Norfolk Southern Ry. v Shanklin
| Citation | 146 L.Ed.2d 374,120 S.Ct. 1467,529 U.S. 344 |
| Decision Date | 17 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | 99312 |
| Parties | Syllabus SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. SHANKLIN, individually and as next friend of SHANKLIN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.
v.
SHANKLIN, individually and as next friend of SHANKLIN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Argued March 1, 2000
Decided April 17, 2000
The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations and issue orders for railroad safety, and it requires the Secretary to maintain a coordinated effort to solve railroad grade crossing problems. The FRSA also has an express pre-emption provision. One regulation promulgated by the Secretary, through the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), addresses the adequacy of warning devices installed under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program (Crossings Program). That program provides funds to States for the construction of such devices pursuant to the Highway Safety Act of 1973. According to the regulation, adequate warning devices installed using federal funds, where any of several conditions are present, are automatic gates and flashing lights. 23 CFR 646.214(b)(3). For crossings where those conditions are not present, a State's decision about what devices to install is subject to FHWA approval. 646.214(b)(4). Respondent's husband was killed when petitioner's train hit his vehicle at a crossing with advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks that the Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) had installed using federal funds under the Crossings Program. The signs were installed and fully compliant with applicable federal standards. Respondent brought a diversity wrongful death action in federal court, alleging that petitioner was negligent in, among other things, failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. The District Court denied petitioner's summary judgment motion, holding that the FRSA did not pre-empt respondent's inadequate warning device claim. After a trial, the jury awarded respondent damages on this and other negligence issues. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The FRSA, in conjunction with 646.214(b)(3) and (4), pre-empts state tort claims concerning a railroad's failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal funds have participated in the devices' installation. In CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 670, this Court held that, because 646.214(b)(3) and (4) "establish requirements as to the installation of particular warning devices," "when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted." Thus, the sole question here is whether they "are applicable" to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds. Easterwood answers this question as well, because it held that the requirements in (b)(3) and (4) are mandatory for all such devices. Id., at 666. They establish a standard of adequacy that determines the type of warning device to be installed when federal funds participate in the crossing improvement project. Once the FHWA has approved and funded the improvement and the devices are installed and operating, the regulation displaces state and private decisionmaking authority with a federal-law requirement. Importantly, this is precisely the interpretation of 646.214(b)(3) and (4) that the FHWA endorsed in Easterwood. The Government's position herethat (b)(3) and (4) only apply where the warning devices have been selected based on diagnostic studies and particularized analyses of a crossing's conditionsis not entitled to deference, because it contradicts the regulation's plain text as well as the FHWA's own previous construction that the Court adopted as authoritative in Easterwood. Respondent's argument that pre-emption does not apply here because this crossing presented several (b)(3) factors, and because the TDOT did not install pavement markings required by the FHWA's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, misconceives how pre-emption operates under these circumstances. If they are applicable, 696.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a federal standard for adequacy that displaces state tort law addressing the same subject. Whether the State should have originally installed different or additional devices, or whether conditions at the crossing have since changed such that different devices would be appropriate, is immaterial. Nothing prevents a State from revisiting the adequacy of devices installed using federal funds, or from installing more protective devices at such crossings with their own funds or additional FHWA funding, but the State cannot hold the railroad responsible for the adequacy of those devices.
Pp. 6-14.173 F.3d 386, reversed and remanded.
requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
DEDRA SHANKLIN, individually, and as next friend of jessie guy shanklin
[April 17, 2000]
This case involves an action for damages against a railroad due to its alleged failure to maintain adequate warning devices at a grade crossing in western Tennessee. After her husband was killed in a crossing accident, respondent brought suit against petitioner, the operator of the train involved in the collision. Respondent claimed that the warning signs posted at the crossing, which had been installed using federal funds, were insufficient to warn motorists of the danger posed by passing trains. The specific issue we must decide is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration's regulation addressing the adequacy of warning devices installed with federal funds, pre-empts state tort actions such as respondent's. We hold that it does.
In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) "to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents." 49 U.S.C. 20101. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation the authority to "prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety," 20103(a), and directs the Secretary to "maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem," 20134(a). The FRSA also contains an express pre-emption provision, which states:
20106.
Although the pre-emption provision contains an exception, see ibid., it is inapplicable here.
Three years after passing the FRSA, Congress enacted the Highway Safety Act of 1973, 203, 87 Stat. 283, which, among other things, created the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program (Crossings Program), see 23 U.S.C. 130. That program makes funds available to States for the "cost of construction of projects for the elimination of hazards of railway-highway crossings." 130(a). To participate in the Crossings Program, all States must "conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose." 130(d). That schedule must, "[a]t a minimum, a provide signs for all railway-highway crossings." Ibid.
The Secretary, through the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), has promulgated several regulations implementing the Crossings Program. One of those regulations, 23 CFR 646.214(b) (1999), addresses the design of grade crossing improvements. More specifically, 646.214(b)(3) and (4) address the adequacy of warning devices installed under the program.* According to 646.214(b)(3), "[a]dequte warning devices a on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals" if any of several conditions are present. Those conditions include (A) "[m]ultiple main line railroad tracks," (B) multiple tracks in the vicinity such that one train might "obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing," (C) high speed trains combined with limited sight distances, (D) a "combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic," (E) the use of the crossing by "substantial numbers of schoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials," or (F) when a "diagnostic team recommends them." 646.214(b)(3)(i). Subsection (b)(4) states that "[f]or crossings where the requirements of 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA." Thus, at crossings where any of the conditions listed in (b)(3) exist, adequate warning devices, if installed using federal funds, are automatic gates and flashing lights. And where the (b)(3) conditions are not present, the decision of what devices to...
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