Bialek v. Mukasey

Decision Date24 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-1284.,07-1284.
Citation529 F.3d 1267
PartiesBarry BIALEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, United States Attorney General; David M. Mason,<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> Federal Election Commission Chairman, in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Michael R. Dezsi, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney, Johnson & Giroux, P.C., Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Eric Fleisig-Greene, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; and Kevin Deeley, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C. (Troy A. Eid, United States Attorney; Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; and Michael S. Raab, Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. with them on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before LUCERO, EBEL, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Barry Bialek appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit against the United States Attorney General and the Chairman of the Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or "Commission"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failing to state a claim. Bialek had sought a judgment declaring that the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA" or "the Act"), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455, bars the Attorney General from investigating or prosecuting criminal violations of campaign finance law absent a referral from four FEC commissioners. We find Bialek's reading of the statute unpersuasive and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

Bialek alleges that the Attorney General, acting through the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), targeted him as part of a "politically motivated investigation" into criminal violations of campaign finance law. Bialek maintains that the alleged investigation, which began in November 2005, resulted from his political and financial support of the 2004 presidential campaign of former United States Senator John Edwards.

According to Bialek's complaint, in April 2006, the Attorney General's office summoned Bialek before a federal grand jury to testify and produce documents.1 During the grand jury investigation, the government "attempted to coerce [Bialek] to reveal constitutionally protected activities such as the identi[t]y of the presidential candidate for whom he voted in the 2004 election." The investigation was initiated and conducted entirely by the DOJ; the FEC was not involved in the matter.

In February 2007, Bialek brought this action against both the Attorney General and the chairman of the FEC seeking a declaration that the Attorney General lacks the authority to initiate an investigation into violations of campaign finance law. Bialek claimed that Congress vested the FEC with exclusive jurisdiction to initiate both civil and criminal investigations into campaign finance law violations, and that the Attorney General may therefore pursue such violations only upon referral by a vote of four FEC commissioners. In their motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the FEC Chairman and the Attorney General countered that the Attorney General's plenary power to prosecute criminal violations includes violations of campaign finance law.

In a written order, the district court concluded that the government had the better of the two arguments and dismissed Bialek's complaint with prejudice. Bialek now appeals. We have jurisdiction to review the district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2

II

"We review the district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Lane, 495 F.3d at 1186. In this case, Bialek's claim rests on the proper scope of the Attorney General's prosecutorial authority. "Under the authority of Art. II, § 2 [of the United States Constitution], Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); see also 28 U.S.C. § 516 ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States ... is interested ... is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General."). But what Congress giveth, Congress may no doubt taketh away. Bialek argues that by enacting and amending the FECA, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455, Congress created an exception to the Attorney General's authority over criminal matters. Under this exception, Bialek urges, the Attorney General may only conduct an investigation of the sort at issue here following a formal referral from the FEC.

FECA was originally enacted in 1971 and subsequently amended several times, most relevantly in 1974, 1976, and 1979. The Act, as amended, regulates campaign finance in a number of ways, such as by capping the amounts of political contributions, regulating contributions from certain classes of entities and individuals, and imposing various disclosure and reporting requirements. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441i, 441k. FECA imposes civil as well as criminal penalties on those who violate its provisions. § 437g(a)(6), (d)(1). The FEC, which is composed of six commissioners, three from each political party, § 437c(a)(1), has "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to civil enforcement" of FECA's provisions, § 437c(b)(1). The FEC has investigatory duties, but may also provide advisory guidance as to whether planned or present conduct violates FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437f; 11 C.F.R. § 112.1.

FECA establishes procedures through which the FEC investigates suspected campaign finance misdeeds. An FEC inquiry begins when the agency receives a sworn complaint alleging a violation, or the Commission otherwise ascertains in its usual course of business that an individual has run afoul of campaign finance law. § 437g(a)(1), (2). The FEC may then initiate an investigation, issue subpoenas, and seek judicial enforcement of its orders. § 437d(a), (b). If the investigation reveals probable cause to believe that a civil violation has occurred, the FEC must provide the target with notice and an opportunity to respond, § 437g(a)(3), and must hold conciliation discussions, § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i). In cases where no conciliation agreement is reached, it may file a civil enforcement suit. § 437g(a)(6)(A).

During the course of an investigation, the FEC may also find probable cause to believe that the campaign finance violation was "knowing and willful." In this event, FECA allows the FEC to refer the case to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution. § 437g(a)(5)(C). Such a referral requires the votes of four FEC commissioners.3 Id.

It is this last provision which, Bialek claims, places limits on the Attorney General's power to independently investigate and prosecute criminal violations of FECA. Because FECA establishes a mechanism through which the FEC may refer matters for criminal investigation, he reasons, this must be the only way that such investigations can commence. Bialek advances several arguments in support, primarily relying on policy considerations and snippets of the legislative history. Both the FEC and the Attorney General disagree with his reading, maintaining that the measure's plain language addresses only the authority of the FEC, and leaves undisturbed the Attorney General's well-established power to investigate and litigate all federal crimes.

At the outset, we emphasize that we cannot presume that Congress has divested the Attorney General of his prosecutorial authority absent "a clear and unambiguous expression of legislative will." United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 281, 32 S.Ct. 81, 56 L.Ed. 198 (1911). "Repeals by implication are not favored," especially when the executive's law-enforcement powers are at issue. Id. Indeed, Bialek's argument is an analogue of one rejected by the Supreme Court nearly a century ago. In Morgan, a defendant was indicted by the federal prosecutor for selling tap water mislabeled as spring water. Id. at 277, 32 S.Ct. 81. The defendant noted that a federal food and drug statute provided procedures by which the Department of Agriculture could find a suspected statutory violation, give notice to the violator, and only then refer the matter for criminal prosecution. Id. at 279-80, 32 S.Ct. 81. Like Bialek, the defendant argued that the administrative mechanism was the sole means by which he could be indicted; absent action by the Department of Agriculture, he maintained, the government had no basis upon which to prosecute.

Employing a rationale equally applicable here, the Court rejected this argument. It found no indication that Congress intended the law to "hamper district attorneys, curtail the powers of grand juries, or make them, with evidence in hand, halt in their investigation and await the action of the Department." Id. at 282, 32 S.Ct. 81. The Court reasoned, "[t]o graft such an exception upon the criminal law would require a clear and unambiguous expression of the legislative will." Id.

Following Morgan, our inquiry begins with the plain language of the statute. See also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). Section 437g(a)(5)(C), like the rest of FECA, speaks only to the power of the FEC. It requires a vote of four commissioners before the FEC may refer a matter for criminal prosecution, but this provision, by its clear terms, restricts only the FEC. Nowhere in FECA do we find a single phrase limiting the Attorney General's powers. If Congress wished all campaign finance litigation, both civil and criminal, to originate with the FEC, only a few lines of statutory text would have been required. Instead, Congress explicitly granted the FEC only "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to civil enforcement" of FECA's provisions. § 437c(b)(1) (emphasis added). The obvious...

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