Plaza Properties v. PRIME BUSINESS INVEST., A99A1053.
Decision Date | 02 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. A99A1053.,A99A1053. |
Citation | 524 S.E.2d 306,240 Ga. App. 639 |
Parties | PLAZA PROPERTIES, LTD. et al. v. PRIME BUSINESS INVESTMENTS, INC. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joe A. Weeks, Avondale Estates, for appellants.
Tobin & Hoffspiegel, Thomas W. Tobin, Valerie G. Tobin, Atlanta, for appellee.
Prime Business Investments, Inc. sued Plaza Properties, Ltd. and its sole shareholder, Wayne Weeks, for breach of contract relating to a commission on the sale of a coin laundry business. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Prime. The defendants appeal, arguing that they were denied their right to a jury trial and that the evidence did not support the judgment. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to Weeks but reverse with respect to Plaza Properties.
1. When defendants filed their answer on January 27, 1997, they did not include a demand for trial by jury. On August 1, 1997, the trial court notified the parties that the case was scheduled for a non-jury trial on September 10, 1997. On September 3, Plaza Properties filed a written demand for a jury trial. Following a hearing on September 9, which was apparently not transcribed, the trial court entered an order rejecting the jury demand, stating that it did not comply with the court's standing order requiring jury demands to be filed ten days before trial.1 The court then continued the trial until the next non-jury calendar because defendants' counsel had a conflict.
The case was then scheduled for trial on November 7, 1997. Before the start of trial, the court asked counsel if there were "[a]ny other matters we need to take up before opening statements." Defendants' counsel did not raise any objection to proceeding without a jury and did not object to the trial court rendering judgment on the merits.
Because defendants participated in the bench trial without objection, they cannot, after having received an adverse decision, now complain that they were denied the right to a jury trial.
2. Defendants contend that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence in several respects. In considering this enumeration, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to support the trial court's judgment.5 Moreover, in a bench trial, the trial court is the trier of fact, and its findings will be upheld on appeal if there is any evidence to support them. 6
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence showed as follows. In February 1995, Prime entered into a listing agreement with Peter Antoniades, the owner of Plaza Coin Laundry, in which Prime agreed to attempt to procure a purchaser for the laundry. Prime then began advertising and promoting the sale of the business. In response to an advertisement, Weeks contacted Prime to investigate the possibility of purchasing the laundry. On March 7, 1995, Weeks met with Mark McCurry, a sales agent with Prime. In return for Prime providing certain information regarding the laundry, including its name, location, asking price, and monthly rent, Weeks signed a contract agreeing to negotiate only through Prime for the purchase of the laundry. Weeks agreed that, if he violated the terms of the contract, he would be liable to Prime for any lost commission. Weeks also acknowledged that Prime was the first entity to provide him with the information about the laundry. After Weeks signed the contract, McCurry provided him with additional financial information about the laundry, including its sales and profitability.
After meeting with McCurry, Weeks sent him a letter stating that he was interested in the laundry and requesting further financial information about the business. McCurry testified that he subsequently tried to telephone Weeks, but that Weeks would not return his calls. This indicated to McCurry that Weeks was no longer interested in the purchase.
On March 30, 1995, without Prime's involvement, Weeks and Antoniades entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the laundry, with a purchase price of $165,000. The agreement, which was prepared by Weeks, stated that Robert Bader was the only agent authorized to sell the business, and provided that Bader would receive a $5,000 commission, less than one-third of what Prime would have been entitled to under its listing agreement with Antoniades. Weeks subsequently formed a corporation, Plaza Properties, of which he is the sole shareholder. The sale of the laundry was consummated on April 14, 1995, with Plaza Properties as the purchaser. Weeks executed the closing documents as president of Plaza Properties.
(a) Weeks contends that he is not liable to Prime for lost commission because Prime was entitled to a commission from Antoniades only if it was the procuring cause of the sale. However, the question is not whether Prime was in fact entitled to a commission from Antoniades, but whether it would have been entitled to a commission if Weeks had not breached his contract with Prime. Under that contract, Weeks agreed to negotiate for the purchase of the property only through Prime. Had Weeks in fact done so, Prime would have been entitled to a commission from Antoniades as the procuring cause of the sale. Accordingly, there was evidence to support the trial court's finding that Weeks was liable for breach of contract.7
(b) Weeks also contends that there was no consideration for his contract with Prime. This contention is without merit, as the contract clearly provides that the consideration consisted of Prime's providing certain information to Weeks regarding the business, including its name, location, and asking price.8
(c) Weeks argues that there was no evidence to support the trial court's award of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. This contention also lacks merit. Under OCGA § 13-6-11, attorney fees may be awarded where there is bad faith "in defendant's carrying out the provisions of the contract."9 In this case, there was sufficient evidence of Weeks' bad faith to justify an award of attorney fees. In exchange for the name and location of the business, as well as financial information regarding the business, Weeks agreed to negotiate only through Prime for the purchase of the business. Weeks then proceeded to enter into separate negotiations with the...
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