532 U.S. 275 (2001), 99-1908, Alexander v. Sandoval
|Docket Nº:||Case No. 99-1908|
|Citation:||532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517, 69 U.S.L.W. 4249, 69 U.S.L.W. 4250|
|Party Name:||ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al v. SANDOVAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.|
|Case Date:||April 24, 2001|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued January 16, 2001
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
As a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department), of which petitioner Alexander is the director, is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of that title prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in covered programs and activities. Section 602 authorizes federal agencies to effectuate §601 by issuing regulations, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in an exercise of this authority promulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Respondent Sandoval brought this class action to enjoin the Department's decision to administer state driver's license examinations only in English, arguing that it violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Agreeing, the District Court enjoined the policy and ordered the Department to accommodate non-English speakers. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Both courts rejected petitioners' argument that Title VI did not provide respondents a cause of action to enforce the regulation.
There is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. Pp. 279-293.
(a) Three aspects of Title VI must be taken as given. First, private individuals may sue to enforce §601. See, e. g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694, 696, 699, 703, 710-711. Second, §601 prohibits only intentional discrimination. See, e. g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293. Third, it must be assumed for purposes of deciding this case that regulations promulgated under § 602 may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under §601. Pp. 279-282.
(b) This Court has not, however, held that Title VI disparate-impact regulations may be enforced through a private right of action. Cannon was decided on the assumption that the respondent there had intentionally
discriminated against the petitioner, see 441 U.S., at 680. In Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, the Court held that private individuals could not recover compensatory damages under Title VI except for intentional discrimination. Of the five Justices who also voted to uphold disparate-impact regulations, three expressly reserved the question of a direct private right of action to enforce them, id., at 645, n. 18. Pp. 282-284.
(c) Nor does it follow from the three points taken as given that Congress must have intended such a private right of action. There is no doubt that regulations applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce that section. But the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601since they forbid conduct that § 601 permitsand thus the private right of action to enforce §601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 173. That right must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602. Pp. 284-286.
(d) Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578. This Court will not revert to the understanding of private causes of action, represented by J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, that held sway when Title VI was enacted. That understanding was abandoned in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78. Nor does the Court agree with the Government's contention that cases interpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have given dispositive weight to the expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in light of the contemporary legal context. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-379; Cannon, supra, at 698-699; and Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, distinguished. Pp. 286-288.
(e) The search for Congress's intent in this case begins and ends with Title VI's text and structure. The "rights-creating" language so critical to Cannon 's §601 analysis, 441 U.S., at 690, n. 13, is completely absent from §602. Whereas §601 decrees that "[n]o person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination," §602 limits federal agencies to "effectuat[ing]" rights created by §601. And § 602 focuses neither on the individuals protected nor even on the funding recipients being regulated, but on the regulating agencies. Hence, there is far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons, Cannon, supra, at 690-691. The methods §602 expressly provides for enforcing its regulations, which place elaborate restrictions on agency enforcement, also suggest a congressional intent not to create a private remedy through
§ 602. See, e. g., Karahalios v. Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533. Pp. 288-291.
(f) The Court rejects arguments that the regulations at issue contain rights-creating language and so must be privately enforceable; that amendments to Title VI in §1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 and §6 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 "ratified" decisions finding an implied private right of action to enforce the regulations; and that the congressional intent to create a right of action must be inferred under Curran, supra, at 353, 381-382. Pp. 291-293..
197 F.3d 484, reversed
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 293.
Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, and John J. Park, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.
Eric Schnapper argued the cause for private respondents. With him on the brief were J. Richard Cohen, Rhonda Brownstein, Steven R. Shapiro, Edward Chen, and Christopher Ho.
Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the United States as respondent under this Court's Rule 12.6. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Dennis J. Dimsey, and Seth M. Galanter. [*]
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether private individuals may sue to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department), of which petitioner James Alexander is the director, accepted grants of financial assistance from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Transportation (DOT) and so subjected itself to the restrictions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Section 601 of that Title provides that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity" covered by Title VI. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Section 602 authorizes federal agencies "to effectuate the provisions of [§ 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability," 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, and the DOJ in an exercise of this authority promulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to "utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin . . . ." 28 CFR § 42.104(b)(2) (2000). See also 49 CFR § 21.5(b)(2) (2000) (similar DOT regulation).
The State of Alabama amended its Constitution in 1990 to declare English "the official language of the state of
Alabama." Amdt. 509. Pursuant to this provision and, petitioners have argued, to advance public safety, the Department decided to administer state driver's license examinations only in English. Respondent Sandoval, as representative of a class, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to enjoin the English-only policy, arguing that it violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. The District Court agreed. It enjoined the policy and ordered the Department to accommodate non-English speakers. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F.Supp.2d 1234 (1998). Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484(1999). Both courts rejected petitioners' argument that Title VI did not provide respondents a cause of action to enforce the regulation.
We do not inquire here whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by § 602, or whether the courts below were correct to hold that the English-only policy had the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. The petition for writ of certiorari raised, and we agreed to review, only the question posed in the first paragraph of this opinion: whether there is a private cause of action to...
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