State v. Van Hook
| Decision Date | 09 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1159,87-1159 |
| Citation | 530 N.E.2d 883,39 Ohio St.3d 256 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. VAN HOOK, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. When a suspect who is being interrogated requests to speak with an attorney, all interrogation must cease and police may not reinitiate an interrogation until counsel has been provided.
2. A suspect who has ended interrogation by requesting the assistance of counsel may himself reinitiate the interrogation before counsel has been provided. (Edwards v. Arizona [1981], 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, and Arizona v. Roberson [1988], 486 U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 followed.) He may also reinitiate such interrogation through the agency of a non-attorney third party.
It was established at trial that on the evening of February 18, 1985, Robert Van Hook, appellant herein, went to a downtown Cincinnati establishment called the Subway Bar. There, he approached David Self. The two engaged in conversation while consuming alcoholic beverages for approximately two to three hours. As they left together, Self stopped briefly to explain to the bartender that he and appellant were planning to go to Self's apartment.
At the apartment, appellant lured Appellant then searched much of the apartment including a chest of drawers and a jewelry box. There was evidence that particular items of jewelry were taken, including specific testimony that the victim's gold chain necklace, which he had worn into the bar earlier that evening, was missing. Thereafter, appellant looked into the victim's refrigerator for food, but not seeing anything that "[he] liked," he prepared his departure from the apartment. Such preparation included smearing his bloody fingerprints, and turning up the volume on the stereo system.
Self into a vulnerable position and, with no provocation, attacked him. Initially, appellant strangled Self into a state of unconsciousness. He then took a paring knife from the victim's kitchen and stabbed the victim behind the right ear, aiming the thrust upward toward the brain, accompanied by a blade-twisting movement. Appellant then stabbed the victim's neck in numerous places, each stab wound accompanied by cutting motions. Several of these wounds penetrated over halfway through the neck and apparently represented appellant's efforts to decapitate the victim. Appellant then made an incision on the victim's body from the abdomen up to and over the sternum. The victim's abdominal cavity was opened so that his liver was visible. Appellant then stabbed upward a number of times, penetrating the liver and eventually penetrating the abdominal wall into the heart in three places. He placed a small bottle which had contained amyl nitrate, its cap, a cigarette butt and the paring knife into the victim's abdominal cavity.
After leaving the apartment, appellant went to the home of Dr. Robert Hoy, a family friend. There, under the guise of recovering from a fight with his stepfather, appellant borrowed money and ate a large meal. He then left and eventually arrived in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. There, he evaded detection until April 1, 1985, when, pursuant to information given by appellant's family, he was arrested by the Oakland Park police.
Subsequently, appellant was indicted for the offenses of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01 and aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01. A specification was also contained in the indictment that appellant committed the aggravated murder during the course of an aggravated robbery and that he was the principal offender. R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). Appellant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Appellant waived his right to a trial by jury, electing to be tried instead by a three-judge panel. Appellant was found guilty of both charges as well as the aggravating circumstances specified. Following the sentencing phase, the three-judge panel, for the reasons set forth in its opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F), imposed the sentence of death upon appellant for the crime of aggravated murder and also imposed a concurrent indefinite term of ten to twenty-five years for the crime of aggravated robbery. The court of appeals, having performed its statutory independent analysis of the record and the proportionality of the sentence, affirmed the sentence in all particulars.
The cause is before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right.
Arthur M. Ney, Jr., Pros. Atty., Leonard Kirschner, William E. Breyer and Theodore J. Froncek, Cincinnati, for appellee.
William Stewart Mathews II and Richard L. Bell, Cincinnati, for appellant.
Appellant asserts as his first proposition of law that the trial court failed to suppress the confession On the morning of April 1, 1985, appellant was arrested by the combined forces of the Ft. Lauderdale and the Oakland Park Police Departments. While at the Oakland Park police headquarters, he was advised of his Miranda rights. At that time, he acknowledged that he wished to make a statement without an attorney present, but then added: "Maybe I should have an attorney." Interpreting this statement as an invocation of the right to counsel, police ceased all interrogation and informed the Cincinnati homicide department of the arrest. Appellant was then transferred to the Broward County Sheriff's Department. No attorney was provided to appellant between the time when police ended their interrogation and the time, some hours later, when appellant confessed to the Cincinnati homicide detectives.
given by appellant to Cincinnati homicide detective William Davis. The confession was made while appellant was in the custody of the Broward County Sheriff's office in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, awaiting extradition to Cincinnati. Actually, the Ft. Lauderdale police had sought appellant for some time in their area. This was upon the recommendation of Detective Davis, who had received information through telephone calls from appellant's family.
At 9:20 p.m., the detectives arrived at the Broward County Sheriff's office, where they met with appellant. Initially, they discussed the extradition of appellant to Cincinnati. Apparently appellant had, subsequent to his post-arrest interrogation, voluntarily communicated to the Ft. Lauderdale police that he desired to waive the extradition process so as to expedite his return to Cincinnati. This had been communicated to the homicide detectives prior to their departure from Cincinnati. They sought to confirm these facts and also to inform appellant of their intention to leave for Cincinnati on the following day.
During the conversation, Detective Davis told appellant that he, Davis, had been in contact with appellant's mother and that "we had a lot to talk to him about." The detective informed him that the detectives could not talk to him unless appellant wanted to talk to them and make a statement. Appellant replied that he also had spoken with his mother, that she had advised him to "just tell the truth," and that he wanted to make a statement. Thereafter, police explained the Miranda rights to him, specifically asking if he now desired an attorney, to which he replied that he did not. Appellant then signed a Notification of Rights/Waiver of Rights form. Afterwards, a recording device was turned on and the police again explained to appellant all of his Miranda rights, pausing after each right to inquire whether appellant understood. They informed him that he could end the session at any time, after which they also inquired as follows:
Appellant then made a full and graphic confession, which is attached hereinafter as the Appendix. The confession included an admission to the killing of David Self as well as to the robbery.
Appellant now asserts that the confession should have been suppressed in its entirety because it was the product of an interrogation which occurred after appellant requested to speak with an attorney and which thus violated the mandate set forth in Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378.
In Edwards, it was held that a suspect who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id. at 484-485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. In subsequent cases, it has been determined that police may not reinitiate an interrogation under the guise of a "generalized discussion * * * [about] the investigation." Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983), 462 U.S. 1039, 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834, 77 L.Ed.2d 405. Also, in Wyrick v. Fields (1982), 459 U.S. 42, 46, 103 S.Ct. 394, 395, 74 L.Ed.2d 214, it was held that interrogation may not resume "unless the suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities." Most recently, these views...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Van Hook v. Anderson, No. C-1-94-269.
...robbery are set forth in numerous state court opinions, including the Ohio Supreme Court's published opinion in State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 530 N.E.2d 883 (1988). That account is reprinted below It was established at trial that on the evening of February 18, 1985, Robert Van Hook,......
- State v. Michael Goodwin, 97-LW-0746
-
State v. Slagle
...(1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 565 N.E.2d 549; State v. Landrum, supra; State v. Lott, supra; State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Van Hook (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 530 N.E.2d 883; State v. Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 530 N.E.2d 382; State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 527 N.E.2d 83......
-
Van Hook v. Anderson
...asserted unsuccessfully a variety of errors both on direct appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings. See State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 530 N.E.2d 883 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1578, 103 L.Ed.2d 944 (1989). After exhausting all of his state court remedies,......