Bryan v U.S.

Citation118 S.Ct. 1939,141 L.Ed.2d 197,524 U.S. 184
Decision Date15 June 1998
Docket Number968422
Parties122 F.3d 90, affirmed. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SILLASSE BRYAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES8422 [
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was convicted of "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The question presented is whether the term "willfully" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful, or whether it also requires proof that he knew of the federal licensing requirement.

I

In 1968 Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 82 Stat. 197 239. In Title IV of that Act Congress made findings concerning the impact of the traffic in firearms on the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States1 and amended the Criminal Code to include detailed provisions regulating the use and sale of firearms. As amended, 18 U.S.C. § 922 defined a number of "unlawful acts"; subsection (a)(1) made it unlawful for any person except a licensed dealer to engage in the business of dealing in firearms.2 Section 923 established the federal licensing program and repeated the prohibition against dealing in firearms without a license, and §924 specified the penalties for violating "any provision of this chapter." Read literally, §924 authorized the imposition of a fine of up to $5,000 or a prison sentence of not more than five years, "or both," on any person who dealt in firearms without a license even if that person believed that he or she was acting lawfully.3 As enacted in 1968, §922(a)(1) and §924 omitted an express scienter requirement and therefore arguably imposed strict criminal liability on every unlicensed dealer in firearms. The 1968 Act also omitted any definition of the term "engaged in the business" even though that conduct was an element of the unlawful act prohibited by §922(a)(1).

In 1986 Congress enacted the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), in part, to cure these omissions. The findings in that statute explained that additional legislation was necessary to protect law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms for lawful purposes.4 FOPA therefore amended §921 to include a definition of the term "engaged in the business,"5 and amended §924 to add a scienter requirement as a condition to the imposition of penalties for most of the unlawful acts defined in §922. For three categories of offenses the intent required is that the defendant acted "knowingly"; for the fourth category, which includes "any other provision of this chapter," the required intent is that the defendant acted "willfully."6 The §922(a)(1)(A)7 offense at issue in this case is an "other provision" in the "willfully" category.

II

The jury having found petitioner guilty, we accept the Government's version of the evidence. That evidence proved that petitioner did not have a federal license to deal in firearms; that he used so-called "straw purchasers" in Ohio to acquire pistols that he could not have purchased himself; that the straw purchasers made false statements when purchasing the guns; that petitioner assured the straw purchasers that he would file the serial numbers off the guns; and that he resold the guns on Brooklyn street corners known for drug dealing. The evidence was unquestionably adequate to prove that petitioner was dealing in firearms, and that he knew that his conduct was unlawful.8 There was, however, no evidence that he was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license.

Petitioner was charged with a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), by willfully engaging in the business of dealing in firearms, and with a substantive violation of that provision.9 After the close of evidence, petitioner requested that the trial judge instruct the jury that petitioner could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement,10 but the judge rejected this request. Instead, the trial judge gave this explanation of the term "willfully":

"A person acts willfully if he acts intentionally and purposely and with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. Now, the person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct may be violating. But he must act with the intent to do something that the law forbids."11

Petitioner was found guilty on both counts. On appeal he argued that the evidence was insufficient because there was no proof that he had knowledge of the federal licensing requirement, and that the trial judge had erred by failing to instruct the jury that such knowledge was an essential element of the offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It concluded that the instructions were proper and that the Government had elicited "ample proof " that petitioner had acted willfully. App. 22.

Because the Eleventh Circuit has held that it is necessary for the Government to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the licensing requirement, United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549, 553 554 (1996), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

III

The word "willfully" is sometimes said to be "a word of many meanings" whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears. See, e.g., Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943). Most obviously it differentiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct, but in the criminal law it also typically refers to a culpable state of mind. As we explained in United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933), a variety of phrases have been used to describe that concept.12 As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a "willful" act is one undertaken with a "bad purpose."13 In other words, in order to establish a "willful" violation of a statute, "the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994).

Petitioner argues that a more particularized showing is required in this case for two principal reasons. First, he argues that the fact that Congress used the adverb "knowingly" to authorize punishment of three categories of acts made unlawful by §922 and the word "willfully" when it referred to unlicensed dealing in firearms demonstrates that the Government must shoulder a special burden in cases like this. This argument is not persuasive because the term "knowingly" does not necessarily have any reference to a culpable state of mind or to knowledge of the law. As Justice Jackson correctly observed, "the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law."14 Thus, in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), we held that the prosecution fulfills its burden of proving a knowing violation of the escape statute "if it demonstrates that an escapee knew his actions would result in his leaving physical confinement without permission." Id., at 408. And in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), we held that a charge that the defendant's possession of an unregistered machinegun was unlawful required proof "that he knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a machinegun." Id., at 602. It was not, however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew that his possession was unlawful. See Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. ___, ___ (1998) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1 3). Thus, unless the text of the statute dictates a different result,15 the term "knowingly" merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

With respect to the three categories of conduct that are made punishable by §924 if performed "knowingly," the background presumption that every citizen knows the law makes it unnecessary to adduce specific evidence to prove that "an evil-meaning mind" directed the "evil-doing hand."16 More is required, however, with respect to the conduct in the fourth category that is only criminal when done "willfully." The jury must find that the defendant acted with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.

Petitioner next argues that we must read §924(a)(1)(D) to require knowledge of the law because of our interpretation of "willfully" in two other contexts. In certain cases involving willful violations of the tax laws, we have concluded that the jury must find that the defendant was aware of the specific provision of the tax code that he was charged with violating. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).17 Similarly, in order to satisfy a willful violation in Ratzlaf, we concluded that the jury had to find that the defendant knew that his structuring of cash transactions to avoid a reporting requirement was unlawful. See 510 U.S., at 138, 149. Those cases, however, are readily distinguishable. Both the tax cases18 and Ratzlaf19 involved highly technical statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.20 As a result, we held that these statutes "carv[e] out an exception to the traditional rule" that ignorance of the law is no excuse21 and require that the defendant have knowledge of the law.22 The danger of convicting individuals engaged in apparently innocent activity that motivated our decisions in the tax cases and Ratzlaf is not present here because the jury found that this petitioner knew that his conduct was unlawful.23

Thus, the willfulness requirement of §924(a)(1)(D) does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.

IV

Petitioner advances a number of additional arguments based on his reading of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
517 cases
  • Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. v. Hiscox Ins. Co., 6:20-CV-06025 EAW
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • 11 Junio 2020
    ...be ‘a word of many meanings’ whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears." Bryan v. United States , 524 U.S. 184, 191, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998). "The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from ac......
  • State v. Newton
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 16 Octubre 2018
    ..."wilfully"—an "intermediate" level of intent—is exemplified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bryan v. United States , 524 U.S. 184, 195–96, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998). See United States v. George , supra, 386 F.3d at 391. In Bryan , the Supreme Court "declined to apply th......
  • U.S. v. Talebnejad
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 28 Septiembre 2004
    ...High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.1990). 7. See also Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998): As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a "willful" act is one undertaken with a "bad ......
  • People v. Magnant
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 30 Julio 2021
    ...posed by overreliance on the general-intent/specific-intent distinction." Rather, I would focus on the term "knowingly" itself. In Bryan v. United States ,8 the United States Supreme Court discussed this term at length and made clear that the term "knowingly" does not necessarily have any r......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • ITAR Criminal Violations — Where The Less You Know Is Not Necessarily The Better
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • 26 Febrero 2014
    ...courts have done in the past, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court decision in Bryan v. United States (524 U.S. 184 1998) (in which the Supreme Court held that specific knowledge of a firearms licensing requirement under Firearm Owners' Protection Act (FOPA),......
8 books & journal articles
  • FALSE STATEMENTS AND FALSE CLAIMS
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review No. 58-3, July 2021
    • 1 Julio 2021
    ...§ 1001, the government must prove that “the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful” (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1998))), and United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying rule that government must prove defendant acted......
  • Specific Environmental Statutes
    • United States
    • Environmental crimes deskbook 2nd edition Part Three
    • 20 Junio 2014
    ...701. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994); Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193-96 (1998). 702. See, e.g ., United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). 703. United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506, 509 (......
  • FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review No. 58-3, July 2021
    • 1 Julio 2021
    ...means that an act was undertaken with a ‘bad purpose,’ that is, with knowledge that the act is unlawful” (citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1998))). 131. See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 449 (5th. Cir. 2007) (holding that government need not prove that defendants s......
  • HEALTH CARE FRAUD
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review No. 58-3, July 2021
    • 1 Julio 2021
    ...166, 176 (4th Cir. 2014). 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a). 38. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)). 39. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) (quoting Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191). 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h); D......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT