525 F.2d 323 (2nd Cir. 1975), 6, International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America (UAW) v. National Caucus of Labor Committees

• Citation: 525 F.2d 323
• Party Name: INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW), Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL CAUCUS OF LABOR COMMITTEES et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Case Date: November 12, 1975
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

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525 F.2d 323 (2nd Cir. 1975)

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW),

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NATIONAL CAUCUS OF LABOR COMMITTEES et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Motion No. 6, Docket 75--7470.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

November 12, 1975

Argued Sept. 23, 1975.

Roger L. Zissu, New York City (Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C.), for plaintiff-appellee.

Jay C. Carlisle, II, Buffalo, N.Y., for defendants-appellants. David S. Heller, New York City, for International Press Service and Campaigner Publications, Inc.

Before FRIENDLY, HAYS and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.

HAYS, Circuit Judge:

Defendants seek review of an order below denying their motions for leave to take depositions by tape recorder pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(4). Should this Court find the order to be interlocutory

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and therefore nonappealable, defendants seek review by way of mandamus. The appeal is dismissed and mandamus denied.

This suit involves a controversy between two labor organizations. Central to the action are publications of each union--plaintiff's 'Solidarity' and defendants' 'New Solidarity.' Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendants' publication infringed their trademark and name and charges defendants with fraudulent conduct in order to discredit plaintiff. Defendants deny plaintiff's charges and plead various counterclaims, including libel and assault upon those who distribute 'New Solidarity.'

Plaintiff has taken several depositions which were recorded by the usual stenographic means. Defendants allege that the taking of depositions is essential to them and, claiming financial inability to take depositions before a reporter, moved for permission to tape record the depositions. Defendants contemplate the use of three tape recorders operated under the supervision of their counsel to ensure accurate recordings. One tape is to be deposited with the court, one tape given to plaintiff's counsel, and the third tape transcribed by a member of defendants' organization.

The district court referred the motion to a magistrate for hearing and recommendation. The magistrate found that the defendants had not made a convincing showing of financial inability to take depositions before a reporter, but did not rest his recommendation that the motion be denied on this point alone. The magistrate found that because the suit had serious political overtones there existed the possibility that the tapes would be abused, and indicated agreement with plaintiff's contention that the proposed recording and transcribing by persons interested in the outcome of the suit was most inadvisable. Additionally, the unusual circumstances of this case, the magistrate found, raised a danger that deposition discovery would be extended to unreasonable and possibly harassing limits, a danger which would hardly be abated by allowing alternate means of recordation.

On the basis of the magistrate's report and recommendation, as to which the court received no objection from counsel, the district court denied defendants' motions.

I.

As a general rule orders denying or directing discovery are interlocutory and therefore not appealable except as part of a final decision disposing of an entire case on its merits. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906); Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 524 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Fried, 386 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1967); American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967).

Defendants argue that the order from which they seek to appeal is 'final' and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it is a final collateral order under the rule of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). While discovery orders are often 'separable from, and collateral to rights asserted in the action,' Cohen, supra at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225, they rarely satisfy the further requisites for appealability under the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Committee, supra, (denial of motion to compel certain pretrial discovery proceedings and their recording on tape non-appealable); Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1974) (appeal of order that grand jury testimony be released to plaintiff dismissed); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 980, 94 S.Ct. 2413, 40 L.Ed.2d 777 (1974) (order compelling production of documents contrary to claim of work-product immunity non-appealable); American Express Warehousing, supra, (appeal of order directing production of documents contrary to appellant's

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assertion of work-product privilege dismissed); Horvath v. Letay, 343 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (appeal of order denying examination of non-party in aid of pre-judgment attachment dismissed).

To be appealable under Cohen an order must present 'a serious and unsettled question,' which is 'too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated' because awaiting final judgment would preclude effective review where rights asserted would be irreparably lost. 337 U.S. at 546--47, 69 S.Ct. 1221. This Court has repeatedly indicated that...