Raygor v. University of Minnesota
| Decision Date | 11 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | C1-99-1140 |
| Citation | 534 U.S. 533 |
| Parties | Lance Raygor, et al., Appellants, vs. University of Minnesota, a Minnesota State University, Respondent. C1-99-1140 STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS Filed |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
University of Minnesota, a Minnesota State University, Respondent.
C1-99-1140
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed January 11, 2000
Hennepin County District Court
1. The assertion of an Eleventh Amendment defense does not vitiate or destroy a federal district court's original jurisdiction over claims involving federal questions or the court's mandatory, supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1994), the limitations period for asserting claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act is tolled during the pendency of a federal district court action alleging similar claims and claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), even though the federal district court action was ultimately dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
3. When the defendant is not prejudiced and when the plaintiff's decision to file an action including both federal and state claims first in federal district court was legally sound, the limitation period under state law may be equitably tolled pending a decision in federal district court.
Howard Bolter, Borkon, Ramstead, Mariani & Letourneau, Ltd., 485 Northstar East, 608 Second Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55402-1959 (for appellants)
Andrew D. Parker, Matthew E. Johnson, Smith Parker, P.L.L.P., 808 Colwell Building, 123 North Third St., Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.*
Reversed
Appellants Lance Raygor and James Goodchild brought this action against their employer, respondent University of Minnesota (University), alleging age discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363.01-.20 (1996). The University moved to dismiss, arguing that the MHRA's 45-day statute of limitations had lapsed and was not tolled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) (1994). The district court agreed and granted the University's motion. We reverse.
In August 1995, appellants filed separate charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) alleging age discrimination against the University. By letters dated July 17, 1996, the MDHR dismissed the charges and notified appellants that they had 45 days in which to file civil suits in state district court. See Minn. Stat. § 363.14, subd. 1 (1996) ().
On August 30, 1996, appellants sued the University in federal district court. They each alleged one claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1974 (ADEA) and one claim under the MHRA. Their actions were consolidated.
Nine months later, the University moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The University argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the ADEA and the MHRA claims because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state by citizens of that or another state. The federal district court granted the University's motion and dismissed appellants' claims without prejudice.
Appellants challenged the federal district court's decision in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. That appeal has been stayed pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in another case involving the issue of whether an ADEA claim against a state is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
Twenty days after the federal district court dismissed their action, appellants brought this action in state district court alleging age discrimination under the MHRA. This action was stayed for several months pending a decision in the federal appeal. The state district court lifted the stay, however, to allow the University to bring this motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.
1. Did the district court err in concluding that the limitation period for appellants' state action was not tolled while appellants' federal action was pending?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by rejecting appellants' claim that the limitation period should be equitably tolled?
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact exist and either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. When the court examines documents and evidence in addition to the pleadings, a motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 becomes one for summary judgment. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. Issues involving jurisdiction and application of statutes of limitations require statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. See Boubelik v. Liberty State Bank, 553 N.W.2d 393, 402 (Minn. 1996).
This case involves interpretation of the federal "Supplemental Jurisdiction" statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) [] and (c) [which allows court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances, such as when a state law claim raises a novel issue or when all original jurisdiction claims have been dismissed] * * *, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. * * *.
* * * *
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) * * * shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
It is undisputed that the federal district court had original jurisdiction over appellants' ADEA claim, because that claim raised a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (). In addition, the gravamen of both the ADEA and MHRA claims was discrimination based on age. Thus, the federal district court had mandatory, supplemental jurisdiction over appellants' MHRA claim, which was "so related to [the ADEA claims] that they form[ed] part of the same case or controversy" under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Nevertheless, the state district court in this case concluded that appellants' claims were not tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The court reasoned that because these claims were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the federal district court never had "original" jurisdiction over them. Thus, the issue here is whether the Eleventh Amendment divested the federal district court of its original, mandatory, and supplemental jurisdiction, such that jurisdiction never attached.
The Eleventh Amendment has been described as a "bar[] to federal court jurisdiction over a suit between an unconsenting State and one of its citizens." Humenansky v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 823-24 (8th Cir. 1998) (). The Eleventh Amendment, however, is not a typical jurisdictional limitation because it can be waived and because a federal court has discretion to raise it sua sponte. Parella v. Retirement Bd. of Rhode Island Employees' Retirement Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 1999). Although the Eleventh Amendment provides a state with an immunity defense, it does not necessarily destroy a federal district court's underlying jurisdiction:
[B]ecause Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived, the presence of an Eleventh Amendment issue does not threaten the court's underlying power to declare the law. If this were not the case, sua sponte consideration of a possible Eleventh Amendment bar would have to be obligatory, not discretionary but the Supreme Court has now clearly stated that courts are free to ignore possible Eleventh Amendment concerns if a defendant chooses not to press them.
Id. at 55-56 (citing Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052-53 (1998)).
In Schacht, the Supreme Court considered whether removal jurisdiction is destroyed when one of the removed claims is subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar. 118 S. Ct. at 2051. Similar to the federal question jurisdiction here, removal jurisdiction requires "original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Supreme Court concluded that while the Eleventh Amendment may place a particular claim beyond the power of the federal courts to decide, it does not destroy previously existing original jurisdiction. Id., 118 S. Ct. at 2052-53. The Court further recognized the distinction between diversity jurisdiction, which is automatically destroyed if one party is not diverse, and original jurisdiction, which is not destroyed even if the Eleventh Amendment is successfully asserted. Id. Thus, Schacht supports appellants' position that the Eleventh Amendment does not destroy or vitiate original jurisdiction until it is successfully asserted by a state or state entity.
The University argues that even if the federal district court had original jurisdiction over appellants' ADEA claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period because appellants' state law MHRA claim was not dismissed by the federal district court for one of the reasons enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (...
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