Calderon v. Ashmus
| Decision Date | 26 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | 97391 |
| Citation | 140 L.Ed.2d 970,118 S.Ct. 1694,523 U.S. 740 |
| Parties | Arthur CALDERON, Warden, et al., Petitioners, v. Troy A. ASHMUS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides, inter alia, an expedited review process-including a 180-day filing period, 28 U.S.C.A. §2263(a)-for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. Proceedings against other States are governed by Chapter 153, which has a 1-year filing period, §2244(d)(1), and lacks expedited procedures. After California officials, including petitioner state attorney general, indicated that they would invoke Chapter 154's protections, respondent, a state capital prisoner, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve whether the Chapter applied to a class of capital prisoners whose convictions were affirmed after a particular date. The Federal District Court issued a declaratory judgment, holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154 and therefore the Chapter did not apply to the class, and enjoined petitioners from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit rejected petitioners' claim that the Eleventh Amendment barred respondent's suit; determined that the District Court had authority to issue a declaratory judgment under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act; and rejected petitioners' contention that the injunction violated the First Amendment. Before reaching the Eleventh and First Amendment issues on which certiorari was granted, this Court must address whether the action is the type of "Article III'' "case or controversy'' to which federal courts are limited. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607-608, 107 L.Ed.2d 603.
Held: This action is not a justiciable case under Article III. The Declaratory Judgment Act validly confers jurisdiction on federal courts to enter declaratory judgments in cases where the controversy would admit "of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.'' Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617. Here, rather than seeking a final or conclusive determination of the underlying controversy-whether respondent is entitled to federal habeas relief-respondent carved out of that claim only the question whether, when he sought habeas relief, California's defense would be governed by Chapter 153 or Chapter 154. He would have obtained such a determination in a habeas action itself, but he seeks instead to have an advance ruling on the collateral issue. The Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used for this purpose. See, e.g., Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316, 65 S.Ct. 298, 89 L.Ed. 264. Such an action's disruptive effects are peculiarly great when the underlying claims must be adjudicated in federal habeas, for it would allow respondent to obtain a declaration as to the applicable limitations period without ever having shown that he has met the exhaustion-of-state-remedies requirement. If class members file habeas petitions and the State asserts Chapter 154, they can litigate California's compliance with the Chapter at that time. The risk associated with resolving the issue in habeas rather than in a pre-emptive suit is no different from risks associated with choices that litigants commonly face. Respondent mistakenly relies on Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, for Steffel falls within the traditional scope of declaratory judgment actions: It completely resolved a concrete controversy susceptible to conclusive judicial determination. Pp. ____-____.
123 F.3d 1199, reversed and remanded.
Ronald S. Matthias, San Francisco, CA, for petitioners.
Michael Laurence, San Francisco, CA, for respondent.
Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §2261 et seq. (Supp.1998), provides certain procedural advantages to qualifying States in federal habeas proceedings. This case requires us to decide whether state death-row inmates may sue state officials for declaratory and injunctive relief limited to determining whether California qualifies under Chapter 154.
Chapter 154 revises procedural rules for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases. Most notably, it provides for an expedited review process in proceedings brought against qualifying States. It imposes a 180-day limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. §2263(a). It treats an untimely petition as a successive petition for purposes of obtaining a stay of execution, §2262(c), and it allows a prisoner to amend a petition after an answer is filed only where the prisoner meets the requirements for a successive petition, §2266(b)(3)(B). Chapter 154 also obligates a federal district court to render a final judgment on any petition within 180 days of its filing, and a court of appeals to render a final determination within 120 days of the briefing. §§2266(a) and (c).
As a general rule, Chapter 153-which has a 1-year filing period, §2244(d)(1), and lacks expedited review procedures-governs federal habeas proceedings against a State. Chapter 154 will apply in capital cases only if the state meets certain conditions. A State must establish "a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel'' in state post-conviction proceedings, and "must provide standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel.'' §2261(b) (); §2265(a) (). 1 The State must offer counsel to all capital defendants, and the state court must enter an order concerning appointment of counsel. §2261(b); §2265(b). If a State meets these criteria, then it may invoke Chapter 154.
Various California officials, including petitioner Attorney General Lungren, publicly indicated that they thought California qualified under Chapter 154 and that they intended to invoke the Chapter's protections. Respondent Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit against petitioners. The class, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied.
The District Court issued a declaratory judgment holding that California does not presently qualify for Chapter 154 and that Chapter 154 therefore does not apply to any class members. It also issued a preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from "trying or seeking to obtain for the State of California the benefits of the provisions of Chapter 154 . . . in any state or federal proceedings involving any class member.'' 935 F.Supp. 1048, 1076 (N.D.Cal.1996).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 123 F.3d 1199 (1997). As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' claim that the Eleventh Amendment barred respondent's suit as one against the State. The court concluded that the case falls within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), because respondent sufficiently alleged a continuing violation of federal law. 123 F.3d, at 1204-1206. California's announced intention to invoke Chapter 154, without having complied with its requirements, threatened to violate the class members' right to thorough federal review of their first habeas petitions, pursuant to Chapter 153, and their right to assistance of counsel in federal habeas proceedings, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §848(q). By stating its intention to invoke Chapter 154, the Court of Appeals reasoned, California forced inmates to make an unacceptable choice: filing a pro se petition within 180 days in order to ensure compliance with Chapter 154, which may fail to raise substantial claims, or waiting until counsel is appointed, which may miss the 180-day filing deadline if Chapter 154 applies. 123 F.3d, at 1204-1205.
The Court of Appeals also determined that the District Court had authority to issue a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. §2201(a). 123 F.3d, at 1206-1207. It noted that a declaratory judgment plaintiff need only demonstrate an independent basis of federal jurisdiction and an actual case or controversy. Id., at 1206. The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 because the case challenged the interpretation of a federal act. And the case or controversy requirement was satisfied, the court concluded, because "the State's threats to invoke Chapter 154 will significantly affect the plaintiff-class's ability to obtain habeas corpus review by a federal court.'' 123 F.3d, at 1207.
The Court of Appeals agreed in large part with the District Court's conclusion that California does not qualify, and therefore found Chapter 154 inapplicable. In affirming the grant of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' contention that enjoining their advocacy of a particular legal position violates the First Amendment. It thought the injunction did not interfere with the state officials' rights since they were free to voice their opinion that the decision was wrong-only not in court in order to invoke the benefits of Chapter 154. Id., at 1207-1209.
Petitioners sought review in this Court. We granted certiorari on both the Eleventh Amendment and the First Amendment issues, 522 U.S. ----, ...
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