536 U.S. 150 (2002), 00-1737, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton
|Citation:||536 U.S. 150, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205, 70 U.S.L.W. 4539, 70 U.S.L.W. 4540|
|Party Name:||Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton|
|Case Date:||June 17, 2002|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued February 26, 2002.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
Respondent Village of Stratton (Village) promulgated an ordinance that, inter alia, prohibits canvassers from going in and upon private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayors office by completing and signing a registration form. Petitioners, a society and a congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought this action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations, although it did require the Village to accept narrowing constructions of several provisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Among its rulings, that court held that the ordinance was content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny; rejected petitioners argument that the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that was recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn, 514 U.S. 334; concluded that the Villages interests in protecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyance and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation; and distinguished this Courts earlier cases protecting the Jehovahs Witnesses ministry.
The ordinances provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. Pp. 160169.
(a) For over 50 years, this Court has invalidated on First Amendment grounds restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering by Jehovahs Witnesses. See, e. g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105. Although those cases do not directly control the question at issue, they yield several themes that guide the Court. Among other things,
those cases emphasize that the hand distribution of religious tracts is ages old and has the same claim as more orthodox practices to the guar-antees of freedom of religion, speech, and press, e. g., id., at 109; discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas, e. g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164, but recognize the legitimate interests a town may have in some form of regulation, partic-ularly when the solicitation of money is involved, e. g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306, or the prevention of burglary is a legitimate concern, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144; make clear that there must be a balance between such interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights, e. g., ibid.; and demonstrate that the Jehovahs Witnesses have not struggled for their rights alone, but for those many who are poorly financed and rely extensively upon this method of communication, see, e. g., id., at 144146, including nonreligious groups and individuals, see, e. g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539540. Pp. 160164.
(b) The Court need not resolve the parties dispute as to what standard of review to use here because the breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Sixth Circuit erred in upholding it. There is no doubt that the interests the ordinance assertedly servesthe prevention of fraud and crime and the protection of residents privacyare important and that the Village may seek to safeguard them through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. However, the amount of speech covered by the ordinance raises serious concerns. Had its provisions been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Villages interest in protecting its residents privacy and preventing fraud. Yet, the Villages administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that it applies to a significant number of noncommercial canvassers promoting a wide variety of causes. The pernicious effect of the permit requirement is illustrated by, e.g., the requirement that a canvasser be identified in a permit application filed in the mayors office and made available for public inspection, which necessarily results in a surrender of the anonymity this Court has protected. Also central to the Courts conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Villages stated interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Villages
argument that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional interests of protecting residents privacy and the prevention of crime is unpersuasive. As to the former, an unchallenged ordinance section authorizing residents to post No Solicitation signs, coupled with their unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for unwilling listeners. As to the latter, it seems unlikely that the lack of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance, and, in any event, there is no evidence in the record of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation. Pp. 164169.
240 F.3d 553, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which OCONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. post, p. 172.
Paul D. Polidoro argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Philip Brumley, Richard D. Moake, and Donald T. Ridley.
Abraham Cantor argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
David M. Gormley, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the cause for the State of Ohio et al. as amici curiae in support of respondents. With him on the brief were Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Elise W. Porter and Kirk A. Lindsey, Assistant Solicitors, and the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas Reilly of Massachusetts, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, and Hoke MacMillan of Wyoming.[*]
Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regulation not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills.
Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovahs Witnesses throughout the United States and publishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do accept donations.
Petitioners brought this action against the Village and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of several sections of Ordinance No. 19985 regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation on private property in the Village. Petitioners complaint alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech, and the freedom of the press. App. 10a44a. The District Court conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the administration of the ordinance and its effect on petitioners was introduced.
Section 116.01 prohibits canvassers and others from going in and upon private residential property for the purpose of promoting any cause without first having obtained a permit pursuant to § 116.03. That section provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause, must obtain a Solicitation Permit from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant
fills out a fairly detailed Solicitors Registration Form. The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on...
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