U.S. v. Simpson

Decision Date03 April 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-5486.,07-5486.
Citation520 F.3d 531
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David SIMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Gerald H. Summers, Summers & Wyatt, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Perry H. Piper, Assistant United States Attorney, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gerald H. Summers, Marya L. Wegenka, Summers & Wyatt, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Robert C. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and BATCHELDER and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BOGGS, Chief Judge.

David Simpson entered a conditional guilty plea to possession, with intent to distribute, of 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. Simpson argues that the police officer had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion of any illegal behavior that would justify stopping Simpson's vehicle and that the seizure and subsequent search therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the district court that there was no constitutional violation, and we therefore affirm, but we do not rely on the district court's overly broad interpretation of the Tennessee statute at issue.

I. Background

On February 21, 2006, at around 8 p.m., Officer Andy Ratcliff of the Cleveland, Tennessee Police Department was parked near the 23-mile marker on Interstate 75, observing northbound traffic. A black Nissan Maxima "caught [his] eye" because of the vehicle's "extremely dark" window tinting, and a "weathered" temporary license plate that was not "clearly legible." Tennessee law exempts out-of-state vehicles from window tinting regulations, see TENN.CODE ANN. ("T.C.A.") § 55-9-107, but Officer Ratcliff nevertheless pulled out to follow the car in order to confirm whether the "tag was illegible." The officer required about two miles to catch up to the Maxima, after which he followed it for approximately two more miles. He estimated that he followed, at times, within a single car length of the Maxima. The officer could see that the tag was from Ohio and could read the tag number (which was printed in large, bold numbers), but could not read the expiration date (which was handwritten with a relatively thin black marker on a piece of silver metallic tape immediately underneath the tag number). Additionally, the officer testified that he could see that the tag was "torn and very weathered," that a portion of the tag was "flapping," that the top of the tag was bolted on but the bottom was secured only with duct tape, and that the whole tag was "coming apart basically." Because the expiration date was not "clearly legible," the officer believed that the tag was not in compliance with T.C.A. § 55-4-110(b) (governing the display of license plates) and so executed a traffic stop by activating his emergency lights.

Once the vehicle stopped, Officer Ratcliff got out of his patrol car and shined his flashlight directly on the tag. He testified, "[The tag] was torn. It was really weathered, discolored. The actual expiration date [was] written on what appear[ed] to be some sort of tape ... [that] the state of Ohio would put on the plate, and it was wrinkled and bubbled up." It spite of its deteriorated condition, the officer could then see that the tag had not expired, but was in fact valid for one more day. The officer approached the passenger side of the vehicle; when the female passenger lowered the window, he could immediately detect the stench of burnt and raw marijuana. After asking Simpson for his license, Simpson — without prompting from the officer — asked whether his tag had fallen off. Officer Ratcliff replied, "[N]o, but it looks like it could at any moment." Simpson told the officer that he had recently stopped at a gas station and put duct tape on the tag to secure it to the vehicle, presumably recognizing its precarious condition.1 Officer Ratcliff asked for permission to search Simpson's vehicle, which was refused. The officer (who was a trained K-9 handler) used his dog to sniff the car, and the dog alerted. The vehicle was then searched and three kilograms of cocaine were found hidden in the trunk.

Simpson moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that Officer Ratcliff lacked sufficient legal justification to seize him under the Fourth Amendment. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the motion be denied. Although the magistrate judge agreed that the illegibility of the expiration date may have violated Tennessee law, he did not base his recommendation solely on those grounds, citing a Fourth Circuit case that held that the inability of a police officer to see the expiration date on an otherwise lawfully displayed temporary tag did not give the officer reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Instead, the magistrate judge distinguished Wilson and recommended denying the motion to suppress based on the deteriorated condition of the tag, stating that the tag's condition gave the officer "a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the temporary tag was so old it had expired...." Once the officer had ascertained that the tag was still valid, "it was not unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards for [Officer] Ratcliff to approach the vehicle to explain why he had stopped it in the first place. This action took only seconds and constituted part of the original traffic stop." The odor of marijuana then gave the officer grounds for further detention, culminating in full-blown probable cause to search the car once the dog alerted.

The district court accepted the magistrate judge's statement of relevant facts, but denied Simpson's motion to suppress on different legal grounds. Concluding that it was unnecessary to "determine whether the temporary tag appeared weathered and worn[,]" the court concluded that the illegibility of the expiration date gave Officer Ratcliff probable cause to stop the vehicle under Tennessee law. United States v. Simpson, No. 1:06-CR-21, 2006 WL 3198945, at *1 (E.D.Tenn. Oct.30, 2006). Regarding the Fourth Circuit's Wilson opinion, the district court concluded that an unpublished Sixth Circuit case contradicted it, and that the district court was "obligated" to follow the Sixth Circuit precedent. Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Dycus, 151 Fed.Appx. 457 (6th Cir.2005)).2 The district court construed T.C.A. § 55-4-110(b) extremely broadly, concluding

that any invisibility or obstruction to visibility of any portion of the tag could constitute a violation of the statute, even if such invisibility or obstruction to visibility is temporary — or even momentary — and may be easily cured, as by the turning on of headlights or by a slight change in distance or the position of the vehicle in relation to the observer.

Ibid. Although initially holding that Officer Ratcliff had probable cause, id. at *3, the district court concluded its analysis by instead stating that the officer "had at least a reasonable suspicion of violation of [T.C.A.] § 55-4-110(b)...." Id. at *5.

Having failed in his motion to suppress, Simpson entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) and appealed to this court.

II. Analysis

"When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo." United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir.2000)). In this case, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings of fact, which included the determination that Officer Ratcliff testified credibly regarding the illegibility and deteriorated condition of the temporary license plate. We may reject this finding only if "on the entire evidence [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir.1999). Our examination of the record leaves us with no such conviction; we therefore accept the magistrate judge's factual findings as correct and focus our inquiry on the question of which legal standard — reasonable suspicion or probable cause — governs this traffic stop, and whether that standard was met.

A. Choice of Law

As a threshold matter, we must determine which state's law applies to Simpson's temporary license plate. Although it might first appear obvious that a vehicle traveling on Tennessee's highways must abide by Tennessee's motor vehicle laws, Simpson argues that the display of an Ohio-registered vehicle's license plate must be judged by Ohio law, rather than by Tennessee law, because (1) the Tennessee statute at issue does not apply to out-of-state vehicles, and (2) Tennessee gives reciprocity to Ohio's vehicle registration laws. The emphasis Simpson places on this point is understandable given that his temporary tag arguably did not violate any Ohio law.3 Nevertheless, for the following reasons, we hold that Tennessee law applies and that Simpson was obliged to follow that law while in Tennessee.

1. Statutory Construction

The relevant portion of Tennessee motor vehicle law states,

Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a horizontal position to the vehicle for which it is issued so to prevent the plate from swinging and at a height of not less than twelve inches from the ground ... in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.

T.C.A. § 55-4-110(b) (emphasis added). As far as this court can determine, no Tennessee court of record has ever specifically applied § 55-4-110 (or any other analogous part of Tennessee motor vehicle law)...

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