Sanders v. State

• Citation: 167 Ala. 85,52 So. 417
• Parties: SANDERS v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 19 April 1910
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

52 So. 417

167 Ala. 85

SANDERS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 19, 1910

Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; S. H. Sprott, Judge.

Frank Sanders was convicted of crime, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Harwood & McKinley, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MAYFIELD J.

The defendant was indicted of larceny, and of receiving stolen goods. The property alleged to be stolen, and received as such, consisted of 16 pairs of pants and 3 pairs of shoes the property of G. A. Horton.

The corpus delicti was not proven, and for this reason the accused should have been acquitted.

The alleged owner of the property testified on his direct examination as follows: "That he knew the defendant. That in January, 1909, before the finding of the indictment, he recovered from the defendant 16 pairs of pants and 3 pairs of shoes. That he (the witness) had never sold any goods like these to the defendant. That the pants were worth from $1 to $2.50 wholesale, and some of them $3, a pair. That the shoes were worth $5 a pair. That these shoes and pants came out of the witness' store at Pleasant Ridge, and, so far as the witness knew, they were obtained from said store without the witness' knowledge or consent. That witness' store is located in Greene county, Ala. That some of said goods had defendant's cost mark on them." This was all of his testimony on direct examination. On his cross-examination he testified to no other fact tending to prove the corpus delicti; but, among other things, testified: That for a number of years prior to the indictment, and at that time, he was engaged in the mercantile business at Pleasant Ridge, Greene county, Ala that during this time there were eight persons besides himself who were authorized to sell goods from his store, and that they did sell same; that he could not swear that the goods in question were not sold out of his store in the due course of trade; that witness was absent from his store a great deal of the time; "that witness had quite a large stock of pants in his store, and quite a large stock of shoes also; that he could not swear that he missed these goods, or any of them, out of his stock, and does not know when they went out of his store; that it was not customary for the cost mark to be removed from goods when they were sold; that witness did not sell these pants and shoes himself, but could not swear that said 16 pairs of pants and three pairs of shoes, or any of them, were stolen; that he could not swear that said shoes were not sold from witness' stock in the regular course of business." This was all the evidence that, in the slightest, tended to prove the corpus delicti.

The goods in question were found in the house of the defendant and when questioned as to where he got them--the parties questioning him at the time threatening to tie him--he ran away from his house, but did not leave the neighborhood; and subsequently he removed the goods in question to a neighbor's house, but, further than this, made no attempt to conceal them.

All the evidence offered as to the defendant's possession of the goods would have been proper and admissible if the corpus delicti had been proven, or any sufficient evidence offered which would authorize the jury to infer that the goods had been stolen by defendant, or by any other person; but, in the absence of such proof, it was all, of course, inadmissible.

It is but a truism to say that there can be no receiving of stolen property, unless the property in question is first stolen. It is likewise true that, in order for the possession of property to be evidence of a crime, the crime must be proven. In the recent case of Smith v. State, 133 Ala. 150 31 So. 807 (91 Am. St. Rep. 21), this court reviewed some of our former cases on this subject, and spoke as follows: "It must now be regarded as settled in this state that the unexplained possession of property recently stolen does not as matter of law raise a presumption of guilt from the circumstance. Nor does the unexplained possession by one person of goods belonging to another raise the presumption that a larceny has been committed and that the possessor is a thief. Additional evidence is necessary to establish a corpus delicti. Unless the jury are satisfied beyond a...