State v. Coleman
| Citation | 37 Ohio St.3d 286,525 N.E.2d 792 |
| Decision Date | 06 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-192,87-192 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. COLEMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Pursuant to R.C. 2903.01, a person may be found guilty of aggravated murder under two different circumstances. Under the first, aggravated murder is committed when a person purposely, and with prior calculation and design, causes the death of another. Under the second, a person is guilty if he or she purposely causes the death of another while committing, attempting, or fleeing after committing kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, or escape. In the second of these situations, if the jury is instructed that the requisite intent to cause death may be inferred from the fact that defendant engaged in a common design with others to commit the offense by force or violence, the jury also must be instructed that the inference is nonconclusive.
2. Under R.C. 2923.03, a person may be an accomplice in an offense and prosecuted as the principal offender if, among other things, he aids or abets another in committing the offense while acting with the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.
3. Scheme, plan, or system testimony of other acts is admissible to establish motive or intent where the similarities in the crimes indicate there is a strong likelihood that the offender in the solved crime also committed the unsolved crime.
4. To discharge a court-appointed attorney, the defendant must show a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
Alton Coleman and Debra D. Brown bicycled into Norwood, Ohio, on July 13, 1984, at about 9:30 a.m. About three hours later, they drove away in Harry Walters' car, leaving Harry Walters unconscious and Marlene Walters dead.
Harry Walters survived. He testified that Coleman and Brown inquired about a camping trailer he had been offering for sale. Upon agreement to sell the trailer, Harry Walters invited Coleman and Brown into his home. He sat on the couch as he and Coleman discussed the trailer title. Coleman picked up a wooden candlestick and, after admiring it, hit Harry Walters on the back of the head. The force of the blow broke the candlestick and drove an island of bone against Mr. Walters' brain. Mr. Walters remembered little else.
Sheri Walters, Harry and Marlene's daughter, came home from work at about 3:45 p.m. At the bottom of the basement steps, she found her father, barely alive, and her mother, dead. Both had ligatures around their throats and electrical cords tied around their bare feet. Her mother's hands were bound behind her back and her father's hands were handcuffed behind his back. Her mother's head was covered with a bloody sheet.
Expert testimony indicated Marlene Walters had been struck on the head approximately twenty to twenty-five times. Twelve lacerations, some of which were made with a pair of vice grips, covered her face and scalp. The back of her skull was smashed to pieces. Parts of her skull and brain were missing.
The living room hallway, and basement, were splattered with blood. Fragments of a broken soda bottle, bearing Coleman's fingerprints, were found in the living room. Strands of Marlene Walters' hair were found on a blood-stained magazine rack located in the living room. Bloody footprints, made by two different kinds of shoes, were found in the basement.
The family car, a red Plymouth Reliant, was gone. Money, jewelry, and shoes had been stolen. Left behind were two bicycles, clothes and shoes.
Coleman was found guilty of aggravated murder while committing aggravated burglary under R.C. 2903.01. The jury found Coleman was the principal offender of this offense. He was also found to be a participant in a course of conduct involving the purposeful attempt to kill two or more persons pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).
The jury also found Coleman guilty of aggravated murder while committing aggravated robbery under R.C. 2903.01 and found he was the principal offender. They also found, as in the first charge, that Coleman participated in a course of conduct involving the purposeful attempt to kill two or more people. Finally, the jury found Coleman guilty of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated robbery (theft of a motor vehicle and other personal property, after inflicting serious physical harm upon Harry Walters), and aggravated burglary.
The jury concluded that the death penalty was appropriate and the trial judge ultimately agreed. The sentence of death was imposed for the aggravated murder convictions. Terms of incarceration were imposed for the remaining convictions.
The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence of death. The court, however, found the trial court erred by not specifically indicating in jury instructions regarding complicity that the inference created in a felony-murder charge is nonconclusive. The appellate court held this error to be harmless.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Arthur M. Ney, Jr., Pros. Atty., and William E. Breyer, Cincinnati, for appellee.
Cissell & Smith, Timothy A. Smith and D. Shannon Smith, Cincinnati, for appellant.
Coleman appeals his aggravated murder convictions and death sentence. We reject his appeal and affirm.
Appellant's first contention is that the guilt-phase jury instructions on complicity are flawed because they do not comport with R.C. 2903.01(D). 1 According to appellant, where a defendant is charged with aggravated murder in a capital case, jury instructions regarding complicity must specifically state that the inference that defendant intended to kill by aiding a crime is nonconclusive. Because this precise language was not part of the jury instructions, appellant argues the jury's verdict and death penalty recommendation are prejudicially tainted and must be reversed.
The state maintains the instructions are proper. The state argues that jury instructions must be read as a whole. By doing so in this case, the state contends the trial court effectively and clearly cautioned the jury that the inference created was nonconclusive. We agree.
Pursuant to R.C. 2903.01, a person may be found guilty of aggravated murder under two different circumstances. Under the first, aggravated murder is committed when a person purposely, and with prior calculation and design, causes the death of another. Under the second, a person is guilty if he or she purposely causes the death of another while committing, attempting, or fleeing after committing kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, or escape. In the second of these situations, if the jury is instructed that a purpose to kill may be inferred from the fact that defendant engaged in a common design with others to commit the offense by force or violence, the jury also must be instructed that the inference is nonconclusive.
Under R.C. 2923.03, a person may be an accomplice in an offense and prosecuted as the principal offender if, among other things, he aids or abets another in committing the offense while acting with the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense. The culpability required for aggravated murder is, of course, specific intent.
Coleman was alleged to have purposely killed Marlene Walters while committing or attempting aggravated burglary. Alternatively, the state alleged Coleman purposely killed the victim while committing or attempting aggravated robbery. He was alleged to be an accomplice in the commission of aggravated murder. 2
With regard to the allegation that Coleman committed aggravated murder while committing aggravated burglary, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The trial court gave the same basic instruction as that quoted above regarding the intent necessary for aggravated murder while committing or attempting aggravated robbery.
With regard to complicity, the judge gave the following instruction:
Appellant is, of course, correct that the trial court's instruction does not specifically say "the inference is nonconclusive." We have previously held, however, that jury instructions must be considered as a whole. State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772, certiorari denied (1980), 446 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 2169, 64 L.Ed.2d 798. When the jury instructions in the case before us are read as a whole, it is clear the trial court explained that the inference was nonconclusive. This was essentially done by indicating that mere association with one who perpetrates a crime does not render a...
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