52 S.W. 723 (Mo. 1899), Kansas City v. Stegmiller
| Citation | 52 S.W. 723, 151 Mo. 189 |
| Opinion Judge | GANTT, C. J. |
| Party Name | Kansas City v. Stegmiller et al., Appellants |
| Attorney | Teasdale, Ingraham & Cowherd for appellants. R. B. Middlebrook for respondent. Clarence S. Palmer also for respondent. |
| Judge Panel | GANTT, C. J. Sherwood, J., absent. |
| Case Date | June 30, 1899 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Page 723
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. Edward P. Gates, Judge.
Affirmed.
(1) We do not deny that Kansas City can amend its charter in certain respects, nor that the extension of limits is an amendment, but we do deny that this particular kind of amendment (extension of limits) is authorized by the Constitution. 15 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (1 Ed.), 1010. (2) The extension of the limits of Kansas City (in question) can be justified from a constitutional standpoint only on two grounds: First, that the Constitution authorized such action as an amendment to the charter of said city. Second, that it was accomplished under a valid and constitutional act of the legislature (sec. 1880, R. S. 1889) as amended by the legislature (Acts of 1895, p. 54.) It can not be sustained as a charter amendment because: (a) It regulates the manner of submitting the question to the town of Westport, a city of the fourth class. (b) It also undertakes to regulate the election and other acts of said city. (c) It attempts to dissolve the legal existence of said city. (d) It results in the assumption of the debts and liabilities of said city. These matters could only be accomplished by the State acting in its sovereign capacity, through the legislature. In re Extension of Denver, 18 Colo. 288. And the extension can not be justified by section 1880 of the Revised Statutes as amended, as said act is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (a) It makes a distinction between cities of a certain population having charters, and those not having charters, although in the same class. Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466. (b) It would add another class to those already existing. Ward v. Boyd Paving Co., 79 F. 391; Bank v. Cheney, 94 Ill. 430. (c) It is an attempted amendment of the charter of a city on a local subject, and obnoxious, therefore, to section 53, article IV, of the Constitution. State ex rel. v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642. (d) It applies to and operates only on charter cities, and charter cities existing at the time of the passage of the act. State ex rel. v. Co. Court, 89 Mo. 237; Dunn v. Street Ry., 131 Mo. 5; Daugherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601; Denver v. Spokane Falls, 34 P. 936; Safe Deposit v. Frische, 152 Pa. St. 231. (e) As originally enacted, it was held unconstitutional (Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141). The only purpose of the original act was to permit an extension of the limits, by ordinance, without a vote of the people. All other portions of the act were dependent and incidental, and consequently fell with the main purpose. There was left nothing to amend. Sutherland on Stat. Const. 174; Jones v. Jones, 104 N.Y. 234; Brooks v. Hydorn, 76 Mich. 273; Kelly v. Beemis, 64 Am. Dec. 51; Copeland v St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 417; Va. Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 304; Darby v. Wilmington, 76 N.C. 133; Fant v. Gibbs, 54 Miss. 396; Warren v. Mayor, 2 Gray 84; Com. v. Hitchings, 5 Gray 482; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 320; State ex rel. v. Commissioners, 5 Oh. St. 497; Rood v. McCarger, 49 Cal. 117; State v. Stark, 18 Fla. 255; Sparhawk v. Stark, 115 Mass. 315; McClosky v. State, 23 S.W. 518. (3) The extension was void for the reason that territory was thereby annexed to Kansas City within four months next preceding the general city election held in Kansas City. Sec. 1885, R. S. 1889; sec. 9, art. I, K. C. Charter; sec. 16; art. IX, Constitution; 1 Black, Com. 45; 1 Kent, Com. 458; Sutherland on Stat. Const., sec. 104. (4) The extension was void because there was no valid registration of voters preceding the required election held in the two cities. Sec. 5, art. VIII., Constitution; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 72; Laws of 1895, Extra Session, p. 26; Laws of 1897, p. 111; Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Oh. 548; Owensboro v. Hickman, 90 Ky. 629; Stevens v. Mayor, 84 Ga. 630; Mills v. Greene, 67 F. 818; Zella v. Chapman, 54 Mo. 502; State ex rel. v. Albin, 44 Mo. 346; State ex rel. v. Frazier, 98 Mo. 426. (5) The extension was void because the proposition submitted to Westport, and upon which the voters acted, was to be included within the limits of Kansas City. Kansas City at the time of the proposed extension enlarged the proposed limits, and thereby altered the proposition as submitted to the people of Westport. Paines' Law of Election, sec. 247; Cushing v. Bedford, 125 Mass. 526; St. Louis v. Epperson, 97 Mo. 300. (6) The extension was void because it was unreasonable, in this, that it added thirteen and one-tenth square miles of territory, some of which was vacant property. Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 544; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. 224; Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 8; Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 421; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 401; State v. Dimond, 44 Neb. 154; Vestal v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321; City v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491.
(1) No registration was necessary in Kansas City, Missouri for the special election. Session Acts 1897, p. 111. (2) Said enabling act of 1887, found now in acts of 1895, page 55, is not unconstitutional, because the grant of power having been given by the Constitution to large cities of the character of Kansas City to amend their charters, such legislation as the General Assembly may think necessary or proper to carry into effect this constitutional grant, with reference to these cities, is neither local nor special, as legislation which is necessary or proper to carry into effect a provision of the Constitution, or which results directly or indirectly from a specific constitutional grant of power, is not local or special. State v. Shields, 4 Mo.App. 250; State ex rel. v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645; State ex rel. v. Yancey, 123 Mo. 391; Kenefick v. St. Louis, 127 Mo. 1; Spaulding v. Brady, 128 Mo. 653; Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 147. See also State ex rel. Maggard v. Pond, 93 Mo. 631; Phillips v. Railroad, 86 Mo. 540; Dunne v. Street Ry., 131 Mo. 1; Humes v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 231. (3) Municipal ordinances are subject to review by judicial tribunals as to their reasonableness or unreasonableness, but nowhere is the doctrine announced, that the voice of the people, acting by authority of constitutional privilege and authority in making statutes by the initiative process, that is, by a direct vote, is subject to be passed upon before judicial tribunals for reasonableness or unreasonableness. Sutherland on Stat. Const., sec. 238. (4) No testimony appearing in the record that any voters were disfranchised or denied the opportunity of registering, and there being no question of the good faith and fairness of the election and no fraud claimed or charged, the court will not declare the election illegal for failure to register simply to illustrate a theory, no practical evil having resulted, and the proposition being to all intents and purposes simply a moot case. Weil v. Calhoun, 25 F. 871.
(1) Kansas City is given power to amend its charter (sec. 16, art. IX. of the Constitution). The extension of the city limits is an amendment of the city charter. Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141. The reason for giving St. Louis special authority to extend her limits (sec. 20, art. IX, Constitution) is apparent. The Constitution not only provided that St. Louis might make its own charter, but that it should have an exceptional organization, including county government, and making the city the agent of the State to collect and transmit its revenues. In addition to that it was the intention of the Constitution that St. Louis should at once proceed to organize as provided by the Constitution. Full authority to accomplish all that was desired was therefore given in the Constitution, instead of waiting two years until the next legislature should have met. (2) Our idea is that the extension of the limits of Kansas City depends for its validity upon both the Constitution and the statute. So far as the action of Kansas City alone is concerned the authority of the Constitution is all-sufficient. The Constitution, section 16, article IX, provides that the charter may be amended in the exact manner in which it was amended in this case, and this court having held, in Westport v. Kansas City, supra, that an extension of the limits is an amendment of the charter, disposes of that phase of the case. It is probably necessary, however, in order that Kansas City may extend its jurisdiction to territory without its limits that it should have the authority of the legislature, and our contention is that such authority is amply given by section 1880 of the Revised Statutes of 1889, as amended in 1895. A distinction must be made between this statute and a statute which attempts to change the powers of a city within territory included in its jurisdiction. This is an enabling statute, providing the machinery by which the constitutional mandate may be carried out. This law was first enacted in 1887 (Laws of 1887, p. 42) and this law was sustained in Kansas City v. Field, 99 Mo. 352; Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Company, 140 Mo. 458. It is perfectly proper in an enabling act to follow the classification of the Constitution. And to hold that such a classification is not proper as a basis of legislation is, in effect, to construe the constitution as providing methods for setting aside its own commands. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 73. The purpose of the enabling act is simply to provide the machinery necessary to give effect to sections 16 and 17, art. IX, of the Constitution. (3) No time for the taking effect of the amendment to the charter is expressly stated in the Constitution. The amendment of the charter is of the same effect as a statute, and the general rule is that when no time is provided the statute...
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