Hunt v. Cromartie

• Citation: 143 L.Ed.2d 731,119 S.Ct. 1545,526 U.S. 541
• Decision Date: 17 May 1999
• Docket Number: 9885
• Parties: Reversed. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES85 JAMES B. HUNT, Jr., GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al., APPELLANTS v. MARTIN CROMARTIE et al. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA [
• Court: United States Supreme Court

526 U.S. 541

119 S.Ct. 1545

143 L.Ed.2d 731

Reversed.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 98 85

JAMES B. HUNT, Jr., GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al., APPELLANTS

v.

MARTIN CROMARTIE et al.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

[May 17, 1999]

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we must decide whether appellees were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, as established by the State's 1997 congressional redistricting plan, constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

This is the third time in six years that litigation over North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District has come before this Court. The first time around, we held that plaintiffs whose complaint alleged that the State had deliberately segregated voters into districts on the basis of race without compelling justification stated a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (Shaw I). After remand, we affirmed the District Court's finding that North Carolina's District 12 classified voters by race and further held that the State's reapportionment scheme was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw II).

In response to our decision in Shaw II, the State enacted a new districting plan. See 1997 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 11. A map of the unconstitutional District 12 was set forth in the Appendix to the opinion of the Court in Shaw I, supra, and we described it as follows:

"The second majority-black district, District 12, is unusually shaped. It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the [Interstate] 85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.' Northbound and southbound drivers on [Interstate] 85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to 'trade' districts when they enter the next county. Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them." 509 U.S., at 635 636 (citations omitted).

The State's 1997 plan altered District 12 in several respects. By any measure, blacks no longer constitute a majority of District 12: blacks now account for approximately 47% of the district's total population, 43% of its voting age population, and 46% of registered voters. App. to Juris. Statement 67a, 99a. The new District 12 splits 6 counties as opposed to 10; beginning with Guilford County, the district runs in a southwestern direction through parts of Forsyth, Davidson, Rowan, Iredell, and Mecklenburg Counties, picking up concentrations of urban populations in Greensboro and High Point (both in Guilford), Winston-Salem (Forsyth), and Charlotte (Mecklenburg). (The old District 12 went through the same six counties but also included portions of Durham, Orange, and Alamance Counties east of Guilford, and parts of Gaston County west of Mecklenburg.) With these changes, the district retains only 41.6% of its previous area, id., at 153a, and the distance between its farthest points has been reduced to approximately 95 miles, id., at 105a. But while District 12 is wider and shorter than it was before, it retains its basic "snakelike" shape and continues to track Interstate 85. See generally Appendix, infra.

Appellees believed the new District 12, like the old one, to be the product of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against several state officials in their official capacities seeking to enjoin elections under the State's 1997 plan. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment and supporting materials, and the three-judge District Court heard argument on the pending motions, but before either party had conducted discovery and without an evidentiary hearing. Over one judge's dissent, the District Court granted appellees' motion and entered the injunction they sought. 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (EDNC 1998). The majority of the Court explained that "the uncontroverted material facts" showed that "District 12 was drawn to collect precincts with high racial identification rather than political identification," that "more heavily Democratic precincts were bypassed in the drawing of District 12 and included in the surrounding congressional districts," and that "[t]he legislature disregarded traditional districting criteria." No. 4:96 CV 104 BO(3) (EDNC, Apr. 14, 1998), App. to Juris. Statement 21a. From these "uncontroverted material facts," the District Court concluded "the General Assembly, in redistricting, used criteria with respect to District 12 that are facially race driven," ibid., and thereby violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 22a. (Apparently because the issue was not litigated, the District Court did not consider whether District 12 was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.)1

The state officials filed a notice of appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction, 524 U.S. ___ (1998), and now reverse.

II

Our decisions have established that all laws that classify citizens on the basis of race, including racially gerrymandered districting schemes, are constitutionally suspect and must be strictly scrutinized. Shaw II, supra, at 904; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 905 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). When racial classifications are explicit, no inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary. See Shaw I, supra, at 642. A facially neutral law, on the other hand, warrants strict scrutiny only if it can be proved that the law was "motivated by a racial purpose or object," Miller, supra, at 913, or if it is " 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,' " Shaw I, 509 U.S., at 644 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)); see also Miller, supra, at 905, 913. The task of assessing a jurisdiction's motivation, however, is not a simple matter; on the contrary, it is an inherently complex endeavor, one requiring the trial court to perform a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, supra, at 266; see also Miller, supra, at 905, 914 (citing Arlington Heights); Shaw I, supra, at 644 (same).2

Districting legislation ordinarily, if not always, classifies tracts of land, precincts, or census blocks, and is race-neutral on its face. North Carolina's 1997 plan was not atypical; appellees, therefore, were required to prove that District 12 was drawn with an impermissible racial motive in this context, strict scrutiny applies if race was the "predominant factor" motivating the legislature's districting decision. To carry their burden, appellees were obliged to show using direct or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both, see Shaw II, 517 U.S., at 905; Miller, 515 U.S., at 916 that "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations," ibid.

Appellees offered only circumstantial evidence in support of their claim. Their evidence included maps of District 12, showing its size, shape,3 and alleged lack of continuity. See Appendix, infra. They also submitted evidence of the district's low scores with respect to traditional measures of compactness and expert affidavit testimony explaining that this statistical evidence proved the State had ignored traditional districting criteria in crafting the new Twelfth District. See App. 221 251. Appellees further claimed that the State had disrespected political subdivisions and communities of interest. In support, they pointed out that under the 1997 plan, District 12 was the only one statewide to contain no undivided county and offered figures showing that District 12 gathered almost 75% of its population from Mecklenburg County, at the southern tip of the district, and from Forsyth and Guilford Counties at the northernmost part of the district. Id., at 176, 208 209.

Appellees also presented statistical and demographic evidence with respect to the precincts that were included within District 12 and those that were placed in neighboring districts. For the six subdivided counties included within District 12, the proportion of black residents was higher in the portion of the county within District 12 than the portion of the county in a neighboring district.4 Other maps and supporting data submitted by appellees compared the demographics of several so-called "boundary segments."5 This evidence tended to show that, in several instances, the State had excluded precincts that had a lower percentage of black population but were as Democratic (in terms of registered voters) as the precinct inside District 12. Id., at 253 290; 3 Record, Doc. No. 61.

Viewed in toto, appellees' evidence tends to support an inference that the State drew its district lines with an impermissible racial motive even though they presented no direct evidence of intent. Summary judgment, however, is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). To be sure, appellants did not contest the evidence of District 12's shape (which hardly could...