Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-2015,73-2015 |
| Parties | POTOMAC PASSENGERS ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, et al. . Argued 6 Nov., 1974. Decided 25 Sept., 1975. Pierre E. Dostert, Washington, D. C., for appellant. James H. Pipkin, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom William E. Miller, Michael K. Wyatt, Washington, D. C., and Robert O. Smith, Jr., Baltimore, Md., were on the brief for appellees. Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wilkey. Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge FAHY. WILKEY, Circuit Judge: On 27 April 1971 Potomac Passengers Association ("Association") filed suit in the District Court against the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company ("C & O/B & O") to enjoin the discontinuance of nine passenger trains providing service between Cumberland, Maryland and Washington, D. C. The suit was characterized as one for violation of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 ("Amtrak Act"). 1 The District Court held the Association had no standing to sue under section 307 of the Act 2 and dismissed the complaint. 3 On appeal this court found that, while the Association's suit admittedly sought a judicial interpretation of the Amtrak Act, it could not properly be considered a suit for a violation of the Act, and therefore was not controlled by the standing requirement of section 307. We reversed the District Court, holding that the Association had standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 4 to sue for a declaratory judgment as to whether the trains involved provided "intercity" or "commuter and other short-haul" service within the meaning of the Act. 5 On remand the trial judge referred this question to the Interstate Commerce Commission for an advisory opinion. 6 The Commission's opinion of 25 June 1973 held that none of the trains involved provided "commuter and other short-haul service"; therefore, C & O/B & O was free to discontinue the trains. B |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
James H. Pipkin, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom William E. Miller, Michael K. Wyatt, Washington, D. C., and Robert O. Smith, Jr., Baltimore, Md., were on the brief for appellees.
Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wilkey.
On 27 April 1971 Potomac Passengers Association ("Association") filed suit in the District Court against the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company ("C & O/B & O") to enjoin the discontinuance of nine passenger trains providing service between Cumberland, Maryland and Washington, D. C. The suit was characterized as one for violation of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 ("Amtrak Act"). 1 The District Court held the Association had no standing to sue under section 307 of the Act 2 and dismissed the complaint. 3
On appeal this court found that, while the Association's suit admittedly sought a judicial interpretation of the Amtrak Act, it could not properly be considered a suit for a violation of the Act, and therefore was not controlled by the standing requirement of section 307. We reversed the District Court, holding that the Association had standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 4 to sue for a declaratory judgment as to whether the trains involved provided "intercity" or "commuter and other short-haul" service within the meaning of the Act. 5
On remand the trial judge referred this question to the Interstate Commerce Commission for an advisory opinion. 6 The Commission's opinion of 25 June 1973 held that none of the trains involved provided "commuter and other short-haul service"; therefore, C & O/B & O was free to discontinue the trains. By order of 3 August 1973 the District Court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Commission. 7 This order is the subject of the instant appeal.
Prior to 1958 the discontinuance of a train, regardless of the type of service it provided, required the approval of the appropriate regulatory agency in each of the states through which the train passed. 8 In an effort to reduce losses on uneconomic passenger train operations, however, Congress in 1958 enacted section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act. 9 This section gives railroads seeking to terminate a particular interstate train service the option of bypassing the state agencies by filing a notice of discontinuance with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Unless the Commission finds the discontinuance is contrary to the public interest, the railroad may halt service thirty days after filing. 10 Section 13a is entirely permissive. If a railroad does not choose to file with the Commission, jurisdiction is retained by the state agencies. 11
The Amtrak Act was enacted in 1970 in order to ensure the maintenance of a national intercity rail passenger service network. The more efficient elimination of uneconomic routes was among the means Congress selected to achieve this goal. 12 Since the Amtrak Act applies only to "intercity rail passenger service," 13 its provisions do not affect the discontinuance of commuter trains. For commuter train discontinuance the discretionary approval of state regulatory agencies or (at the railroad's option) the I.C.C. is still required. Section 401 of the Act, 14 however, authorizes any railroad which has entered into a contract with the Amtrak Corporation to discontinue any intercity passenger train as of right by simply notifying the I.C.C.
Pursuant to section 401, on 16 April 1971 B & O entered into a contract with Amtrak, relieving the railroad of its responsibility to continue intercity service. B & O took advantage of the contract to discontinue the nine trains involved in this case. It is the Association's contention, however, that these trains provided "commuter and other short-haul service" within the meaning of the Amtrak Act. They could not, therefore, be discontinued under the abbreviated procedure set forth in section 401, but only through the regular process of petitioning the appropriate state agencies or, under section 13a, the I.C.C.
When this case was last before this court the Association was seeking both a determination that the trains in question provided commuter service 15 and an injunction against their discontinuance. 16 The Association claimed the elimination of commuter service would be in violation of the Act. We responded:
The Act has nothing to do with commuter trains. If the trains at issue provide intercity rail passenger service, as B & O contends, there is no question but that their discontinuance is lawful under the Act. If the trains provide commuter and other short-haul service, as appellant alleges, there is no question but that their discontinuance is unlawful not under the Amtrak Act, but under the laws of the states through which they pass, since approval has admittedly not been sought from either the state regulatory agencies or the I.C.C. 17
It followed that the District Court had no power to enjoin the discontinuance of the trains.
If they provide intercity rail passenger service, their discontinuance is concededly lawful. If they provide commuter service, since no notice of discontinuance has yet invoked the jurisdiction of the ICC, their discontinuance is a violation of state, not federal law. The District Court has no power to issue an injunction enforcing state law in this instance, for to do so would usurp the primary jurisdiction of the state regulatory agencies and would circumvent the procedure established by the state to enforce its own laws. Should B & O seek approval of the discontinuances from the ICC, an injunction would be inconsistent with the ICC's primary jurisdiction. 18
Thus, it was, and is, clear that the Amtrak Act does not confer upon railroad passengers any special right to the continued operation of commuter trains. To the extent that the Association's complaint was premised upon the assumption that the discontinuance of a commuter train would violate the Act, it failed as a matter of law to state a cause of action. 19 In view of this, the previous panel, which included the author of the present opinion, examined the Association's complaint closely to determine if it could be read otherwise to state a viable federal claim. We found such a claim in the Association's prayer that the District Court issue an order referring the inter- city-commuter issue to the I.C.C. for an advisory opinion. 20 We determined that this request was tantamount to an assertion of jurisdiction in the District Court to render a declaratory judgment as to whether the trains in question provided "intercity" service or "commuter and other short-haul service" within the meaning of the Act. We concluded that this decision was within the District Court's power.
(T)he court may decide whether discontinuance of these trains is still subject to the jurisdiction of the state regulatory agencies and the ICC or whether they are exempted from such jurisdiction by the Amtrak Act. The sole issue in this case is interpretation of a federal law regulating the railroads, and the case is therefore one meeting the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1337 which grants jurisdiction of civil actions arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce. The power to construe the Amtrak Act and declare the nature of these trains is subsumed within the power granted by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). 21
We therefore remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to adjudicate the merits of the controversy. Following the ICC's decision, the District Court found all nine trains provided "intercity" service within the meaning of the Amtrak Act. The Association appeals this declaratory judgment.
Both the Association and defendants C & O/B & O have briefed and argued to us, first, the meaning of the terms "intercity" and " commuter and other short-haul" under the Amtrak Act and, second their application to the facts of this case. Their approach was to be expected, in view of this court's earlier decision ordering the District Court to reach the merits of the controversy. Our own review of the merits, however, has led us to reassess the jurisdictional foundation of this suit. While fully aware of the respect due this court's prior opinion and regretful of the expenditures of time and energy which have gone into the present litigation, after a searching inquiry we have come to the reluctant conclusion that our prior decision with respect to the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction was incorrect as a matter of law. 22
The Association invoked the District Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which confers "original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce . . .." 23 The inquiry crucial to the District Court's jurisdiction to whether the Association's suit "aris(es) under" a federal statute regulating commerce. 24 The question is much the same under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), 25 except that under the latter the action may arise under the Constitution or any law or treaty of the United States so long as the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. It follows that case law on the question whether an action "arises under" for purposes of section 1331(a) is highly important to consideration of the same question under section 1337.
The difficulty with this court's earlier decision lies in our conclusion that even...
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