Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice

• Decision Date: 30 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-50490.,06-50490.
• Citation: 529 F.3d 599
• Parties: Darren L. MAYFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; Gary L. Johnson, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, sued in individual and official capacity; Bill Pierce, Director of Chaplaincy, sued in individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

529 F.3d 599

Darren L. MAYFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; Gary L. Johnson, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, sued in individual and official capacity; Bill Pierce, Director of Chaplaincy, sued in individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-50490.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 30, 2008.

Aditi Dravid (argued), ConocoPhillips, Houston, TX, for Mayfield.

Marjolyn Carol Gardner, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Darren L. Mayfield ("Mayfield"), Texas prisoner # 571949, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his claims alleging First Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5. For the following reasons we affirm in part, vacate in part, and reverse in part the district court's judgment and remand.

I

Mayfield, a prisoner incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") Hughes Unit, practices the Odinist/Asatru faith. He describes Odinism as the ancestral folk religion of Northern Europe and a polytheistic, nature-based faith that worships a variety of gods and goddesses. The practice of Odinism involves group worship meetings known as Blotar. A Blotar ceremony requires the use of certain religious paraphernalia including runestones, a blessing bowl, a nonalcoholic beverage, a drinking horn, an altar cloth, a symbolic Thor's hammer made of material such as cardboard, and a leafed evergreen branch. Runestones are small tiles made from pieces of antler, wood, or stone that have been carved with characters of the ancient runic alphabet inscribed on them. Aside from having runestones for the Blotar ceremony, Odinism also involves the individual study of runestones. The individual study of runestones is an essential component of the Odinist faith because the stones serve as meditation tools to reveal wisdom and truth to the practitioner. Hughes Unit inmates designating their faith preference as Odinism are relatively few. Just 41 out of the 2,869 inmates confined in the Hughes Unit designated their faith preference as Odinist/Asatru. Only 21 of the designated Odinists regularly participate in the Odinist religious ceremonies.

According to the affidavits of various Odinist leaders outside the prison, Blotar should be conducted, at a minimum, on a monthly basis. Odinists in the Hughes Unit are unable to conduct their Blotar on a regular basis because the TDCJ requires that they have a security-trained, religious volunteer present for their group meetings.¹ The only approved outside volunteer lives in Arkansas and could not come to the Hughes Unit as frequently as Mayfield and the other Odinists desired.² Mayfield asked prison authorities for permission to hold Odinist group meetings with prison security present rather than an outside volunteer. The TDCJ denied this request on a number of occasions, noting that security and space considerations prevented the Odinists from meeting without an outside volunteer. Also, despite repeated requests to personally possess runestones, the TDCJ did not allow the Odinists access to runestones except for when the trained volunteer brought them into the prison.³ The TDCJ determined that runestones presented distinct security issues because they could be used for gambling, as gang identifiers, or for secret communication between inmates.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Mayfield brought this suit against the TDCJ and against Gary Johnson ("Johnson") and Bill Pierce ("Pierce") in their individual and official capacities.⁴ His suit claims that the defendants placed impermissible burdens on the Odinist adherents at the Hughes Unit by allowing them to meet only when an approved outside volunteer could visit the prison, by prohibiting the Odinist adherents from personally possessing runestones, and by prohibiting access to literature on the runes. Mayfield brought suit under § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Mayfield also claimed that the TDCJ's practices violated RLUIPA, which protects the religious practices of institutionalized persons.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Mayfield's claims. The court provided a number of grounds for its summary judgment dismissal. First, the district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mayfield had not sufficiently shown a violation of either RLUIPA or the First Amendment. However, the district court also proceeded to consider the impact of sovereign and qualified immunity on Mayfield's claims. The district court held that both sovereign and qualified immunity prevented Mayfield from pursuing his claims. Finally, the district court determined that Mayfield had failed to state claim for relief — because he was a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis the district court imposed a strike against him under the three-strikes provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).⁵ Mayfield filed a timely notice of appeal and counsel was eventually appointed on appeal.

II

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as did the district court. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 119 (5th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden to "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In making our determination, we must resolve disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, in this case Mayfield. See id.

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we address each of its grounds for granting the summary judgment dismissal. First, we consider the district court's conclusions as to sovereign and qualified immunity. Concluding that complete dismissal of Mayfield's claims was improper on immunity grounds alone, we then proceed to analyze whether issues of fact remain.

A

In reaching its conclusion as to the application of sovereign immunity, the district court held that all of Mayfield's claims against the TDCJ and the employees of the TDCJ charged in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As to Mayfield's claims for damages against Johnson and Pierce in their individual capacities, the district court held that the two defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court dismissed all claims against the TDCJ on sovereign immunity grounds. The TDCJ is an agency of the state, and as such is normally shielded from "suits by individuals absent [its] consent." Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). Mayfield does not challenge the district court's dismissal of his claims against the TDCJ, and therefore has waived any contention that these claims should survive the district court's judgment.⁶ See Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir.2007) (holding that prisoner waived First Amendment claim because he failed to brief arguments on appeal).

Still, sovereign immunity is subject to an established exception when it comes to the ability of state officers to invoke its protections. "Under Ex Parte Young, a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law." McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir.2004); see also Frew, 540 U.S. at 437, 124 S.Ct. 899 (noting that Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law). Construing Mayfield's pro se complaint liberally, we find that it seeks declaratory relief as well as a permanent injunction against Johnson and Pierce in their official capacities. See Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't, 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir.1996) (recognizing that we construe pro se complaints liberally); Aguilar v. Tx. Dep't Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir.1998) (explaining that the application of Ex Parte Young requires the complaint to include claims against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the "relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect"). Mayfield's amended complaint and attached memorandum state that he seeks for the court to "declare the acts and omissions described herein violated the Plaintiff's ... rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States," and also that he "seeks a permanent injunction ... as to his claims." Both § 1983 and RLUIPA allow for declaratory and injunctive relief.⁷ As such, the district court erred in concluding that "Plaintiff's claims are all covered with immunity from the Eleventh Amendment." Mayfield's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Johnson and Pierce in their official capacity are not barred by sovereign immunity.

To the extent that Mayfield seeks damages against Johnson and Pierce, we need not address the district court's conclusions that sovereign and qualified immunity prevent Mayfield's recovery.⁸ Instead, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the extent that Mayfield seeks damages because his damage claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act...