Rivet v. Regions Bank Louisiana

Citation118 S.Ct. 921,139 L.Ed.2d 912,522 U.S. 470
Decision Date24 February 1998
Docket Number961971
PartiesMary Anna RIVET, et al., Petitioners, v. REGIONS BANK OF LOUISIANA et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus*

After a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate to respondent Regions Bank of Louisiana (Bank), the partnership granted a second mortgage to petitioners, and later filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved a sale of the leasehold estate to the Bank. Thereafter, the Bank acquired the underlying land and sold the entire property to respondent Fountainbleau Storage Associates (FSA). Petitioners then filed this action in Louisiana state court, alleging that transfer of the property without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated state law. Respondents removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished petitioners' rights. The District Court denied petitioners' motion to remand, concluding from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 44 F.3d 362, that removal was properly predicated on the preclusive effect of the Bankruptcy Court orders. The court then granted summary judgment to, inter alios, the Bank and FSA. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit agreed that under Carpenter removal is proper where a plaintiff's state cause of action is completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question. The court thought Carpenter 's holding was dictated by the second footnote in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397, n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2427, n. 2, 69 L.Ed.2d 103.

Held: Claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no basis for removal. Such a defense is properly made in the state proceedings, and the state courts' disposition of it is subject to this Court's ultimate review. Pp. ___-___.

(a) Respondents invoked, in support of removal, the district courts' original federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1441(b). The presence or absence of such jurisdiction is governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule,'' under which "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.'' Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318. Because a defense is not part of a plaintiff's properly pleaded statement of his or her claim, see, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55, removal of a case to federal court may not be predicated on the presence of a federal defense, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2848-2849, 77 L.Ed.2d 420. As a corollary to the well-pleaded defense rule, "a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.'' Id., at 22, 103 S.Ct., at 2853. If the plaintiff thus "artfully pleads'' a claim, a court may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the face of the complaint. The artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts an asserted state-law claim, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S., at 65-66, 107 S.Ct., at 1547-1548, for a claim of that preempted character is, from its inception, a claim that can arise only under federal, not state, law. Caterpillar, 482 U.S., at 393, 107 S.Ct., at 2430. P. ___.

(b) Removal was improper here. Claim preclusion, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(c) makes clear, is an affirmative defense. A case blocked by the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment differs from a case preempted by a federal statute: The prior federal judgment does not transform the plaintiff's state-law claims into federal claims but rather extinguishes them altogether. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, preclusion thus remains a defensive plea involving no recasting of the plaintiff's complaint, and is therefore not a proper basis for removal. The Court's marginal comment in Moitie noted that the Court declined, in that case-specific context, to "question . . . [the District Court's] factual finding'' that the plaintiffs "had attempted to avoid removal jurisdiction by artfully casting their essentially federal[-]law claims as state-law claims.'' 452 U.S., at 397, n. 2, 101 S.Ct., at 2427, n. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the footnote placed Moitie in the "artful pleading'' category, it created no preclusion exception to the rule, fundamental under currently governing legislation, that a defendant cannot remove on the basis of a federal defense. Pp. ___-___.

108 F.3d 576, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

John G. Odom, Savannah, GA, for petitioners.

Charles L. Stern, Jr., New Orleans, LA, for respondents.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

Congress has provided for removal of cases from state court to federal court when the plaintiff's complaint alleges a claim arising under federal law. Congress has not authorized removal based on a defense or anticipated defense federal in character. This case presents the question whether removal may be predicated on a defendant's assertion that a prior federal judgment has disposed of the entire matter and thus bars plaintiffs from later pursuing a state-law-based case. We reaffirm that removal is improper in such a case. In so holding we clarify and confine to its specific context the Court's second footnote in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397, n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2427, n. 2, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). The defense of claim preclusion, we emphasize, is properly made in the state proceeding, subject to this Court's ultimate review.

I

This case arose out of a series of mortgages and conveyances involving a parcel of real property in New Orleans. In 1983, a partnership that owned the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate in the property mortgaged that interest to respondent Regions Bank of Louisiana (Bank). 1 One year later, to secure further borrowing, the partnership granted a second mortgage to petitioners Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmund G. Miranne, and Edmund G. Miranne, Jr. The partnership thereafter filed for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee sought court permission to sell the leasehold estate free and clear of all claims.

In June and August 1986 orders, the Bankruptcy Court first granted the sale application and later approved sale of the leasehold estate to the Bank, sole bidder at the public auction. The court also directed the Recorder of Mortgages for Orleans Parish to cancel all liens, mortgages, and encumbrances, including the mortgages held by the Bank and petitioners. Nonetheless, petitioners' mortgage remained inscribed on the mortgage rolls of Orleans Parish. Subsequently, in 1993, the Bank acquired the underlying land from respondents Walter L. Brown, Jr., and Perry S. Brown. The Bank then sold the entire property to the current owner, respondent Fountainbleau Storage Associates (FSA).

On December 29, 1994, petitioners filed this action in Louisiana state court. They alleged that the 1993 transactions violated Louisiana law because the property was transferred without satisfying petitioners' superior rights under the second mortgage. In their prayer for relief, petitioners sought recognition and enforcement of their mortgage or, alternatively, damages. Respondents removed the action to the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Federal-question jurisdiction existed, they contended, because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished petitioners' rights under the second mortgage.

In federal court, petitioners filed a motion to remand and respondents moved for summary judgment. The District Court denied the remand motion. Relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 44 F.3d 362 (1995), the District Court held that removal was properly predicated on the preclusive effect of the 1986 Bankruptcy Court orders. The Court then granted summary judgment to the Bank and FSA on the ground that the Bankruptcy Court's adjudication barred petitioners' suit. The District Court also granted summary judgment to the Browns, ruling that petitioners failed to state a claim against them.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 108 F.3d 576 (1997). It agreed with the District Court that under Carpenter a defendant could remove ""where a plaintiff files a state cause of action completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a question of federal law.''' 108 F.3d, at 586 (quoting Carpenter, 44 F.3d, at 370). Carpenter 's holding, the Court of Appeals thought, was dictated by the second footnote to our decision in Moitie, 452 U.S., at 397, n. 2, 101 S.Ct., at 2427 n. 2.

In dissent, Judge Jones maintained that removal is appropriate under Moitie only where a plaintiff loses in federal court on an "essentially federal'' claim and, recharacterizing the claim as one based on state law, files again in state court. 108 F.3d, at 594. She concluded that removal here was improper because there was nothing federal about petitioners' claim.

The circuit courts have adopted differing views regarding the propriety of removing a state court action to federal court on the ground that the claim asserted is precluded by a prior federal judgment. 2 We granted certiorari, 521 U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 31, 138 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1997), to resolve the matter.

II
A

A state court action may be removed to federal court if it qualifies as a "civil action . . . of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,'' unless Congress expressly provides otherwise. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). In this case, respondents invoked, in support of removal, ...

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