Illinois Cent. Gulf RR v. Pargas, Inc.

Decision Date13 November 1981
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 80-691-A.
PartiesILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD v. PARGAS, INC.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

Murphy J. Foster, III, Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiff.

Charles A. O'Brien, Baton Rouge, La., for defendant.

Stephen K. Conroy, Metairie, La., for Union Tank, third party defendant.

JOHN V. PARKER, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., filed on behalf of third party defendant, Union Tank Car Company ("Union"). The parties have orally argued the motion and it has been submitted to the Court for decision.

The main demand is an action for recovery of damages allegedly incurred by the railroad when a tank car, owned by Pargas, containing liquified petroleum gas leaked gas onto the railroad track. The railroad seeks to recover its costs and expenses in the clean-up operation and alleges that Pargas, the owner, is liable for these damages under the Association of American Railroads Interchange Rules. Pargas, while denying liability to the railroad, has filed a third party complaint against Union, alleging that the tank car in question was modified by Union under a contract with Pargas, that the defect in the car was caused by Union's defective workmanship and that Union is liable to Pargas for full indemnity for any amount which the railroad may recover from Pargas. Union has answered, denying liability and it attaches a copy of the written contract to its answer. There is no dispute concerning the provisions of the contract.

The predicate for Union's motion is a limitation of warranty clause in the agreement.

The contract is dated November 20, 1977, and it generally provides that Union agrees to convert 126 non-insulated pressure railway tank cars owned by Pargas so as to meet specifications mandated by United States Department of Transportation Regulations. The precise modification is specified, a "unit price" is fixed, a production schedule running from July 1, 1978, through December 31, 1981, is specified, a delivery schedule to Union's plant is set forth and it is specified that Illinois law shall govern interpretation of the contract. Under the contract, Union agrees to complete modification of each tank car within a specified period and in the event that Union does not do so, "then Union shall at its option either return such car to Owner and pay to Owner the sum of $900 in respect of such car as fully liquidated damages" or hold the car for a future production run.

Paragraph seven of the agreement which is relied upon by Union, reads as follows:

"7. Warranty.
Union warrants that the cars will be modified in accordance with the specifications applicable to 112J 114J cars set forth in HM-144 and that the cars will be free from defects in material and workmanship. The obligation of Union under this warranty shall be limited to repairing or replacing at a repair shop selected by Union any part or parts of any of the modifications made by Union which shall within one year after completion of the modification be returned to a repair shop designated be returned to a repair shop designated for such purpose and which Union's examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective. THIS WARRANTY IS EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR THAT THE CARS ARE FIT FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, AND SPECIFICALLY IN LIEU OF ALL INDIRECT, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.

Union's position is that, assuming for purposes of argument that its workmanship under the contract was defective, Pargas nevertheless has no right of indemnity because the above quoted contract provision amounts to a waiver by Pargas of any warranty at all. Third party plaintiff, Pargas, advances the notion that the limitation of warranty provisions do not have the effect of shielding Union from tort liability or liability for its own negligence and further argues that the intent of the above quoted language is to shield Union only from damages which are incurred by Pargas itself as a result of defective workmanship, as opposed to damages which are incurred by third parties and for which Pargas may be held liable.

As noted, Union raises this issue by means of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Since Union has attached a copy of the contract to its answer and since Pargas concedes the correctness of the copy, the Court may consider the contract, as a part of the pleadings. It is elementary that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may not be granted unless it is clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 312 U.S. 45, 61 S.Ct. 418, 85 L.Ed. 577 (1941); Greenberg v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 478 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1973).

In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposing party and all well pleaded allegations in the opposing party's pleadings are assumed to be true....

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6 cases
  • Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 6 Junio 1983
    ...if they can, under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1653 (1976). The facts are not in dispute and may be found in the district court's opinion. See 526 F.Supp. 209 (M.D.La.1981). The sole contention presented in the railroad's original complaint in this case was that Pargas owed it reimbursement for its $40,......
  • Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Inc. v. Watson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 31 Enero 1983
  • Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 12 Enero 1984
    ...may now proceed to the merits of this appeal. The facts are not in dispute and may be found in the district court's opinion. See 526 F.Supp. 209 (M.D.La.1981). The only issue on this appeal concerns the legal consequences under Illinois law of the liability disclaimer in article 7 of the co......
  • Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Watson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Alaska
    • 2 Abril 1982
    ... ... Supp. 653 ... SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, INC., Plaintiff, ... James WATSON, et al., Defendants, ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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