Adkins v. Mireles
| Decision Date | 16 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-56005.,06-56005. |
| Citation | 526 F.3d 531 |
| Parties | David ADKINS, Plaintiff, and Bernardo Alvarez; Raul Alvarez; Daniel Atencio; Robert Auxier; Ernesto Barraza; James Bentson; Daniel Black; Virginia Brandon; Bryant; Armando Bustamente, Jr.; Edward Cesena, Jr.; Arthur Cena; Callen Campbell; Lila Diaz; Dorene Doric; Jeff Dunne; Jose Espinoza; Andrew Finley; Michael Fornaseri; Daniel Gallegos; David Garcia; Darvey Guidry; Martin Gonzalez; Fernando Gonzalez; Richard Heitzwebel; Charles Hearn; Rosemary Jaime; Patrick King; Kenneth Lammon; Jackie Lopez; Cecilia Lozano; Barbara Lute; Francisco Marin; Raul Mata; Katharine Miranda; Peter Miller; Linda Morales; William Mueller, Jr.; Matthew Montgomery, Jr.; Earl Pedford; Victor Paz; Jose Perez; Sefo Purcell; Martin Ramos; Leo Ruiz Michael Rodriguez; Marie Riley; Blaine Roskelley; Ritch Smith; Samuel Saldana; Richard Sarmast; Thomas Servia; Martin Sepulveda; Kathy Seward; Richard Sherman; Rita Slagle; Julie Toone; Hiram Travis; John Vandyken; Jose Vargas; Ted Wightman; Darryl Williams; Gerald Wildermuth; Albert Zamora, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ed MIRELES; Harry Ashley; Teamsters Local 952, a labor organization, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Lee A. Wood (argued), Raymond E. Brown, Lee A. Wood & Associates, P.C., Santa Ana, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Fern M. Steiner (argued), Thomas Tosdal, Tosdal, Smith, Steiner & Wax, San Diego, CA, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Alicemarie H. Stotler, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-00979-AHS.
Before: B. FLETCHER, DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,* and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises out of a union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") governing employees of Lucky Stores, Inc.'s ("Lucky") general merchandise warehouse. David Adkins and other former employees at Lucky's Fullerton, California warehouse (collectively, "Appellants"), all members of Teamsters Local 952 ("the Union"), appeal the district court's judgment, following a partial summary judgment and jury trial, in favor of the Union, Ed Mireles, secretary-treasurer of the Union, and Harry Ashley, president of the Union (collectively, "Appellees").
Appellants allege breach of the duty of fair representation, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud & deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 ("RICO"), and conspiracy to commit RICO violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all but one claim, finding the other claims preempted by federal law. The remaining claim, for breach of the duty of fair representation, was decided after an 8-day jury trial.1 Appellants contend the district court erred by finding preemption as to the dismissed claims and as to the claim that went to trial by granting a motion in limine to exclude evidence of a 1985 incident in which two or more of the Appellants burned their teamster jackets. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
We hold that the district court did not err in holding that federal law preempts Appellants' breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because each implicates the duty of fair representation. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953) (). The district court did not err in finding that the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 preempts Appellants' fraud and deceit claim, because the claim cannot be maintained without the court interpreting the provisions of the CBA. The Appellants' RICO claims are preempted under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), because Appellants alleged an unfair labor practice — bargaining in bad faith — which is prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") §§ 7 and 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158, and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). Lastly, the Appellants failed to perfect their challenge to the district court's evidentiary decision to exclude evidence regarding the jacket-burning incident: while Appellants proffered this evidence in limine, they did not attempt to introduce the evidence at trial.
In 1985, a strike by Lucky employees, including members of the Union, led to a settlement which left some warehouse employees unsatisfied. In response to the settlement of that strike, some employees at the Fullerton warehouse, including at least two of the Appellants in this case, burned their teamster jackets in protest on national television. Appellants allege that as a result of this incident, Mireles harbored animosity toward the Fullerton warehouse employees for the next decade, then exacted revenge during a September 1994 Union-initiated negotiation with Lucky over the terms of a CBA, which was to cover the Fullerton warehouse, as well as others in Buena Park and Irvine, for the years 1994 to 1998.
Appellants sought protective language in the CBA that would allow them to "follow their product," that is, to obtain an assurance from Lucky that if the Fullerton warehouse was closed and the product transferred, Appellants would continue to be employed by Lucky and transferred to the warehouse that received the transferred product. Mireles negotiated with Lucky — in the absence of other Union business agents who were present at prior negotiations — and secured this protective language in the CBA for employees of the Buena Park and Irvine warehouses but not for employees of the Fullerton warehouse. Lucky planned to close down the Fullerton facility in 1998 without allowing transfers to the larger planned replacement warehouse. Lucky gave the Union jurisdiction over this new warehouse, which opened in La Habra, near the old Fullerton facility, in 1996. Appellants claim Mireles represented to them, contrary to the actual terms of the CBA, that they could follow their product, and that when Appellants were terminated from their employment at the Lucky warehouse in Fullerton in September 1998, Mireles refused to pursue their grievances. In October 1998, Appellants filed the present complaint in Orange County Superior Court; it was later removed to federal district court.
Appellants alleged that Appellees colluded with Lucky to persuade the Appellants to accept a CBA that was substantially less protective of Appellants' rights than was represented to them. Appellants further maintained that Appellees were motivated by the Union's desire to secure Lucky's prospective cooperation in becoming the labor representative of a larger number of Lucky's employees, and by Mireles's long-harbored animosity toward Appellants. Appellants contended that the Union negotiated a secret deal with Lucky, which was not disclosed to them; that they ratified the 1994-98 CBA because they relied on material misrepresentations by the Union that Fullerton workers would be allowed to follow their product; and that the Union failed to properly represent them both in the 1994 CBA negotiations and 1998 negotiations about Lucky's closure of the Fullerton facility at which they worked.
In response to Appellees' motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed with prejudice the breach of the duty of fair representation claim to the extent it was asserted against individual Appellees. It reasoned that LMRA § 301 exempts union agents from claims of any nature related to the CBA and the collective bargaining process.2 Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962). Appellants do not challenge this portion of the district court's order. The district court held that the other claims save one were preempted by federal labor laws and dismissed them with prejudice. Appellants appeal these rulings.
The case proceeded to jury trial on Appellants' remaining claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith manner towards the Appellants. The jury returned a verdict for Appellees, finding that they did not breach their duty of fair representation.
Appellants allege that their jury trial was prejudiced by the district court's grant of a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding the 1985 jacket-burning incident. In arguing against the motion in limine, Appellants' counsel represented to the court that a number of Appellants were going to testify that Mireles thought that this incident, which was shown nationally on television, set back the Union's effort and was a major embarrassment to him. Appellants allege that this incident along with others in the early 1990s motivated Mireles and the Union to act against them. Unpersuaded by Appellants' argument, the court granted the motion without prejudice, prohibiting reference to the jacket burning incident without further leave of the court, but allowing Appellants to develop a written offer of proof, outside the presence of the jury, to include evidence regarding the incident. Appellants did not make an offer of proof. Appellants timely appealed this evidentiary ruling and the partial summary judgment.
A ruling on a motion for partial summary judgment merges with the final judgment and is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix v. Ordean, 528 F.2d 894, 897, fn. 1 (9th Cir.1976). We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v....
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...any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 538 (9th Cir.2008).DISCUSSIONI. Diversity Jurisdiction At the outset, we will review the district court's determination that it possessed juri......
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Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
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Introduction
...appeal, the court ultimately held that an expert witness’s opinion need not take eyewitness testimony into account. Adkins v. Mireles , 526 F.3d 531, 542 (9th Cir. 2008). In action against union for breach of duty and other claims, former union members were required to attempt to introduce ......