Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz

• Decision Date: 07 October 1899
• Parties: STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. SCHMALTZ.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

53 S.W. 49

STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. SCHMALTZ.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 7, 1899.

Appeal from circuit court, Miller county; Joel D. Conway, Judge.

Action by Catherine Schmaltz against the Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appealed. Affirmed.

H. C. Hynson and Scott & Jones, for appellant. Williams & Arnold, for appellee.

BATTLE, J.

Catherine Schmaltz sued the Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company for the sum of $2,000, upon a policy of insurance against accidents, which was executed by the defendant to her husband, E. Schmaltz, in his lifetime. She alleged in her complaint that the defendant insured her husband, for her benefit, against the loss of life resulting from bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means; and that, on the 3d day of April, 1897, her husband, while engaged in the performance of the duties incident and pertaining to his employment and occupation as a machinist, in an effort to remove the cylinder head of an engine he was repairing, and to prevent the same from falling, violently, unexpectedly, and accidentally, and by external means, wrenched his body in such a manner as to rupture one of the blood vessels of his stomach, and thereby caused his death; and that, immediately after his death, "she gave notice thereof, and, within the time prescribed by said policy, made out and forwarded to said insurance company proofs of his death, and that she had in all other respects complied with the provisions and requirements of said policy."

The defense to the action was as follows: The deceased did not suffer death from injuries by external, violent, and accidental means; the policy specially exempted the defendant from liability for all injuries which resulted from lifting or overexertion, and that he came to his death by those means; and the proof of death had not been furnished as required by the policy.

The issues of fact were tried by a jury, and they returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,000, the amount of the policy, and the court rendered a judgment in her favor for that amount against the defendant, and it appealed.

1. The appellant contends that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence. The undisputed facts are: (1) The appellant insured E. Schmaltz, for the benefit of appellee, his wife, in the sum of $2,000, against loss of life resulting from bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means, and agreed to pay that amount to her in the event of death caused by such means; and (2) the insured died within the term of his insurance, from a sudden and unexpected rupture of one or more blood vessels in the stomach. But appellant insists that the death was not caused by external, violent, and accidental means. Upon this part of the case the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

"(1) If you find from the evidence that E. Schmaltz came to his death by violent, external, and accidental means, in removing the cylinder head of an engine, and if you further find that the removal or lifting of said cylinder was in the line of his occupation and duty as a machinist, and that he incurred no more risk or danger in removing or lifting said cylinder head than was customary among reasonably prudent machinists in the performance of like duties, then you are instructed that the removal of said cylinder head was not within the exceptions of the policy.

"(2) A person may do certain acts, the result of which may produce unforeseen consequences, and may produce what is commonly called `accidental death,' although the means are exactly what the man intended to use, and did use, and was prepared to use. In such case, the means would not be accidental, although the result might be accidental. In this case you are told that the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the injury to the deceased was caused by external, violent, and accidental means, and it is not sufficient that she prove that the result of the means employed by deceased was unforeseen, unexpected, and accidental.

"(3) If the jury find from the evidence that in the removing of the cylinder head from the engine, and carrying it off and putting it down, deceased acted in the manner he intended to act, and used the means he intended to use, in the manner he intended to use them, and in so doing a blood vessel was ruptured, then you are told that the injury was not the result of accidental means, and plaintiff cannot recover.

"(4) The jury are instructed that if they find from the evidence that deceased was removing a cylinder head from an engine, and in so doing he used the ordinary and usual means employed under the circumstances then existing, and, without the occurrence of any unforeseen accidental or involuntary movement of the body in removing said cylinder head, a blood vessel was ruptured in the body of deceased, then the cause of the injury was not accidental, and you are instructed that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [there] was such an unforeseen and accidental or involuntary movement of the body, and that this caused the rupture of the blood vessel."

As the correctness of these instructions is not questioned by either party, we make no comment upon them.

The evidence adduced in the trial tended to prove, substantially, the following facts: E. Schmaltz, at the time he was injured, was a strong, healthy, active, muscular man, weighing from 170 to 175 pounds. He had occupied the position of railroad machinist for seven or eight years; was employed in that capacity at the time he was insured and when he was injured and in the intervening time; and had frequently lifted cylinder heads from engines without accident or injury. Railroad machinists usually perform this duty, and it is not a dangerous undertaking, though the piece of machinery is unhandy. On the 3d of April, 1897, he removed a cylinder head, seventeen inches in diameter and about one inch thick, and weighing about eighty pounds, from an engine. He did so in the usual way. It was uncomfortably warm, and he used some "waste" to protect his hands. The head stuck, and he picked up a steel bar and removed it, and as he did so he dropped the bar, and caught it (the cylinder head), as quickly as he could, in order to prevent it from falling, and while he was in a stooping position, standing on his toes. A witness, who saw him catch it, says he "supposed, from his movements, it was as quick as possible." He was immediately taken sick. His stomach filled with blood, of which he vomited great quantities. He groaned. His face became deadly pale, and assumed a blanched, anxious expression, and clearly indicated that he was suffering great pain. He continued to vomit blood, at intervals, until he died. His physician, who attended him in his last illness, testified that his death was caused by the rupture of a blood vessel in his stomach.

We think that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury as to the means of death. The facts in this case are similar to those in Association v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755. In that case the plaintiff's husband was, at the time of his injury, robust and in good health, weighing from 160 to 175 pounds. He and two others jumped from a platform four or five feet from the ground. The other two alighted safely, but the plaintiff's husband, Dr. Barry, ruptured a blood vessel of the stomach, from which he died. Upon this evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: "We understood from the testimony, without question, that the deceased jumped from the platform with his eyes open, for his own convenience, in the free exercise of his choice, and not from any perilous necessity. He encountered no obstacle in jumping, and he alighted on the ground in an erect posture. So far we proceed without difficulty; but you must go further, and inquire, and here is the precise point on which the question turns: Was there or not any unexpected or unforeseen or involuntary movement of the body, from the time Dr. Barry left the platform until he reached the ground or in the act of alighting? Did he or not alight on the ground just as he intended to do? Did he or not unexpectedly lose or relax his self-control in his downward movement? Did his feet strike the ground as he intended or expected, or did they not? Did he or not miscalculate the distance, and was there or not any involuntary turning of the body in the downward movement, or in the act of alighting on the ground? These are points directly pertinent to the question in hand.

"And I instruct you that if Dr. Barry jumped from the platform and alighted on the ground in the way he intended to do, and nothing unforeseen, unexpected, or involuntary occurred, changing or affecting the downward movement of his body, as he expected or would naturally expect such a movement to be made, or causing him to strike the ground in any different way or position from that which he anticipated, or would naturally anticipate, then any resulting injury was not effected through any accidental means. But if, in jumping or alighting on the ground, there occurred, from any cause, any unforeseen or involuntary movement, turn, or strain, which brought about the alleged injury, or if there occurred any unforeseen circumstance which interfered with or changed such a downward movement as he expected to make, or as it would be natural to expect, under such circumstances, and as caused him to alight on the ground in a different position or way from that which he intended or expected, and injury thereby resulted, then the injury would be attributal to accidental means.

"Of course, it is to be presumed that he expected to reach the ground safely and without injury. Now, to simplify the question, and apply to its consideration a common-sense rule, did...