535 U.S. 162 (2002), 00-9285, Mickens v. Taylor
|Docket Nº:||No. 00-9285.|
|Citation:||535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 70 U.S.L.W. 4205, 70 U.S.L.W. 4216|
|Party Name:||MICKENS v. TAYLOR, WARDEN|
|Case Date:||March 27, 2002|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued November 5, 2001
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
A Virginia jury convicted petitioner of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy, and sentenced petitioner to death. Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition alleging, inter alia, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial. Petitioners lead attorney, Bryan Saunders, had represented Hall on assault and concealed-weapons charges at the time of the murder. The same juvenile court judge who dismissed the charges against Hall later appointed Saunders to represent petitioner. Saunders did not disclose to the court, his co-counsel, or petitioner that he had previously represented Hall. The District Court denied habeas relief, and an en banc majority of the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The majority rejected petitioners argument that the juvenile court judges failure to inquire into a potential conflict either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. The court concluded that petitioner had not demonstrated adverse effect.
In order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known, a defendant must establish that a conflict of interest adversely affected his counsels performance. Pp. 166176.
(a) A defendant alleging ineffective assistance generally must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsels unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694. An exception to this general rule presumes a probable effect upon the outcome where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. The Court has held in several cases that circumstances of that magnitude, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, n. 26, may also arise when the defendants attorney actively represented conflicting interests. In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, the Court created an automatic reversal rule where counsel is forced to represent co-defendants over his timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
the Court declined to extend Holloway and held that, absent objection, a defendant must demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation, 446 U.S., at 348349. Finally, in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, the Court granted certiorari to consider an equal-protection violation, but then remanded for the trial court to determine whether a conflict of interest that the record strongly suggested actually existed, id., at 273. Pp. 166170.
(b) This Court rejects petitioners argument that the remand instruction in Wood, directing the trial court to grant a new hearing if it determined that an actual conflict of interest existed, 450 U.S., at 273, established that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict the defendant, to obtain reversal, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest, not that the conflict adversely affected counsels performance. As used in the remand instruction, an actual conflict of interest meant precisely a conflict that affected counsels performanceas opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. It was shorthand for Sullivans statement that a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief, 446 U.S., at 349350 (emphasis added). The notion that Wood created a new rule sub silentio is implausible. Moreover, petitioners proposed rule of automatic reversal makes little policy sense. Thus, to void the conviction petitioner had to establish, at a minimum, that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsels performance. The Fourth Circuit having found no such effect, the denial of habeas relief must be affirmed. Pp. 170174.
(c) The case was presented and argued on the assumption that (absent some exception for failure to inquire) Sullivan would be applicable to a conflict rooted in counsels obligations to former clients. The Court does not rule upon the correctness of that assumption. Pp. 174176.
240 F.3d 348, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and OConnor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which OConnor, J., joined, post, p. 176. Stevens, J., post, p. 179, and Souter, J., post, p. 189, filed dissenting opinions. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 209.
Robert J. Wagner, by appointment of the Court, 533 U.S. 927, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert E. Lee and Mark E. Olive.
Robert Q. Harris, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General.
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Gregory G. Garre, and Joel M. Gershowitz.[*]
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is what a defendant must show in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known.
In 1993, a Virginia jury convicted petitioner Mickens of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy. Finding the murder outrageously and wantonly vile, it sentenced petitioner to death. In June 1998, Mickens filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging, inter alia, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial. Federal habeas counsel had discovered that petitioners lead trial attorney, Bryan Saunders, was representing Hall (the victim) on assault and concealed-weapons charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had been appointed to represent Hall, a juvenile, on March 20, 1992, and had met with him once for 15 to 30 minutes some time the following week. Halls body was discovered on March 30, 1992, and four days
later a juvenile court judge dismissed the charges against him, noting on the docket sheet that Hall was deceased. The one-page docket sheet also listed Saunders as Halls counsel. On April 6, 1992, the same judge appointed Saunders to represent petitioner. Saunders did not disclose to the court, his co-counsel, or petitioner that he had previously represented Hall. Under Virginia law, juvenile case files are confidential and may not generally be disclosed without a court order, see Va. Code Ann. § 16.1305 (1999), but petitioner learned about Saunders prior representation when a clerk mistakenly produced Halls file to federal habeas counsel.
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied petitioners habeas petition. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 227 F.3d 203 (2000), and the Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc, 240 F.3d 348 (2001). As an initial matter, the 7-to-3 en banc majority determined that petitioners failure to raise his conflict-of-interest claim in state court did not preclude review, concluding that petitioner had established cause and that the inquiry as to prejudice for purposes of excusing [petitioners] default . . . incorporates the test for evaluating his underlying conflict of interest claim. Id., at 356357. On the merits, the Court of Appeals assumed that the juvenile court judge had neglected a duty to inquire into a potential conflict, but rejected petitioners argument that this failure either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. Relying on Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), the court held that a defendant must show both an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect even if the trial court failed to inquire into a potential conflict about which it reasonably should have known, 240 F.3d, at 355356. Concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated adverse effect, id., at 360, it affirmed the District Courts denial of habeas relief. We
granted a stay of execution of petitioners sentence and granted certiorari. 532 U.S. 970 (2001).
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall have the right to the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. This right has been accorded, we have said, not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). It follows from this that assistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness does not meet the constitutional mandate, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685686 (1984); and it also follows that defects in assistance that have no probable effect upon the trials outcome do not establish a constitutional...
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