People v. Emerson
| Citation | 522 N.E.2d 1109,122 Ill.2d 411,119 Ill.Dec. 250 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 61915,61915 |
| Parties | , 119 Ill.Dec. 250 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Dennis EMERSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Theodore A. Gottfried, Appellate Defender, Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, Springfield, James E. Chadd, Asst. Defender, for appellant.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for appellee; Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago, Thomas V. Gainer, Kevin Sweeney, David A. Cuomo, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel.
The defendant, Dennis Emerson, was convicted in a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County of one count each of murder, attempted murder, and aggravated arson and of two counts of armed robbery. The same jury imposed the death sentence for the murder conviction. The defendant's execution was stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b); 107 Ill.2d Rules 603, 609(a).
This is the second time the defendant has been convicted of the offenses here and sentenced to death; in an earlier appeal, the court reversed the defendant's convictions and granted him a new trial (People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill.2d 487, 74 Ill.Dec. 11, 455 N.E.2d 41). The defendant's retrial was conducted in March 1985. The main evidence against the defendant was provided by Robert Ray, co-owner and operator of the Centaur Lounge, located at 1154 West 69th Street in Chicago. Ray testified that he was working at his lounge around noon on Sunday, August 12, 1979, when he received a telephone call from the defendant, who said that he was going to stop by later that day; Ray had known the defendant for several years. The defendant called again later that afternoon, saying that he had been delayed but that he would still come by. Ray closed the lounge at about 1:15 the following morning, and the defendant called around that time and said that he was on his way over. The defendant soon arrived with one of his brothers, Richard Jackson, and the three sat and talked in Ray's apartment, which was connected to the lounge and was located at the back of the building. Ray's girlfriend, Delinda Byrd, appeared some time later, and Ray introduced her to the others. Ray then left briefly to buy cigarettes at a store across the street--the vending machine in the Centaur Lounge was out of his brand. Ray returned to the apartment and rejoined the others.
Ray testified that as he was opening his pack of cigarettes the defendant stood up, pulled out a gun, and ordered him and Byrd to lie on the floor. The defendant then bound their hands and feet with electrical cords that he pulled from lamps in the apartment and tavern. The defendant took Ray's keys and opened the cash register; Ray also told the defendant where his guns and jewelry were hidden, and the defendant found those items. The defendant searched Ray and Byrd and found on Byrd $600, which, according to Ray, she had planned to use in renting a new apartment. While this was going on, Richard Jackson kept a gun trained on Ray and Byrd, who were lying on the floor.
The defendant and Jackson then went into the kitchen of the apartment, and Jackson told the defendant to "use this," picking up a half pair of scissors or shears lying on Ray's desk. The defendant straddled Ray, lifted Ray's shoulder, and stabbed him two times in the chest with the blade. The defendant then went over to where Byrd was lying and stabbed her a number of times in the back. Following that, the defendant started a fire in the bedroom, and the defendant and Jackson threw Ray and Byrd into the burning room and shut the door. Ray testified that he heard the door knob being rattled and that he lay still until the noise died. He then untied his hands, hopped over to the bedroom window and raised it, and fell out into the airshaft between his building and the building next door, a drop of about eight feet.
Ray testified that Byrd also managed to get out of the bedroom and into the airshaft, and there he untied the rest of the bindings. Ray then climbed back into the bedroom and tried to open the door, but he found that it had been secured shut. Ray jumped back into the airshaft and opened the kitchen window, but the kitchen was engulfed with smoke and fire. Finally, Ray tried to get into a window that had an air conditioner in it. He stood on top of the air conditioner, kicked out the plasterboard surrounding it, and fell into the lounge. Ray ran out the front door and asked someone to call the fire department. Ray then went to the back of the building, where he was able to see Byrd through a narrow gap separating his building from the one next door.
Firefighters were unable to rescue Delinda Byrd from the airshaft, and her body was found there after the fire was extinguished. Medical testimony established that Byrd had been stabbed five times in her back, and she also had second-degree and third-degree burns over 90% of her body. The cause of her death was attributed to loss of blood from the stab wounds; the extensive burns were a contributing cause.
Following the fire, lengths of electrical cord were found in the bedroom of the apartment. The bedroom door was consumed in the fire, but a door knob and door lock assembly were found on the floor, and a coat hanger was next to them. No scissors or shears were found in the wreckage. Debris taken from the fire scene was tested for the presence of flammable hydrocarbons, and the results were negative.
Exculpatory evidence was provided by codefendant Richard Jackson, who was the defendant's brother. Jackson implicated himself in the offenses, and he gave a description of events that largely paralleled Ray's testimony, with the exception that a man named Phillip Anderson, and not the defendant, was the person with Jackson at Ray's lounge. Jackson said that on August 12, 1979, he called the defendant to ask to borrow several hundred dollars. According to Jackson, the defendant said that the money could be obtained from Robert Ray, to whom the defendant had made a loan. The defendant then called Ray and said that his brother would be coming over. Jackson testified that he later went to Ray's lounge with a friend, Phillip Anderson. There, Jackson asked Ray for $300, but Ray would give him only $50. According to Jackson, Anderson then drew a gun, and when Delinda Byrd arrived, she and Ray were tied up. Jackson testified that Anderson stabbed Ray and Byrd and set the bedroom on fire; Anderson and Jackson then threw the two into the room. On cross-examination, Jackson conceded that he had not previously told this version of events to anyone.
The jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and aggravated arson. A bifurcated sentencing hearing was then held. The parties stipulated that the defendant was born in 1951 and therefore was 18 years or older at the time of the offenses here. The jury found the defendant eligible for the death penalty because of his commission of the murder during the course of another felony, armed robbery. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6).) At the second part of the penalty hearing, the State presented certified copies of the defendant's convictions for various State and Federal offenses. That evidence showed that the defendant pleaded guilty to a number of armed robbery charges in Cook County circuit court in September 1971 and was sentenced to concurrent, indeterminate terms of four to eight years' imprisonment. In 1975, in a Federal prosecution, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of receiving and possessing stolen bank notes and unlawful use of a weapon, and he was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of five years' imprisonment. In 1976 the defendant pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Cook County to a charge of armed robbery and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five to eight years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the Federal sentence; the defendant was paroled from prison on July 24, 1979, several weeks before the offenses in this case were committed. No evidence in mitigation was presented, and the defendant was sentenced to death for his murder conviction.
The defendant first argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for automatic substitution of judge. Judge Bailey presided at the defendant's first trial, and following this court's remand the case was returned to Judge Bailey's trial call on December 7, 1983. That day the defendant told the judge that he was going to file a motion for automatic substitution of judge, and he did so a week later, on December 14. Judge Bailey denied the motion, ruling that the motion was untimely because the case was not a new one but rather had been on his call for a long time.
The defendant's motion for substitution of judge was made under section 114-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which provides:
Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 114-5(a).
The defendant argues that the cause on remand was a new proceeding for purposes of section 114-5(a). In support of that argument, the defendant correctly observes that in several cases similar to this the court has...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rupe, In re
...1263, 108 L.Ed.2d at 426, 428 (citing Byrne v. Butler, 847 F.2d 1135, 1138-40 (5th Cir.1988); People v. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d 411, 442-43, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 263, 522 N.E.2d 1109, 1122 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 246, 102 L.Ed.2d 235 (1988); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 29......
-
Leonard v. State
...783, 794 (1990) (citing Witt, 469 U.S. at 437, 105 S.Ct. 844 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)); People v. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d 411, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109, 1119 (1987). 10. Leonard notes that NRS 47.250 contains the following disputable presumptions: "(3) That evidence willfu......
-
Saffle v. Parks
...the rule of Lockett and Eddings. See Byrne v. Butler, 847 F.2d 1135, 1138-1140 (CA5 1988); People v. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d 411, 442-443, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 263, 522 N.E.2d 1109, 1122 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 246, 102 L.Ed.2d 235 (1988); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 295 ......
-
People v. Smith
...not make "a direct, unequivocal concession of the defendant's guilt of the primary charge against him." People v. Emerson (1987), 122 Ill.2d 411, 430, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109. The record does not show how defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to cross-examine the three......