Marquez v Screen Actors

Citation525 U.S. 33,119 S.Ct. 292,142 L.Ed.2d 242
Decision Date03 November 1998
Docket Number971056
Parties124 F.3d 1034, affirmed. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES1056 NAOMI MARQUEZ, PETITIONER v. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, INC., et al. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 452, as added, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), permits unions and employers to negotiate an agreement that requires union "membership" as a condition of employment for all employees. We have interpreted a proviso to this language to mean that the only "membership" that a union can require is the payment of fees and dues, NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963), and we have held that §8(a)(3) allows unions to collect and expend funds over the objection of nonmembers only to the extent they are used for collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment activities, Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745, 762 763 (1988). In this case, we must determine whether a union breaches its duty of fair representation when it negotiates a union security clause that tracks the language of §8(a)(3) without explaining, in the agreement, this Court's interpretation of that language.We conclude that it does not.

We are also asked to review the Court of Appeals' decision that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide a claim that a union breached the duty of fair representation by negotiating a clause that was inconsistent with the statute. We conclude that because this challenge to the union security clause was based purely on an alleged inconsistency with the statute, the Court of Appeals correctly held that this claim was within the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

I
A

The language of §8(a)(3) is at the heart of this case. In pertinent part, it provides as follows:

"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer

"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later . Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).

This section is the statutory authorization for "union security clauses," clauses that require employees to become "member[s]" of a union as a condition of employment. See Communications Workers v. Beck, supra, at 744 745.

The conclusion that §8(a)(3) permits union security clauses is not the end of the story. This Court has had several occasions to interpret §8(a)(3), and two of our conclusions about the language of that subsection bear directly on this case. First, in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 742 743 (citing Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954)), we held that although §8(a)(3) states that unions may negotiate a clause requiring "membership" in the union, an employee can satisfy the membership condition merely by paying to the union an amount equal to the union's initiation fees and dues. See also Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106, n. 16, 108 (1985). In other words, the membership that may be required "as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 742. Second, in Communications Workers v. Beck, supra, we considered whether the employee's "financial core" obligation included a duty to pay for support of union activities beyond those activities undertaken by the union as the exclusive bargaining representative. We held that the language of §8(a)(3) does not permit unions to exact dues or fees from employees for activities that are not germane to collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, or contract administration. Id., at 745, 762 763. As a result of these two conclusions, §8(a)(3) permits unions and employers to require only that employees pay the fees and dues necessary to support the union's activities as the employees' exclusive bargaining representative.

B

Respondent Screen Actors Guild (SAG) is a labor organization that represents performers in the entertainment industry. In 1994, respondent Lakeside Productions (Lakeside) signed a collective bargaining agreement with SAG, making SAG the exclusive bargaining agent for the performers that Lakeside hired for its productions. This agreement contained a standard union security clause, providing that any performer who worked under the agreement must be "a member of the Union in good standing." App. 28. Tracking the language of §8(a)(3), the clause also provided:

"The foregoing [section], requiring as a condition of employment membership in the Union, shall not apply until on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of this Agreement, whichever is the later; the Union and the Producers interpret this sentence to mean that membership in the Union cannot be required of any performer by a Producer as a condition of employment until thirty (30) days after his first employment as a performer in the motion picture industry . The Producer shall not be held to have violated this paragraph if it employs a performer who is not a member of the Union in good standing if the Producer has reasonable grounds for believing that membership in the Union was denied to such performer or such performer's membership in the Union was terminated for reasons other than the failure of the performer to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fee uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the Union ." Id., at 28 29.

The present dispute arose when petitioner, a part-time actress, successfully auditioned for a one-line role in an episode of the television series, "Medicine Ball," which was produced by Lakeside. Petitioner accepted the part, and pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, Lakeside's casting director called SAG to verify that petitioner met the requirements of the union security clause. Because petitioner had previously worked in the motion picture industry for more than 30 days, the union security clause was triggered and petitioner was required to pay the union fees before she could begin working for Lakeside. There is some dispute whether the SAG representative told Lakeside's casting director that petitioner had to "join" or had to "pay" the union; regardless, petitioner understood from the casting director that she had to pay SAG before she could work for Lakeside. Petitioner called SAG's local office and learned that the fees that she would have to pay to join the union would be around $500.

Over the next few days, petitioner attempted to negotiate an agreement with SAG that would allow her to pay the union fees after she was paid for her work by Lakeside. When these negotiations failed to produce an acceptable compromise and petitioner had not paid the required fees by the day before her part was to be filmed, Lakeside hired a different actress to fill the part. At some point after Lakeside hired the new actress, SAG faxed a letter to Lakeside stating that it had no objection to petitioner working in the production. The letter was too late for petitioner; filming proceeded on schedule with the replacement actress.

Petitioner filed suit against Lakeside and SAG alleging, among other things, that SAG had breached the duty of fair representation. According to petitioner, SAG had breached its duty by negotiating and enforcing a union security clause with two basic flaws. First, the union security clause required union "membership" and the payment of full fees and dues when those terms could not be legally enforced under General Motors and Beck. Petitioner argued that the collective bargaining agreement should have contained language, in addition to the statutory language, informing her of her right not to join the union and of her right, under Beck, to pay only for the union's representational activities. Second, the union security clause contained a term that interpreted the 30-day grace period provision to begin running with any employment in the industry. According to petitioner, this interpretation of the grace period provision contravened the express language of §8(a)(3), which requires that employees be given a 30-day grace period from the beginning of "such employment." She interprets "such employment" to require a new grace period with each employment relationship. Finally, in addition to these claims about the language of the union security clause, petitioner alleged that SAG had violated the duty of fair representation by failing to notify her truthfully about her rights under the NLRA as defined in Beck and General Motors.

The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, ruling first that SAG did not breach the duty of fair representation by negotiating the union security clause. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a 29a. The court also determined that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that SAG had attempted to enforce the union security clause beyond the lawful limits. Id., at 30a. Finally, the court ruled that petitioner's challenge to the grace period provision was actually an unfair labor practice claim, and thus it was preempted by the...

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