Haddle v. Garrison

• Decision Date: 14 December 1998
• Docket Number: 971472
• Citation: 525 U.S. 121,119 S.Ct. 489,142 L.Ed.2d 502
• Parties: 132 F.3d 46, reversed and remanded. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 119 S.Ct. 489 142 L.Ed.2d 5021472 MICHAEL A. HADDLE, PETITIONER v. JEANETTE G. GARRISON et al. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT [
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

525 U.S. 121

119 S.Ct. 489

142 L.Ed.2d 502

132 F.3d 46, reversed and remanded

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

119 S.Ct. 489

142 L.Ed.2d 502

No. 97 1472

MICHAEL A. HADDLE, PETITIONER v. JEANETTE G. GARRISON et al.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[December 14, 1998]

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Michael A. Haddle, an at-will employee, alleges that respondents conspired to have him fired from his job in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and to deter him from testifying at a federal criminal trial. We hold that such interference with at-will employment may give rise to a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat §1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).

According to petitioner's complaint, a federal grand jury indictment in March 1995 charged petitioner's employer, Healthmaster, Inc., and respondents Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, officers of Healthmaster, with Medicare fraud. Petitioner cooperated with the federal agents in the investigation that preceded the indictment. He also appeared to testify before the grand jury pursuant to a subpoena, but did not testify due to the press of time. Petitioner was also expected to appear as a witness in the criminal trial resulting from the indictment.

Although Garrison and Kelly were barred by the Bankruptcy Court from participating in the affairs of Healthmaster, they conspired with G. Peter Molloy, Jr., one of the remaining officers of Healthmaster, to bring about petitioner's termination. They did this both to intimidate petitioner and to retaliate against him for his attendance at the federal-court proceedings.

Petitioner sued for damages in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, asserting a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and various state-law claims. Petitioner stated two grounds for relief under §1985(2): one for conspiracy to deter him from testifying in the upcoming criminal trial and one for conspiracy to retaliate against him for attending the grand jury proceedings. As §1985 demands, he also alleged that he had been "injured in his person or property" by the acts of respondents in violation of §1985(2) and that he was entitled to recover his damages occasioned by such injury against respondents jointly and severally.

Respondents moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because petitioner conceded that he was an at-will employee, the District Court granted the motion on the authority of Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (1987). In Morast, the Eleventh Circuit held that an at-will employee who is dismissed pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by §1985(2) has no cause of action. The Morast court explained that "to make out a cause of action under §1985(2) the plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury. Because Morast was an at will employee, . . . he had no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. Therefore, Morast's discharge did not constitute an actual injury under this statute." Id., at 930. Relying on its decision in Morast, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Judgt. order reported at 132 F.3d 46 (1997).

The Eleventh Circuit's rule in Morast conflicts with the holdings of the First and Ninth Circuits. See Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 868, 871 (CA1 1983), and Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 910 (CA9 1993). We therefore granted certiorari, 523 U.S. __ (1998), to decide whether petitioner was "injured in his property or person" when respondents induced his employer to terminate petitioner's at-will employment as part of a conspiracy prohibited by §1985(2).

Section 1985(2), in relevant part, proscribes conspiracies to "deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified."1 The statute provides that if one or more persons engaged in such a conspiracy "do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, . . . the party so injured may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury against any one or more of the conspirators." §1985(3). 2

Petitioner's action was dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because, in the Eleventh Circuit's view, he had not suffered an injury that could give rise to a claim for damages under §1985(2). We must, of course, assume that the facts as alleged in petitioner's complaint are true and that respondents engaged in a conspiracy prohibited by §1985(2). Our review in this case is accordingly confined to one question: Can petitioner state a claim for damages by alleging that a conspiracy proscribed by §1985(2) induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?3

We disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that petitioner must suffer an injury to a "constitutionally protected property interest" to state a claim for damages under §1985(2). Nothing in the language or purpose of the proscriptions in the first clause of §1985(2), nor in its attendant remedial provisions, establishes such a requirement. The gist of the wrong at which §1985(2) is directed is not deprivation of property, but intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings. The terms "injured in his person or property" define the harm that the victim may suffer as a result of the conspiracy to intimidate or retaliate. Thus, the fact that employment at will is not "property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause, see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 347 (1976), does not mean that loss of at-will employment may not "injur[e] [petitioner] in his person or property" for purposes of §1985(2).

We hold that the sort of harm alleged by petitioner here essentially third-party interference with at-will employment relationships states a claim for relief under §1985(2). Such harm has long been a compensable injury under tort law, and we see no reason to ignore this tradition in this case. As Thomas Cooley recognized:

"One who maliciously and without justifiable cause, induces an employer to discharge an employee, by means of false statements, threats or putting in fear, or perhaps by means of malevolent advice and persuasion, is liable in an action of tort to the employee for the damages thereby sustained. And it makes no difference whether the employment was for a fixed term not yet expired or is terminable at the will of the employer." 2 T. Cooley, Law of Torts 589 91 (3d ed. 1906) (emphasis added).

This Court also recognized in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915):

"The fact that the employment is at the will of the parties, respectively, does not make it one at the will of others. The employe has manifest interest in the freedom of the employer to...