State v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 12 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 11705,11705
• Citation: 96 Idaho 743,536 P.2d 738
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chester LEWIS and Raymond B. Robinson, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 738

536 P.2d 738

96 Idaho 743

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chester LEWIS and Raymond B. Robinson, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 11705.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 12, 1975.

Wayne Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.

Peter D. McDermott, Pocatello, for defendants-respondents.

BAKES, Justice.

Defendants Raymond B. Robinson and Chester Lewis were each charged with the crimes of kidnapping and rape. Following presentation of the state's evidence, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the charges involved on the ground that the state had not proved the elements of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The state has appealed from the order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss.

Lewis and Robinson were both accused of the kidnapping and rape of a Pocatello woman. At the trial she testified that at approximately 2:00 a. m. on the morning of June 22, 1973, as she was leaving a friend's party and walking toward her car to return home, she saw one of the defendants, Chester Lewis, on the street. She testified that he had said, 'Hi;' she responded, 'Hi;' then Lewis grabbed her, put his hand over her mouth and told her not to scream or try to make any noises. Then two other men, one of whom was identified as defendant Raymond Robinson, and the other of whom was never identified, appeared. She was forced into the cab of a pickup, and Lewis again told her to be quiet. She testified that Robinson, who was driving the vehicle, then took the four of them to a remote and uninhabited area several miles outside of Pocatello. After they stopped, she testified that Lewis got her out of the cab and into the bed of the truck where there was a sleeping bag. She entered the sleeping bag and Lewis later entered the sleeping bag with her and engaged in a single act of sexual intercourse with her. Although she testified that she did not struggle or resist to prevent the act of intercourse, she claimed she did not consent to the act of intercourse but engaged in it because she feared for her life. She even admitted to kissing Lewis in response to his advances, but for the same reason.

She testified that during the two hours she spent in the back of the truck with Lewis that she had persuaded him to try to convince the other two men not to have intercourse with her. According to her testimony, Lewis agreed to do this, but returned to her after talking with the other two men and told her that they would not agree to this. Then, she testified, Robinson came to the back of the truck and engaged in a single act of sexual intercourse with her. Following that, the third man also came to the back of the truck and engaged in a single act of intercourse with her.

She testified that after this the truck was driven back to Pocatello and she was released near the point where she claimed she was abducted. She claimed that at that time, in an effort to entrap Lewis she gave him her name, address and telephone number and agreed to meet him in a local city park the following afternoon. When she met Lewis in the park that afternoon, Lewis was arrested by a detective from the Pocatello police department who had accompanied her there.

The following witnesses were among the witnesses that the prosecution called to testify during the trial: the physician who examined the complaining witness at approximately 5:30 a. m. on the morning of June 22, 1973; the complaining witness's father; the poiice officer who had responded to the father's call to the police department; and the police officer who had arrested Lewis in the park. The physician who had examined the complaining witness testified that his examination of her showed that she had engaged in intercourse within the three days before his examination. He further testified that he found no evidence of bruising anywhere on the complaining witness's body nor evidence of torn or bruised tissue in the vaginal area. The complaining witness's father testified that she had returned home at approximately 4:30 or 5:00 a. m. on June 22, 1973, and that she was screaming and in a hysterical state at that time. He testified it took 15 to 20 minutes to calm her to a state in which she could talk to him. He then called the police. The police officer who answered the call and accompanied the complaining witness to the hospital to be examined said that she was in a state of 'controlled hysteria,' crying and on the verge of breaking down. The police officer who arrested Lewis said that the complaining witness seemed noticeably upset that afternoon in the park. He further testified that Lewis had admitted to him to engaging in intercourse with the complaining but denied forcing her or raping her.

At the close of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, the defense moved for a dismissal of both the kidnapping and rape charges against both defendants. In arguing upon this motion, defense counsel emphasized his assertion that there had been no proof that force was used to accomplish the act of intercourse. After considering counsel's arguments, the court made the following ruling:

'It's the burden of the prosecuting attorney to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't believe you've proved the elements of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. There is still reasonable doubt as to her fear and I don't believe this is a proper case for this court to allow it to go to the jury. Therefore, I'm going to grant the motion to dismiss as both to the kidnapping and to the rape charge.' Rptr. Tr., p. 95.

The prosecution has appealed from this ruling of the trial court.

The first question which we must decide is whether this court should consider this appeal. I.C. § 19-2804, ¹ which enumerates six orders, rulings or judgments from which appeal may be taken by the state, does not include in that list appeals from an order granting a defendant's motion to dismiss. If this statute exclusively defines our authority to hear appeals by the state in criminal matters, then we must dismiss this appeal. But it does not. The Idaho Constitution, in Art. 5, § 9, defines the appellate jurisdiction of this Court: 'The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof, . . .' That section of the Constitution gives this Court power to review 'any decision' of the district courts even though I.C. § 19-2804 does not give the aggrieved party, in this case the state, a right of appeal to this Court. See State v. Berlin, 95 Idaho 225, 506 P.2d 122 (1973), where we referred to this plenary power of review, although we declined to exercise it. See also State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1972), where we dismissed an appeal because it was not authorized by I.C. § 19-2804, but nevertheless thought it advisable to decide the issues of law involved in the case because they presented a recurring problem concerning hunting and fishing rights of the Shoshone-Bannock Indians. Our holding that we shall exercise this plenary right of review is in conflict with the cases of State v. Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 710, 51 P. 750 (1897), and State v. Grady, 31 Idaho 272, 170 P. 85 (1918), and for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs we overrule these two cases.

Grady was a short case which reaches its conclusion upon this question by citation to a legal encyclopedia, the Ridenbaugh case, and several cases decided by other states. It neither expands upon the holding in Ridenbaugh nor offers additional reasons for upholding Ridenbaugh; therefore, its vitality is dependent solely upon the continued vitality of Ridenbaugh.

In Ridenbaugh the Court construed Article 5, § 9, as not allowing this Court to hear appeals by the state from decisions of the district courts when such appeal is not authorized by statute, even though the literal language of the Constitution allows an appeal from 'any decision' of the district court. The Court in Ridenbaugh reached that conclusion because such a decision would have, in the Court's opinion, undermined the common law and constitutional prohibitions against twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense. This argument is not persuasive. The power to consider the state's argument on appeal is not coincident with the power to remand the case for further proceedings in violation of the double jeopardy provisions of the Idaho and United States Constitutions. So long as we do not order a disposition of the case that subjects the defendant to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, our holding is in conformity with the Constitutions of Idaho and of the United States and we are exercising powers that have been given to this Court by the Constitution of Idaho and which cannot be withheld by the legislature. 'The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it . . ..' Idaho Constitution, Art. 5, § 13. Accordingly, Ridenbaugh and Grady are overruled.

By overruling Ridenbaugh, we have not made an abrupt departure from precedent. Ridenbaugh's holdings have already been considerably eroded. In Ridenbaugh, after stating that we had no jurisdiction over the appeal that the state had attempted to bring, we further said that all authority and reason forbade us from expressing any view upon the legal question that would have been presented had we considered the substantive merits of the case. But in Tinno, supra, although we concluded we would not hear the appeal on the merits, we nevertheless expressed our opinion upon the legal question involved therein. To that extent, Ridenbaugh had already been overruled. The language in Berlin, supra, which indicated that this Court has plenary power under the Idaho Constitution, Article 5, § 9, to hear appeals by the state not authorized by I.C. § 19-2804, was in direct opposition to the holding in...