Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club

• Decision Date: 26 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-1349,74-1349
• Citation: 521 F.2d 344
• Parties: Harold S. GOLDEN and David Fincher, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BISCAYNE BAY YACHT CLUB et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 344

521 F.2d 344

Harold S. GOLDEN and David Fincher, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BISCAYNE BAY YACHT CLUB et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 74-1349.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 26, 1975.

Henry Burnett, Miami, Fla., for defendants-appellants.

Maurice Rosen, Miami Beach, Fla., Warren S. Schwartz, Opa-Locka, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and COLEMAN and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs, Black and Jewish applicants for membership in defendant's private Biscayne Bay Yacht Club brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, ¹ 1983 ² and 2000a ³ alleging the Club discriminated on the basis of race and religion in their admission policies. The trial court ⁴ found a pattern of discrimination had existed and that it was conducted "under color of law" because the Club leased bay bottom land from the city of Miami, Florida regulated by ordinances that expressly prohibited discrimination for race, religion or national origin ⁵ upon which to maintain its dock facilities and, such governmental participation constituted sufficient "state action" to bring the discriminatory conduct within the Fourteenth Amendment. ⁶ Accordingly, the trial court ordered the Club to cease the practice of denying persons membership in the Club solely on account of their race or religious affiliations. We agree.

The History

The Club, was organized in 1887 to provide a meeting place for yachtsmen in early Miami. In 1932, the Club purchased its present club house located adjacent to Biscayne Bay. In 1962, the City of Miami asserted ownership to the bay bottom land abutting the Club's property and since that time the Club has leased from the City sufficient bay bottom land to support its docking facilities at an annual rental of $1.00.

The City acquired the bay bottom lands from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida under deed terms which required that the lands be used for public purposes only. In 1969 it obtained a waiver from the trustees for its lease to the Club by asserting that the docks maintained by the Club helped relieve the shortage of public dock facilities in the city. The docks are for the exclusive use of Club members and the general public is prohibited from tying up there or using the decking. But without the bay bottom land the Club could not maintain docking or mooring facilities and accordingly the City's lease of this land is essential to the Club's function, considering that a yacht club is not much of one if members and authorized guests have no means to anchor, moor or tie up their craft.

Membership in the Club is by sponsorship ⁷ only. The by-laws of the Club provide for invitation to membership by three sponsors (members) consisting of a proposer and two seconders who file with the Club's secretary a letter stating the candidate's qualifications for membership. After investigation by the Club a vote by secret ballot is held by the Board of Governors sitting as the Membership Committee. At least eight members are needed for a quorum and if any three members of the committee veto the candidate, the black ball is run up and no invitation is issued. ⁸ While the by-laws of the Club do not expressly prohibit membership by members of the Jewish faith or Black race there are no known past or present Jewish or Black members except for one honorary Black member, the Commodore of the Jamaica Yacht Club.

Both Golden and Fincher expressed interest to Club officials in obtaining applications for membership but were informed that they would have to be sponsored by a Club member to be eligible for membership. As a result of the Club's refusal to accept plaintiffs' applications they brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief asserting that the Club's admission procedure was discriminatory on the basis of race and religion and accordingly violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights statutes.

From a finding by the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs the Club appeals asserting that, (i) the plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the Club's admission policies, (ii) the record fails to support the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs were deprived of their constitutional rights, (iii) that the record fails to support the trial court's conclusion that the Club's membership practices were discriminatory on the basis of race or religion, (iv) whether the Club's leasing of city owned land constituted acts under color of law sufficient to create jurisdiction within the satrapy of Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Standing

Fundamentally, Article III of the United States Constitution requires that the judicial power of the United States Courts shall extend only to cases or controversies arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This constitutional requirement has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that the plaintiff must assert that the conduct of the defendant has caused him injury in fact whether economic or otherwise. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 1970,397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184. In the words of Mr. Justice Marshall in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 1969, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404, "(t)he indispensable requirement is, of course, that the party seeking relief allege 'such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' " Id. at 423, 89 S.Ct. at 1849. Citing, Baker v. Carr, 1962, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663; Flast v. Cohen, 1968, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 1951, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817. See also Evers v. Dwyer, 1958, 358 U.S. 202, 79 S.Ct. 178, 3 L.Ed.2d 222.

In the case at hand the District Court specifically found that the plaintiffs had a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. The existing membership policies they attacked as exhibiting a pattern of discrimination formed the standards upon which the Club refused to accept plaintiffs' applications. More specifically, it is unquestionable that standing may be based upon an interest created by the Constitution or a statute. See Parker v. Fleming, 1947, 329 U.S. 531, 67 S.Ct. 463, 91 L.Ed. 479; Coleman v. Miller, 1939, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385. Here is involved a claim of racial and religious discrimination which seems clearly to fall within the "zone of interest" of the statutory language of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. ⁹ Thus, we reject out of hand the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs possess insufficient standing to assail the membership policies of the Club.

The Standard

" Two elements must be proved to recover under § 1983(i) a deprivation of a constitutional right by the defendant, and (ii) that the defendant, acted under 'color of law'." See Smith v. Young Men's Christian Association of Montgomery, 5 Cir., 1972, 462 F.2d 634; Accord, Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 1970, 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142. Because we find that these elements are satisfied and relief is appropriate under § 1983 we deem it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the Club's admission policies also violated § 1981 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.

Acts Of Discrimination

The trial court found that admission policies of the Yacht Club over its long history had fostered a subtle pattern and practice of discrimination evidenced by the total lack of minority representation, save one honorary member who was a citizen of a foreign country. See Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, City of Miami, supra, 370 F.Supp. at 1043. Moreover, the Court found that the sponsorship requirement, although not egregious on its face, in practicality operates to exclude Blacks and Jews from Club membership. ¹⁰ Id., Citing Local 53 of International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 5 Cir., 1969, 407 F.2d 1047; Ross v. Dyer, 5 Cir., 1963, 312 F.2d 191.

Upon such findings of fact the trial court concluded that the "plaintiffs had not been afforded the same rights to membership as their white and Christian counterparts". See Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, City of Miami, supra, 370 F.Supp. at 1043. These findings of racial and religious discrimination are supported by the record and are well above the Plimsoll line of F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 5 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 505.

"Under Color Of Law" The Basis Upon Which Constitutional Restrictions Are Applied To Private Conduct Entwined With Public Activities

We recognize at the outset that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the "(i)ndividual invasion of individual rights." Civil Rights Cases, 1883, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 3 S.Ct. 18, 21, 27 L.Ed. 835, 839. However, it does prohibit state action of every kind that operates to deny any citizen the equal protection of the laws. Id. When private enterprises become sufficiently entwined with Government policy or receive substantial aid and support from governmental entities they are said to be acting "under color of law" and consequently are subject to the Constitutional limitations which prohibit discriminatory conduct by the State. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 1974, 417 U.S. 556, 565, 94 S.Ct. 2416, 41 L.Ed.2d 304; Evans v. Newton, 1966, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373.

This finding is not only sufficient to supply state action, it is also well armored against attack as clearly erroneous. Indeed, it draws additional validity from the type of actionable wrong here involved.

Despite its heavy overlay of law, the "state action" which...