Robinson v. Foti, Civ. A. No. 81-4563.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-4563.
• Citation: 527 F. Supp. 1111
• Parties: Eduardo ROBINSON v. Charles FOTI.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

527 F. Supp. 1111

Eduardo ROBINSON v. Charles FOTI.

Civ. A. No. 81-4563.

United States District Court, E. D. Louisiana.

December 15, 1981.

Eduardo Robinson, petitioner pro se.

Robert Finklestein, New Orleans, La., for defendant.

CHARLES SCHWARTZ, Jr., District Judge.

This matter came before this Court on a former day upon plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order, and the supplemental affidavits thereto filed pursuant to this Court's order of November 19, 1981. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Now, having carefully considered the record in this matter, the memoranda and affidavits filed by petitioner and counsel for the sheriff, the law, as well as other authorities hereinafter set out, it is the opinion of the Court that plaintiff's motion must be, and hereby is, DENIED.

The petitioner, Eduardo Robinson is a Black American male. Born in Mississippi, he celebrated his eighteenth birthday less than two weeks ago. He is presently serving two consecutive life sentences which arose out of the brutal and apparently motiveless murder of a young woman one afternoon last year while she was gardening in her own back yard. When he was booked on November 6, 1980, the petitioner informed authorities that he was a Baptist. The petitioner now claims to be a Rastafari, and has petitioned this Court to enjoin the Sheriff of Orleans Parish Prison from enforcing prison haircut regulations¹ on the grounds that to do so would infringe the petitioner's First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.

Specifically, item (2) of Robinson's original complaint and petition filed November 19, 1981 states:

Plaintiff contends that he is presently under a Black Religious sic and that to cut his hair would subject him to metal sic, and physical anguish and would cause him "Irreparable Injury" sic.

The third item of plaintiff's complaint states:

Your Plaintiff ask this Honorable Court to issue an Injunction to prohibit the said defendant and his successors in office from cutting your plaintiff's hair, because he would not be able to contine sic to participate in the religious culture in which he is presently involved in should he have to be forced to get the hair, in which come to him from birth cut from his head by force.

On November 19, 1981, this Court denied the petitioner's request for a temporary restraining order pending the submission of affidavits by both the sheriff and the petitioner. Plaintiff was directed to set forth all details concerning his claim, and the sheriff was directed to set forth the regulations concerning haircuts and the reasons therefor. Both plaintiff and defendant have complied with this Court's directions and filed two such affidavits each. The Court has reconsidered the motion for a temporary restraining order, in accordance with its order, but can find no basis for granting the relief which the plaintiff requests.

It is well established that "when a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights" Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-406, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807-1808, 40 L.Ed.2d 224, 236 (1974); see also Barnes v. Government of Virgin Islands, 415 F.Supp. 1218 (D.St.Croix 1976).

The cases clearly establish that a prisoner does not shed his first amendment rights at the prison portals. Theriault v. Silber, 453 F.Supp. 254, 261 (9 W.D.Tex. 1978) citing Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971).

However, even first amendment rights, though "preferred," are not unlimited, and while

... reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear of penalty, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972),

there are certain state interests which may justify restrictions of the First Amendment rights of prisoners.

It must be remembered that

lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948).

In general, prisoners may be the subject of reasonable rules, regulations, and measures. In particular, reasonable state prison regulations as to personal hygiene and grooming have long been upheld in this circuit. See, for example, Brooks v. Wainright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970), and the able opinion of the late Judge John Wood in Theriault v. Silber, 453 F.Supp. 254, 263 (W.D.Tex.1978).

While the general principles are clear, their application to a particular case such as this requires individualized evaluation and scrutiny. Although often the subject of ethnographers² and journalists,³ the Rastafari have been an infrequent subject of judicial scrutiny.⁴ While we are disinclined to agree with the dismissal of the group as,

a vegetarian sect who eat no eggs or meat and do not cut or wash their hair, but leave it in "dreadlocks," United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76 f.2 (2nd Cir. 1978);

neither are we inclined, based on the facts of this case and the circumstances of this petitioner, to recognize the Rastafari as a religion within the meaning of the First Amendment.⁵ However, even without reaching this difficult question, there are ample reasons for denying the plaintiff's petition.

First, whether or not we choose to regard the Rastafari as a religion,⁶ the practice of wearing "dreadlocks," while popular, is not mandatory among members.⁷ Second, plaintiff, in the record before us, fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the sincerity of his contentions. Not only does the petition appear to be the work of another hand, but Robinson demonstrates little if any familiarity with the Rastafari, their history, teaching, or practice. In his Complaint, Affidavit and Supplementary Affidavit, no mention is made of Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian leader credited with messianic attributes by the group. Similarly, Mr. Robinson appears to be entirely unfamiliar with Marcus Garvey, the powerful Black leader from Jamaica often regarded as the architect of Rastafari's philosophical foundations and political goals. Even Jamaica, whose history, culture, religions and music are so inextricably bound up with every aspect of Rastafari life is regarded as unworthy of mention by Robinson. Thus, even were the Rastafari among those groups which are entitled to First Amendment protection, Robinson has failed to make even the most minimal showing that he is in fact a bona fide member with a rudimentary knowledge of Rastafari teaching, despite three separate opportunities to do so.

Further, the claims he does make are...