U.S. v. Ramirez

• Decision Date: 04 March 1998
• Docket Number: 961469
• Citation: 523 U.S. 65,140 L.Ed.2d 191,118 S.Ct. 992
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Hernan RAMIREZ
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

523 U.S. 65

118 S. Ct. 992

140 L. Ed. 2d 191

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. HERNAN RAMIREZ

No. 96-1469

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

January 13, 1998, Argued

March 4, 1998, Decided

SYLLABUS

Based on a reliable confidential informant's statement that he had seen a person he believed to be Alan Shelby, a dangerous escaped prisoner, at respondent's home, and on a federal agent's subsequent observation of a man resembling Shelby outside that home, the Government obtained a "no-knock" warrant to enter and search the home. Having gathered in the early morning hours to execute the warrant, officers announced over a loud speaker system that they had a search warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window in respondent's garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to dissuade occupants from rushing to the weapons stash the informant had told them was in the garage. Awakened by the noise and fearful that his house was being burglarized, respondent grabbed a pistol and fired it into the garage ceiling. When the officers shouted "police," respondent surrendered and was taken into custody. After he admitted that he had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another in the house, and that he was a convicted felon, respondent was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. The District Court granted his motion to suppress evidence regarding weapons possession, ruling that the officers had violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109 because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify their destruction of property in executing the warrant. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. The Fourth Amendment does not hold officers to a higher standard when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property. It is obvious from the holdings in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 936, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976, 115 S. Ct. 1914, and Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2794, that such an entry's lawfulness does not depend on whether property is damaged in the course of the entry. Under Richards, a no-knock entry is justified if police have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would "be dangerous or futile, or . . . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2794, *16. Whether such a reasonable suspicion exists does not depend on whether police must destroy property in order to enter. This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment does not speak to the manner of executing a warrant. Such execution is governed by the general touchstone of reasonableness that applies to all Fourth Amendment analysis. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S. Ct. 330. Excessive or unnecessary property destruction during a search may violate the Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression. Applying these principles to the facts at hand demonstrates that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The police certainly had a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence might be dangerous to themselves or others, in that a reliable informant had told them that Alan Shelby might be in respondent's home, an officer had confirmed this possibility, and Shelby had a violent past and possible access to a large supply of weapons and had vowed that he "would not do federal time." Moreover, the manner in which the entry was accomplished was clearly reasonable, in that the police broke but a single window in the garage to discourage Shelby, or anyone else, from rushing to the weapons that the informant had told them were there. Pp. 3-5.

2. The officers executing the warrant did not violate § 3109, which provides: "The officer may break open any . . . window . . . to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance . . . ." Contrary to respondent's contention, that statute does not specify the only circumstances under which an officer executing a warrant may damage property. By its terms § 3109 prohibits nothing, but merely authorizes officers to damage property in certain instances. Even accepting arguendo that it implicitly forbids some of what it does not expressly permit, it is of no help to respondent. In both Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332, 78 S. Ct. 1190, and Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591, n. 8, 20 L. Ed. 2d 828, 88 S. Ct. 1755, this Court noted that § 3109's prior notice requirement codified a common-law tradition. The Court now makes clear that § 3109 also codified the exceptions to the common-law requirement of notice before entry. Because that is the case, and because the common law informs the Fourth Amendment, Wilson and Richards serve as guideposts in construing the statute. In Wilson, the Court concluded that the common-law announcement principle is an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, but noted that the principle was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. 514 U.S. at 934. In Richards, the Court articulated the test used to determine whether exigent circumstances justify a particular no-knock entry. 520 U.S. at ___. Thus, § 3109 includes an exigent circumstances exception and that exception's applicability in a given instance is measured by the same standard articulated in Richards. The police met that standard here. Pp. 6-7.

91 F.3d 1297, reversed and remanded.

COUNSEL: David C. Frederick argued the cause for petitioner.

Michael R. Levine argued the cause for respondent.

JUDGES: REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

OPINION BY: REHNQUIST

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Richards v. Wisconsin, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2794, *16 (1997), we held that so-called "no-knock" entries are justified when police officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would "be dangerous or futile, or . . . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." In this case, we must decide whether the Fourth Amendment holds officers to a higher standard than this when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property. We hold that it does not.

Alan Shelby was a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences in the Oregon State prison system. On November 1, 1994 the Tillamook County Sheriff's Office took temporary custody of Shelby, expecting to transport him to the Tillamook County Courthouse, where he was scheduled to testify. On the way to the Courthouse, Shelby slipped his handcuffs, knocked over a deputy sheriff, and escaped from custody.

It was not the first time Shelby had attempted escape. In 1991 he struck an officer, kicked out a jail door, assaulted a woman, stole her vehicle, and used it to ram a police vehicle. Another time he attempted escape by using a rope made from torn bedsheets. He was reported to have made threats to kill witnesses and police officers, to have tortured people with a hammer, and to have said that he would "not do federal time." App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. It was also thought that Shelby had had access to large supplies of weapons.

Shortly after learning of Shelby's escape, the authorities sent out a press release, seeking information that would lead to his recapture. On November 3, a reliable confidential informant told ATF Agent George Kim that on the previous day he had seen a person he believed to be Shelby at respondent Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Kim and the informant then drove to an area near respondent's home, from where Kim observed a man working outside who resembled Shelby.

Based on this information, a Deputy U.S. Marshal sought and received a "no-knock" warrant granting permission to enter and search Ramirez's home. Around this time, the confidential informant also told authorities that respondent might have a stash of guns and drugs hidden in his garage. In the early morning of November 5, approximately 45 officers gathered to execute the warrant. The officers set up a portable loud speaker system and began announcing that they had a search warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window in the garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to dissuade any of the occupants from rushing to the weapons the officers believed might be in the garage.

Respondent and his family were asleep inside the house at the time this activity began. Awakened by the noise, respondent believed that they were being burglarized. He ran to his utility closet, grabbed a pistol, and fired it into the ceiling of his garage. The officers fired back and shouted "police." At that point respondent realized that it was law enforcement officers who were trying to enter his home. He ran to the living room, threw his pistol away, and threw himself onto the floor. Shortly thereafter, he, his wife, and their child left the house and were taken into police custody. Respondent waived his Miranda rights, and then admitted that he had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another gun that was inside the house, and that he was a convicted felon. Officers soon obtained another search warrant, which they used to return to the house and retrieve the two guns. Shelby was not found.

Respondent was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court granted his motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, ruling that the police officers had violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109 because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a.

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