from the evidence submitted, whether the woman alleged to have been seduced was virtuous at the time of the alleged seduction; "that is, had she at that time had sexual intercourse with another man? If she had, she was not a virtuous woman; if she had not, she was a virtuous woman." This charge was excepted to on the ground that it confined the jury to a consideration of her physical chastity, and eliminated all consideration by the jury of any fact or circumstance tending to show her want of moral chastity. This exception was not well taken. The court, in this instruction, was giving to the jury the legal meaning of the expression "a virtuous *** female," as applied to a woman who had never married, in reference to the crime of...