U.S. v. Geelan
Citation | 520 F.2d 585 |
Decision Date | 25 July 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 74-2822,74-2822 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Albert GEELAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
David M. Rothman (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Steven D. Rathfon, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DUNIWAY and ELY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, * District Judge.
Henry Geelan appeals from the District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.
On March 26, 1968, the Bank of America in Cucamonga, California, was robbed. On the next day, Geelan was arrested near Wittman, Arizona, by deputies of the Mohave County Sheriff's Office. They arrested him on an Arizona warrant charging him with robbery in Phoenix on March 15, 1968.
On April 1, 1968, a federal detainer was placed against Geelan, and on May 1, 1968, the federal grand jury for the Central District of California indicted Geelan and Harold Hemphill for the March 26th robbery in Cucamonga. 1
On September 19, 1968, the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, declared Geelan incompetent to stand trial on the state robbery charge and committed him to the Arizona State Hospital. After more than four and three-fourths years, Geelan was apparently found competent by hospital authorities because on July 18, 1973, he was released from the hospital to the custody of the Sheriff of Maricopa County.
On April 17, 1974, the state robbery charge was dismissed and Geelan was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal in Phoenix. He was later brought to Los Angeles.
On May 28, 1974, Geelan was arraigned in United States District Court in Los Angeles on the federal bank robbery charge; he pleaded not guilty. The Court appointed a psychiatrist to examine Geelan.
On June 24, 1974, on the basis of the psychiatrist's report, the Court and all counsel agreed that Geelan was not competent to stand trial. The Court denied Geelan's motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial, but authorized this interlocutory appeal from that denial. The Court then committed Geelan to the federal hospital in Springfield, Missouri, and ordered a report on his condition within six months.
The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), adopted a balancing test for speedy trial cases. The Court identified four factors to be considered in each case: length of delay, defendant's assertion of his right, reason for the delay, and prejudice to the defendant.
Applying these factors to the circumstances of this case, we hold that Geelan's right to a speedy trial has been violated.
Length of delay acts as a triggering mechanism. Unless there is a delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire further. Barker v. Wingo, supra. We believe that the delay here of more than six years between indictment and arraignment is presumptively prejudicial. See United States ex rel. Little v. Twomey, 477 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1973).
During the six-year period, Geelan never asserted his right to a speedy trial. In some circumstances, failure to assert this right may constitute waiver. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S.Ct. 2182. But a waiver must be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
Here, Geelan could not have knowingly waived his right to a speedy trial. Throughout the period of delay, he was an adjudicated incompetent and could not knowingly and intelligently waive any right. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966).
The Government contends that Geelan's incompetence to stand trial justifies the delay. Otherwise, the Government argues, it would be forced either to try an incompetent in violation of his due process rights or to dismiss the indictment for denial of a speedy trial.
The Government has a duty to bring a defendant to trial as promptly as possible, Barker v. Wingo, supra at 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970), and it may not justify a delay merely by citing the defendant's incompetence. The Government must carefully and vigilantly protect the interests of both the incompetent individual and society.
The due process clause precludes conviction of a person while he is legally incompetent. Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at 378, 86 S.Ct. 836; Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956). The Government may, however, commit an incompetent defendant to an institution pending his regained competency.
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 1858, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), which involved Indiana's commitment statutes, the Supreme Court placed substantive constitutional limitations on a state's power to commit an incompetent defendant:
" . . .
The federal government's power under its commitment statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4248, is subject to these constitutional limitations.
A state is required to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring a defendant to trial even though he is in a federal prison. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969). The duty owed to a state or federal defendant is not less because he is in the custody of another jurisdiction, whether in prison or in a mental hospital. We think that the federal prosecutor here owed the same duty to Geelan, who was in a state hospital, that he would owe to an incompetent defendant in a federal...
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