Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss

Decision Date25 April 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99-1884.,99-1884.
Citation532 U.S. 394
PartiesLACKAWANNA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY ET AL. v. COSS
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III—A, and IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III—C, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III—B, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 408. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 410.

William P. O'Malley argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Eugene M. Talerico and Andrew J. Jarbola III.

Robert M. Russel, Assistant Solicitor General of Colorado, argued the cause for the State of Colorado et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Ken Salazar, Attorney General of Colorado, Dan Schweitzer, and the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington.

James V. Wade argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Daniel I. Siegel.*

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts III—B and III—C.

For the second time this Term, we are faced with the question whether federal postconviction relief is available when a prisoner challenges a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction for which the petitioner is no longer in custody. In Daniels v. United States, ante, p. 374, we held that such relief is generally not available to a federal prisoner through a motion to vacate the sentence under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed., Supp. V), but left open the possibility that relief might be appropriate in rare circumstances. We now hold that relief is similarly unavailable to state prisoners through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (1994 ed. and Supp. V).

I

Respondent Edward R. Coss, Jr., has an extensive criminal record. By the age of 16, he had been adjudged a juvenile delinquent on five separate occasions for offenses including theft, disorderly conduct, assault, and burglary. See Record Doc. No. 101 (Pl. Exh. 5, pp. 4-6). By the time he turned 23, Coss had been convicted in adult court of assault, institutional vandalism, criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, and possession of a controlled substance. See id., at 6-7. His record also reveals arrests for assault, making terroristic threats, delivery of controlled substances, reckless endangerment, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, retail theft, and criminal conspiracy, although each of those charges was later dropped. See ibid. A report generated by the Lackawanna County Adult Probation Office sums up the "one consistent factor in this defendant's life: criminal behavior, much of it being aggressive." Id., at 8.

This case revolves around two of the many entries on Coss' criminal record. In October 1986, Coss was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief. He was then sentenced to two consecutive prison terms of six months to one year. He did not file a direct appeal. See App. 54a; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29.

In June 1987, Coss filed a petition for relief from the 1986 convictions under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. (1998), alleging that his trial attorney had been constitutionally ineffective. See App. 50a—53a. The Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas promptly appointed counsel for Coss, id., at 57a, and the district attorney filed an answer to the petition, id., at 59a. The court, however, took no further action on the petition for the remainder of Coss' time in custody. Indeed, it appears that Coss' state postconviction petition has now been pending for almost 14 years, and has never been the subject of a judicial ruling. Neither petitioners nor respondent is able to explain this lapse. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 29.

In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was again convicted in Pennsylvania state court, this time of aggravated assault. He was sentenced to 6 to 12 years in prison, but successfully challenged this sentence on direct appeal because of a possible inaccuracy in the presentence report. App. 62a.

On remand, the court's first task was to determine the range of sentences for which Coss was eligible. In calculating Coss' "prior record score"—one of two determinants of the applicable sentencing range, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9721 (1998) (reproducing 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(a) (1998))—the new presentence report took account of Coss' most serious juvenile adjudication and Coss' 1986 misdemeanor convictions, counting the latter as separate offenses. See Record Doc. No. 101 (Pl. Exh. 3, at 10). Coss objected, claiming that his 1986 convictions should be counted as one misdemeanor offense because they arose from the same transaction. See ibid. (Pl. Exh. 5, at 3-4). The trial court sustained Coss' objection, finding that the convictions should be "viewed . . . as being one transaction, one incident, one conviction." Id., at 5. Under the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, one prior misdemeanor does not affect the prior record score. See id., at 10 (displaying grid for calculating prior record score). Thus, the practical effect of the court's decision was to eliminate the 1986 convictions from Coss' prior record score entirely. See ibid.; see also 204 F. 3d 453, 467-468 (CA3 2000) (en banc) (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Consequently, Coss' 1986 convictions played no part in determining the range of sentences to which Coss was exposed.

The court's next task was to choose a sentence within that range. In doing so, the trial court considered a number of factors, including "the seriousness and nature of the crime involved here, the well being and protection of the people who live in our community, your criminal disposition, your prior criminal record, the possibility of your rehabilitation, and the testimony that I've heard." Record Doc. No. 101 (Pl. Exh. 3, at 26). The court concluded that "it's indicative that from your actions that you will continue to break the law unless given a period of incarceration." Ibid. The court then reimposed a 6 to 12 year sentence. Because Coss' 1986 convictions are a part of his prior criminal record, the Court of Appeals concluded that the state court took those convictions "into consideration" in sentencing Coss. See 204 F. 3d, at 459.

In September 1994, Coss filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. That provision, a postconviction remedy in federal court for state prisoners, provides that a writ of habeas corpus is available to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" if that person "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." § 2254(a). In his petition, Coss contended that his 1986 assault conviction was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. App. 73a—74a.

In answer to Coss' § 2254 petition, the Lackawanna County District Attorney argued that the District Court could not review the constitutionality of Coss' 1986 convictions because Coss was no longer in custody on those convictions. Record Doc. No. 55, p. 2. The district attorney, however, indicated his understanding that the crux of Coss' claim was that his 1986 convictions "may have impact sic upon the sentences which have been imposed . . . upon Coss for criminal convictions rendered against him" for his 1990 convictions. Ibid. See also Brief for Petitioners 4 ("Respondent argues that the sentence for his 1990 conviction was adversely and unconstitutionally affected by the 1986 simple assault conviction").

The District Court stated that Coss was arguing "that his current sentence for the 1990 conviction was adversely affected by the 1986 convictions because the sentencing judge considered these allegedly unconstitutional convictions in computing Coss's present sentence." App. to Pet. for Cert. 105a—106a. Finding that "the sentencing judge . . . did make reference to the 1986 convictions in sentencing Coss," id., at 107a, the court held that it could properly exercise jurisdiction under § 2254, id., at 108a; see also Record Doc. No. 87, p. 3, n. 2. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, holding that Coss' 1986 trial counsel had been ineffective, but that Coss had not been prejudiced by the ineffectiveness. App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a, 116a, 120a.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed that "the sentencing court for the 1990 conviction took into consideration Coss' 1986 convictions," and therefore that the District Court had jurisdiction over Coss' § 2254 petition. 204 F. 3d, at 459. Citing Circuit precedent and our decisions in Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S. 488 (1989) (per curiam), and United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972), the court concluded that § 2254 provided a remedy for "an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, even if the § 2254 petitioner has served in entirety the...

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