Adoption of T.R.M., Matter of

Decision Date06 July 1988
Docket NumberNo. 64S03-8807-JV-607,64S03-8807-JV-607
Citation525 N.E.2d 298
PartiesIn the Matter of ADOPTION OF T.R.M., An Indian Child. and J.Q., (Natural Mother), Appellant, v. D.R.L. and E.M.L. (Adoptive Parents), Appellees.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

DICKSON, Justice.

The power of state courts to conduct adoption proceedings involving children of Indian ancestry may be subject to significant limitations under the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA"), 25 U.S.C. Secs. 1901-1963 (1982). The central issue in this case is whether a state adoption proceeding was proper and valid under the ICWA.

T.R.M. ("the child") was born on June 14, 1981, in Hot Springs, South Dakota. Her biological mother is J.Q. Her paternity has not been established. In the summer of 1974, J.Q. met D.R.L. and E.M.L. ("adoptive parents") when the adoptive parents began travelling to the Pine Ridge Reservation, Shannon County, South Dakota, where the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe ("Tribe") is located. The adoptive parents went to the reservation to visit a mission sponsored by their church organization. During the ensuing years, J.Q. and the adoptive parents became good friends. On two separate occasions J.Q. asked the adoptive parents if they would take her children and raise them if anything ever happened to her. The adoptive parents agreed to do so. During this time, the adoptive parents met and became friends with J.Q.'s since-divorced husband, G.C.M. ("the former husband").

In April, 1981, J.Q. telephoned the adoptive parents at their residence in Porter County, Indiana, requesting that they keep their prior promise and adopt her unborn child. J.Q. called again in May, 1981, to confirm the plans for the adoption. The adoptive parents agreed to adopt the child.

The child was born out of wedlock on June 14, 1981, not on the reservation, but in a hospital at Hot Springs, South Dakota. On June 19, 1981, J.Q. telephoned the adoptive parents informing them that the child had been born and requested that they come and get the baby. When the adoptive mother arrived in Hot Springs the following day, she went to see J.Q. at a motel where J.Q. lived with her other children. J.Q. asked the adoptive mother to take the child with her. The adoptive mother agreed, accepted the infant child, and took the child with her. The former husband was present and did not object to the transfer. On the next day, June 21, 1981, J.Q. signed a consent form to the adoption. The adoptive mother returned to Porter County, Indiana, with the child, who was then 7 days old. The child, now age seven, has resided with the adoptive parents in Porter County, Indiana, ever since.

Other than two telephone calls and two letters from J.Q. to the adoptive parents within two weeks after the adoptive mother returned to Indiana with the child, J.Q. made no further contact with either the child or the adoptive parents until she filed a habeas corpus action in the Porter Circuit Court in April of 1982. The Tribe also filed a similar action claiming jurisdiction in the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court. The trial court heard evidence on the petitions for habeas corpus relief on September 24, 1982, and on October 21, 1982, dismissed the Tribe's petition for failure to appear and present evidence at the hearing. The trial court also denied J.Q.'s petition and granted temporary custody of the child to the adoptive parents.

On September 22, 1982, the adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption of the child with the trial court. On November 29, 1982, the Indian tribal court, through the Indian Child Welfare Advocate, filed a motion to transfer the case to the Indian tribal court and attached a copy of an order of wardship of the child which had been entered by the Indian tribal court on September 21, 1982, the day prior to the adoptive parents' filing of the adoption petition in the trial court. On September 29, 1983, and October 19, 1983, the Porter Circuit Court heard evidence concerning the jurisdictional matter and the adoption proceeding, and on November 28, 1983, granted the adoption.

On appeal by the natural mother, the Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that exclusive jurisdiction had vested in the Indian tribal court pursuant to the order of wardship entered on September 21, 1982. Adoption of T.R.M. v. D.R.L. (1986), Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 156. We hereby grant transfer and affirm the trial court.

Since the principal thrust of the argument of appellant J.Q. and the Tribe is that the Porter Circuit Court adoption proceedings and judgment are contrary to the ICWA, the public policy goals of Congress in enacting the ICWA are of particular importance. In this regard, we find particularly helpful the following observations of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D (1985), Okla., 742 P.2d 1059, 1062-63, reh'g denied (1987), cert. denied, (1988), --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1042, 98 L.Ed.2d 1005:

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is structured around the concern "that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies" and in non-Indian homes and institutions. [25 U.S.C. Sec. 1901(4) ] Congress has declared the policy of this Nation in passing the ICWA as follows:

"... [T]o protect the best interest of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture...." [25 U.S.C. Sec. 1902]

The central thrust and concern of the ICWA is, therefore, "the establishment of minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families".

Numerous provisions of the act support this conclusion.

Section 1901(4) states:

"[A]n alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them...."

Section 1911(a) provides exclusive jurisdiction in the Indian tribe:

"Over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation...."

Section 1912 addresses pending court proceedings. Subsection (d) requires:

"Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. ["] (emphasis added).

Subsection (e) declares:

"No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." (emphasis added).

Subsection (f) states:

"No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional physical damage to the child. ["] (emphasis added).

The Indian Child Welfare Act is applicable, therefore, when we are confronted with the removal of Indian children from their families. The purpose of the act is to promote the best interest of Indian children through promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families. The act is applicable when you have Indian children being removed from their existing Indian environment.

[emphasis in original; footnotes deleted]

In the case before us, the child's biological ancestry is Indian. However, except for the first five days after birth, her entire life of seven years to date has been spent with her non-Indian adoptive parents in a non-Indian culture. While the purpose of the ICWA is to protect Indian children from improper removal from their existing Indian family units, such purpose cannot be served in the present case before this Court. From the unique facts of this case, where the child was abandoned to the adoptive mother essentially at the earliest practical moment after childbirth and initial hospital care, we cannot discern how the subsequent adoption proceeding constituted a "breakup of the Indian family." We therefore hold that, separate from and independent of our consideration of the merits of appellant's specific issues, the ICWA should not be applied to the present case in which the purpose and intent of Congress cannot be achieved thereby.

However, notwithstanding our decision that the ICWA should not apply to the adoption proceeding in the instant case, we shall proceed to independently discuss the issues raised, as a separate and independent basis for our decision. 1

The ICWA is facially implicated because the parties have stipulated that J.Q. is an Indian, that the child is an Indian child, and that the Tribe is the Indian child's tribe, all as defined in Sec. 1903 of the ICWA. Section 1911 of the ICWA provides:

(a) Exclusive jurisdiction

An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of...

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