Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard

Citation140 L.Ed.2d 387,523 U.S. 272,118 S.Ct. 1244
Decision Date25 March 1998
Docket Number961769
PartiesOHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY, et al., Petitioners, v. Eugene WOODARD
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus*

After respondent Woodard's Ohio murder conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and this Court denied certiorari, petitioner Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced its clemency investigation in accordance with state law, informing respondent that he could have his voluntary interview with Authority members on a particular date, and that his clemency hearing would be held a week later. Respondent filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The District Court granted judgment on the pleadings to the State, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Noting that Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464-465, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2464-65, 69 L.Ed.2d 158, had decisively rejected the argument that federal law can create a liberty interest in clemency, the latter court held that respondent had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process. The court also held, however, that respondent's "original'' pretrial life and liberty interests were protected by a "second strand'' of due process analysis under Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 834, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, although the amount of process due could be minimal because clemency, while an "integral part'' of the adjudicatory system, is far removed from trial. The court remanded for the District Court to decide what that process should be. Finally, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Ohio's voluntary interview procedure presented respondent with a "Hobson's choice'' between asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and participating in Ohio's clemency review process, thereby raising the specter of an unconstitutional condition.

Held: The judgment is reversed.

107 F.3d 1178, reversed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, concluding that giving an inmate the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process does not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. That Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1557-58, 47 L.Ed.2d 810. Even on assumptions most favorable to respondent's claim-i.e., that nothing in the clemency procedure grants applicants immunity for what they might say or makes the interview in any way confidential, and that the Authority will draw adverse inferences from respondent's refusal to answer questions-his testimony at a voluntary interview would not be "compelled.'' He merely faces a choice quite similar to those made by a criminal defendant in the course of criminal proceedings. For example, a defendant who chooses to testify in his own defense abandons the privilege against self-incrimination when the prosecution seeks to cross-examine him, and may be impeached by proof of prior convictions. In these situations, the undoubted pressures to testify that are generated by the strength of the Government's case do not constitute "compulsion'' for Fifth Amendment purposes. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84-85, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1897-98, 26 L.Ed.2d 446. Similarly, respondent here has the choice of providing information to the Authority-at the risk of damaging his case for clemency or for postconviction relief-or of remaining silent, but the pressure to speak does not make the interview compelled. Pp. ____-____.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by Justice SCALIA, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice THOMAS, concluded in Part II that an inmate does not establish a violation of the Due Process Clause in clemency proceedings, under either Dumschat or Evitts, where, as here, the procedures in question do no more than confirm that such decisions are committed, as is the Nation's tradition, to the executive's authority. This Court reaffirms its holding in Dumschat, supra, at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 2464, that pardon and commutation decisions are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review. Respondent's argument that there is a continuing life interest in clemency that is broader in scope than the "original'' life interest adjudicated at trial and sentencing is barred by Dumschat. The process respondent seeks would be inconsistent with the heart of executive clemency, which is to grant clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing determinations. Although respondent maintains a residual life interest, e.g., in not being summarily executed by prison guards, he cannot use that interest to challenge the clemency determination by requiring the procedural protections he seeks. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2103-04, 60 L.Ed.2d 668. Also rejected is respondent's claim that clemency is entitled to due process protection under Evitts. Expressly relying on the combination of two lines of cases to justify the conclusion that a criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right, 469 U.S., at 394-396, 105 S.Ct. at 834-36, the Evitts Court did not purport to create a new "strand'' of due process analysis, and it did not rely on the notion of a continuum of due process rights, as respondent claims. There is no such continuum. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2769-71, 106 L.Ed.2d 1. An examination of the function and significance of the discretionary clemency decision at issue here readily shows that it is far different from a first appeal as of right, and thus is not "an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating . . . guilt or innocence,'' as Evitts, supra, at 393, 105 S.Ct. at 834, requires. Pp. ____-____.

Justice O'CONNOR, joined by Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER, concluded that, because a prisoner under a death sentence has a continuing interest in his life, the question raised is what process is constitutionally necessary to protect that interest. Although due process demands are reduced once society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore established its right to punish, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2611-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part), the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that some minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings. Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process. However, a remand to permit the District Court to address respondent's specific allegations of due process violations is not required. The process he received comports with Ohio's regulations and observes whatever limitations the Due Process Clause may impose on clemency proceedings. Pp. ____-____.

REHNQUIST, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part III, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

William A. Klatt, Columbus, OH, for petitioners.

S. Adele Shank, for respondent.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, and an opinion with respect to Part II in which Justice SCALIA, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice THOMAS join.

This case requires us to resolve two inquiries as to constitutional limitations on state clemency proceedings. The first is whether an inmate has a protected life or liberty interest in clemency proceedings, under either Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981), or Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). The second is whether giving inmates the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process violates an inmate's Fifth Amendment rights.

We reaffirm our holding in Dumschat, supra, that "pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.'' Id., at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 2464 (footnote omitted). The Due Process Clause is not violated where, as here, the procedures in question do no more than confirm that the clemency and pardon power is committed, as is our tradition, to the authority of the executive. 1 We further hold that a voluntary inmate interview does not violate the Fifth Amendment.

I

The Ohio Constitution gives the Governor the power to grant clemency upon such conditions as he thinks proper. Ohio Const., Art. III, §2. The Ohio General Assembly cannot curtail this discretionary decision-making power, but it may regulate the application and investigation process. State v. Sheward, 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 524-525, 644 N.E.2d 369, 378 (1994). The General Assembly has delegated in large part the conduct of clemency review to petitioner Ohio Adult Parole Authority. Ohio Revised Code Ann. §2967.07 (1993).

In the case of an inmate under death sentence, the Authority must conduct a clemency hearing within 45 days of the...

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