Weeks v. Angelone

Decision Date19 January 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-5746 ,99-5746
Citation528 U.S. 225,120 S.Ct 727,145 L.Ed.2d 727
PartiesLONNIE WEEKS, JR., PETITIONER v. RONALD J. ANGELONE, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

176 F.3d 249, affirmed.

REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined, and in which SOUTER, J., joined as to Parts II, III, and IV.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Constitution is violated when a trial judge directs a capital jury's attention to a specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circumstances. We hold that it is not and that habeas relief is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III).

Petitioner Lonnie Weeks, Jr., was riding from Washington, D. C., to Richmond, Virginia, as a passenger in a car driven by his uncle, Lewis Dukes. Petitioner had stolen the vehicle in a home burglary earlier in the month. The two sped past the marked car of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos, who was monitoring traffic. Trooper Cavazos activated his emergency lights and took chase. After passing other vehicles on the highway shoulder, Dukes stopped on an exit ramp. Trooper Cavazos approached the driver's side of the stolen vehicle on foot. Upon the trooper's request, Dukes alighted and stood near the rear of the car. Trooper Cavazos, still standing near the driver's side, asked petitioner to step out as well. As Weeks stepped out on the passenger's side, he carried a 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol loaded with hollow-point bullets. Petitioner proceeded to fire six bullets at the trooper, two of which entered his body near the right and left shoulder straps of his protective vest, and four of which entered his forearms and left wrist. Trooper Cavazos died within minutes.

Petitioner was arrested the next morning. During routine questioning about his physical and mental state by classification officers, petitioner confessed, indicating that he was considering suicide because he shot the trooper. Petitioner also voluntarily wrote a letter to a jail officer admitting the killing and expressing remorse.

Petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court for Prince William County, Virginia, in October 1993. After the jury had found him guilty of capital murder, a 2-day penalty phase followed. In this proceeding the prosecution sought to prove two aggravating circumstances: that Weeks "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society" and that his conduct was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved depravity of mind or aggravated battery." App. 192. During the penalty phase, the defense presented 10 witnesses, including petitioner, in mitigation.

The jury retired at 10:40 a.m. on the second day to begin deliberations. At around noon, the judge informed counsel that the jury had asked the following question:

"Does the sentence of life imprisonment in the State of Virginia have the possibility of parole, and if so, under what conditions must be met to receive parole?" App. to Pet. for Cert. 90.

The judge responded to the jury's question as follows:

"You should impose such punishment as you feel is just under the evidence, and within the instructions of the Court. You are not to concern yourselves with what may happen afterwards." Ibid.

The prosecution agreed with the judge's response and defense counsel objected. At 12:40 p.m., court reconvened and the judge told the jurors that there would be a one-hour luncheon recess and that they could go to lunch or continue deliberations, as a juror had apparently informed the bailiff that they might be interested in working through lunch. At 12:45 p.m., the jury retired from the courtroom. At 3:15 p.m., the judge informed counsel that he had received the following written question from the jury:

"If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? Or must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) whether or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What is the Rule? Please clarify?" Id. at 91 (emphasis in original).

The judge wrote the following response: "See second paragraph of Instruction # 2 (Beginning with 'If you find from . . . . . . ')." Ibid. The judge explained to counsel his answer to the jury's question:

"In instruction number 2 that was given to them, in the second paragraph, it reads, 'If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two alternatives, and as to that alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for life with a fine not to exceed $ 100,000.'

"I don't believe I can answer the question any clearer than the instruction, so what I have done is referred them to the second paragraph of instruction number 2, and I told them beginning with, 'if you find from,' et cetera, et cetera, for them to read that paragraph." n1 App. 222-223.

The prosecution stated that the judge's solution was appropriate. Defense counsel disagreed, and stated:

"Your Honor, we would ask that Your Honor instruct the jury that even if they find one or both of the mitigating factors -- I'm sorry, the factors that have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that they still may impose a life sentence, or a life sentence plus a fine." Id., at 223.

Defense counsel asked that his objection be noted.

More than two hours later, the jury returned. The clerk read its verdict:

"We the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant Lonnie Weeks, Jr., guilty of capital murder, and having unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane, in that it involved depravity of mind and or aggravated battery, and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his punishment at death . . . ." Id. at 225 (emphasis added).

The jurors were polled and all responded affirmatively that the foregoing was their verdict in the case.

Petitioner presented 47 assignments of error in his direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, and the assignment of error respecting the judge's answering the jury's question about mitigating circumstances was number 44. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence, holding that the claims petitioner advances here lack merit. 248 Va. 460, 465-466, 476-477, 450 S.E.2d 379, 383, 390 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829 (1995). The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed petitioner's state habeas petition as jurisdictionally barred on timeliness grounds. The District Court denied petitioner's request for federal habeas relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed his petition. 176 F.3d 249 (1999). We granted certiorari, 527 U.S. 1060 (1999), and now affirm.

Petitioner relies heavily on our decisions in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 90 L. Ed. 350, 66 S. Ct. 402 (1946), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982). Bollenbach involved a supplemental instruction by the trial court following an inquiry from the jury -- in that respect it is like the present case -- but the instruction given by the trial court in Bollenbach was palpably erroneous. 326 U.S. at 611. In this respect it is quite unlike the present case. Eddings arose out of a bench trial in a capital case, and this Court reversed a sentence of death because the trial judge had refused to consider mitigating evidence: "It was as if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf." 455 U.S. at 114.

[Here the trial judge gave no such instruction. On the contrary, he gave the instruction that we upheld in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 139 L. Ed. 2d 702, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), as being sufficient to allow the jury to consider mitigating evidence. And in addition, he gave a specific instruction on mitigating evidence -- an instruction that was not given in Buchanan -- in which he told the jury that "you must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find there is evidence to support it." n2 Even the dissenters in Buchanan said that the ambiguity that they found in the instruction there given would have been cleared up by "some mention of mitigating evidence anywhere in the instructions." 522 U.S. at 283.

]In Buchanan, we considered whether the Eighth Amendment required that a capital jury be instructed on particular mitigating factors. Buchanan's jury was given precisely the same Virginia pattern capital instruction that was given to Weeks' jury. See 522 U.S. at 272, and n. 1. We noted that our cases have established that the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, and that the State may structure the jury's consideration of mitigation so long as it does not preclude the jury from giving effect to it. Id., at 276. We further noted that the "standard for determining whether jury instructions satisfy these principles was 'whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S....

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