Curry v. Estelle, 75--3181

• Decision Date: 14 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75--3181,75--3181
• Citation: 531 F.2d 766
• Parties: Alva E. CURRY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee. Summary Calendar. *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 766

531 F.2d 766

Alva E. CURRY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 75--3181 Summary Calendar. ^*

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 14, 1976.

Alva E. Curry, pro se.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Dunklin Sullivan, Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before AINSWORTH, CLARK and RONEY, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:

The sole issue meriting discussion in this habeas case is whether the petitioner's mental competency to plead was properly resolved in accordance with the standards of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). In 1972, Alva E. Curry, represented by court-appointed counsel, pled guilty to rape in Texas state court and received a sentence of 5--15 years. Before accepting the plea, the court advised Curry of the consequences of his action and asked several questions directed toward ascertaining whether the plea was freely and voluntarily given. The state transcript reveals that after entering his plea, Curry was asked by the court if he had anything to say as to why sentence should not be imposed. His response was the one word, 'Insanity.' At this point, Curry's counsel explained to the judge that although his client was in need of medical treatment, he believed him to be presently sane. The state then introduced letters from two psychiatrists who had examined and found petitioner competent to stand trial and legally sane at the time of the rape. Based on this evidence, the judge allowed the guilty plea to stand. There was no direct appeal.

Curry's pro se habeas petition in the district court generally alleged, inter alia, that his plea was involuntary, though not specifically focusing on the competency question. In denying the petition without a hearing, the district court squarely addressed the competency issue and held that petitioner had sufficiently exhausted state remedies on this point. The court then refused to find petitioner's plea involuntary based on the fact that Curry had been represented by reasonably effective counsel at the time of the sentencing. See Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974).

We agree with the district court's conclusion, but for a different reason. Although the voluntariness of the plea issue is often intertwined with the question of whether defendant was represented by competent counsel, there is an independent duty imposed upon the court to determine if an accused possesses the mental capacity to enter a knowing and intelligent plea. We recognized in Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d 1065, 1067 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1299, 31 L.Ed.2d 448 (1972), that unlike other nonjurisdictional defects, a claim of mental incompetency renders the plea involuntary and so cannot be waived by entry of the plea.

Although a person who asserts incompetency at the time of arraignment cannot be held to have waived any right to challenge that plea on incompetency grounds by the mere entry of the plea, petitioner here cannot succeed on the merits of his claim. Pate v. Robinson requires that...