Willbanks v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.

Decision Date11 July 2017
Docket NumberNo. SC 95395,SC 95395
Citation522 S.W.3d 238
Parties Timothy S. WILLBANKS, Appellant, v. Missouri DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Willbanks was represented by Craig A. Johnston of the public defender's office in Columbia, (573) 777-9977.

The department was represented by Michael J. Spillane of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Mary R. Russell, Judge

Timothy S. Willbanks was 17 years old when he was charged with kidnapping, first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree robbery, and three counts of armed criminal action. He was convicted and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the kidnapping count, life for the assault count, 20 years for each of the two robbery counts, and 100 years for each of the three armed criminal action counts. On appeal, he argues his sentences, in the aggregate, will result in the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence. He contends Missouri's mandatory minimum parole statutes and regulations violate his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as protected under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution in light of Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).

This Court holds that Missouri's mandatory minimum parole statutes and regulations are constitutionally valid under the Supreme Court of the United States's opinion in Graham . Graham held that the Eighth Amendment barred sentencing a juvenile to a single sentence of life without parole for a nonhomicide offense. Because Graham did not address juveniles who were convicted of multiple nonhomicide offenses and received multiple fixed-term sentences, as Willbanks had, Graham is not controlling. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.1

Factual and Procedural Background

Willbanks was 17 years old when he devised a plan with two other individuals to steal a car. Carrying a sawed-off shotgun, Willbanks approached a woman in the parking lot of her apartment building. After ordering her to get in the driver's seat of her car, he climbed in the back seat and directed her to drive to an ATM, where he took all the money from her account. When the victim failed to follow Willbanks's driving instructions, he became angry, ordered her to stop the car, and forced her into the trunk.

Willbanks drove to a different location. Once he released the victim from the trunk, he took her jewelry and other belongings. Willbanks told his accomplices, who had followed in a separate car, that he wanted to shoot the victim, but they told him to leave her alone. At Willbanks's direction, the victim began to walk away from them, and as she did, Willbanks shot her four times. Willbanks and his accomplices then left her and drove away. The victim crawled for 40 minutes to get help despite injuries to her right arm, shoulder, back, and head. The victim survived the ordeal, but she was left with permanent disfigurement and irreparable injuries.

After the victim picked Willbanks out of a photograph lineup, the police arrested him and his accomplices, and all three gave consistent confessions. A jury convicted Willbanks of one count of kidnapping, one count of first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree robbery, and three counts of armed criminal action. The trial court imposed prison sentences of 15 years for kidnapping, life imprisonment for first-degree assault, 20 years for each robbery count, and 100 years for each armed criminal action count, and set these terms to run consecutively.

Willbanks's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, State v. Willbanks , 75 S.W.3d 333 (Mo. App. 2002), and his motion for postconviction relief was overruled. Willbanks v. State , 167 S.W.3d 789 (Mo. App. 2005). He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Cole County Circuit Court, arguing his aggregated sentences amounted to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence and violated his Eighth Amendment rights under Graham . The trial court denied the petition, indicating the proper avenue for the relief Willbanks sought was through a declaratory judgment action.

Accordingly, Willbanks filed another petition, in which he requested a judgment declaring that section 558.019.32 and 14 CSR 80-2.010, which require offenders to serve specific percentages of their sentences before they become parole-eligible, are unconstitutional as applied to him. He alleged, under the current Missouri parole statutes and regulations, he does not have a meaningful opportunity to obtain release because he does not become parole eligible until he is approximately 85 years old. Willbanks requested a hearing to present evidence in support of these allegations.

The Department of Corrections ("DOC") answered the petition and sought judgment on the pleadings. The trial court sustained DOC's motion, finding Willbanks's case was distinguishable from Graham because Graham involved a single sentence of life without parole for one offense and Willbanks was convicted of seven separate felonies and received seven consecutive sentences as a result. Willbanks appeals.3

Standard of Review

The constitutional validity of a statute is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Honeycutt , 421 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Mo. banc 2013). A statute is presumed to be valid and will not be held unconstitutional absent a clear contravention of a constitutional provision. Id.

Legal Background

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. When reviewing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, "courts must look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Graham , 560 U.S. at 58, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

In the last decade, the Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions concerning the constitutional validity of punishments for offenders who were younger than 18 years of age at the time they committed crimes. In Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the Supreme Court affirmed a holding from this Court that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments barred the execution of juvenile offenders. Five years later in Graham , the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred courts from sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole. 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Graham was expanded to prohibit homicide juvenile offenders from being subject to a mandatory sentence of life without parole in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled in Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 732, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), that Miller ' s new substantive rule must be applied retroactively on collateral review for juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory life without parole.

Analysis

Willbanks argues Missouri's statutes and regulations requiring offenders to serve a percentage of their total sentence before being eligible for parole are unconstitutional when applied to him as he is denied parole eligibility until past his natural life expectancy.4 According to Willbanks, pursuant to Missouri's parole statutes and regulations, his aggregated sentences for seven nonhomicide offenses prevent him from having a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release" as required by Graham. 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011.

Willbanks's argument is misplaced as Graham concerned "juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense." Id. at 63, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (emphasis added). In Graham , the juvenile offender was convicted of two nonhomicide crimes, armed burglary and attempted armed robbery, and was sentenced to life imprisonment and 15 years for each respective charge.5 Id. at 57, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile nonhomicide offenders from being sentenced to life without parole. Id. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Importantly, "[a] State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term." Id. (emphasis added).

Graham ' s facts involved (1) a juvenile offender (2) who committed a nonhomicide crime and (3) was sentenced to life without parole. Although Willbanks was younger than 18 years old at the time he committed his nonhomicide crimes, he was not sentenced to life without parole. His argument is Graham applies to him as he was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced to multiple fixed-term periods that, in the aggregate, total more than his life expectancy. Willbanks contends, under Missouri's mandatory minimum parole statutes and regulations, his life sentence plus multiple fixed-year terms are the "functional equivalent of life without parole" because they prevent him from being eligible for parole until he is approximately 85 years old.

Whether multiple fixed-term sentences, which total beyond a juvenile offender's life expectancy, should be considered the functional equivalent of life without parole is a question of first impression for this Court. Graham prohibits a life without parole sentence because it

guarantees he will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.

Id. at 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011.

Requiring inmates to serve a mandatory minimum percent of their sentence is not inherently unconstitutional. See, e.g. , State v. Pribble , 285 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Mo. banc 2009) (holding that a five-year mandatory minimum parole ineligibility period does not "run[ ] afoul of cruel and unusual punishment"). B...

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