U.S. v. Williams
Decision Date | 11 August 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 07-2679.,07-2679. |
Citation | 537 F.3d 969 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth D. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Diane Dragan, AFPD, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
Thomas J. Mehan, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
The defendant, Kenneth D. Williams, pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Williams argues that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence based on a finding that his prior convictions for auto theft and auto tampering qualify as crimes of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Williams pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Williams to a term of 57 months in prison, a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range. The advisory range was calculated using § 2K2.1(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. That subsection enhanced Williams's base offense from a level 14 to a level 24 because the district court found that Williams had committed two prior felonies that qualified as crimes of violence—auto theft and auto tampering. Both prior felonies were violations of Missouri law.
Our court previously held that auto theft is a crime of violence. United States v. Sprouse, 394 F.3d 578, 581 (8th Cir.2005) ( ); United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir.2002) ( ). Following Sun Bear, our court also held auto tampering to be a violent felony. United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990, 997 (8th Cir.2005) ( ); United States v. Counts, 498 F.3d 802, 804-05 (8th Cir.2007) (, )cert. granted and judgment vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2049, 170 L.Ed.2d 790 (2008) ( ). The district court applied our controlling precedent to determine the advisory Guidelines range.
Subsequent to oral argument in this case, the United States Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), which held that driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) is not a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 128 S.Ct. at 1583. Our panel, therefore, sought and received supplemental briefing on Begay's effect on our precedent dealing with auto tampering and auto theft. We now conclude that Begay, as intervening Supreme Court authority, compels us to disregard Sun Bear and its progeny to the extent that the Supreme Court uses reasoning that conflicts with the rationale that our court used to determine that auto theft and auto tampering were crimes of violence.
We first note that we are bound by cases interpreting whether an offense is a crime of violence under the Guidelines as well as cases interpreting whether an offense is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d at 996 (). Section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines prescribes an offense level of 24 for a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after having been convicted of two or more crimes of violence. Section 4B1.1 provides for an enhanced offense level for certain crimes if the defendant has two predicate felonies for qualifying drug offenses or crimes of violence. The commentary to both § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.1 refer to § 4B1.2(a), which provides a definition of a "crime of violence" that is virtually identical to the definition of a "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
The present case involves the term "crime of violence" whereas the Supreme Court in Begay interpreted the term "violent felony." We have never recognized a distinction between the two. See Sprouse, 394 F.3d at 580 (). In fact, in Sprouse, we held that pursuant to the prior authority of Sun Bear, auto theft is a violent felony for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), just as it was a crime of violence for purposes of the Guidelines. Id. at 580-81; see also United States v. Walker, 494 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir.2007) (, )cert. granted and judgment vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2050, 170 L.Ed.2d 790 (2008) ( ); United States v. Spudich, 443 F.3d 986, 987 (8th Cir.2006) (); United States v. Abernathy, 277 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.2002).
In construing whether auto theft and auto tampering are crimes of violence, we look at what is commonly referred to as the "otherwise" clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) or U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The "otherwise" clause provides enhanced penalties for defendants with predicate felonies for certain listed example crimes— "burglary, arson, or extortion," and crimes "involv[ing][the] use of explosives"—as well as crimes that "otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The "otherwise" clause is the section of the Armed Career Criminal Act analyzed in Begay. 128 S.Ct. at 1581.
Begay held that for a crime to fall within the "otherwise" clause it must pose a similar degree of risk of physical injury as the example crimes and be similar in kind to the example crimes. 128 S.Ct. at 1585-86. Therefore, even if a crime presents the same degree of risk of physical injury as the example crimes, it is not covered by the "otherwise" clause unless it is also similar in kind to the example crimes. Id. at 1586. For a crime to be similar in kind to the example crimes, it should typically involve "purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct." Id. For example, although DUI may be as dangerous as the example crimes, it is too different in kind to be covered by the "otherwise" clause. Id. at 1586-87 ( ).
Begay did not take issue with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that DUI poses a significant threat of injury to another. Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1584 ( ). Likewise, Begay does not impact our court's earlier findings that auto theft and auto tampering pose a similar degree of risk of physical injury as the example crimes. We now recognize, however, that the degree of risk of physical injury is only half of the analysis. Sun Bear and its progeny did not consider whether auto theft and auto tampering were similar in kind to the example crimes. Instead, our previous analyses focused solely on the degree of risk of physical injury associated with a crime. See Counts, 498 F.3d at 804 ( ); Sprouse, 394 F.3d at 580-81 ( ); Sun Bear, 307 F.3d at 752-53 ( ). Begay, therefore, requires that our analysis focus on whether auto theft and auto tampering are similar in kind to the example crimes.
To determine whether auto theft is similar in kind to the example crimes, we consider whether auto theft involves conduct that is similarly "purposeful, violent, and aggressive" when compared to the conduct involved in auto theft's closest analogue among the example crimes.1 See James v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1597, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) ( ). We also recognize that Begay emphasized that the "otherwise" clause should only encompass crimes "show[ing] an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger." Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1587.
As relevant to this case, a person commits the crime of auto theft under Missouri law if he appropriates the property of another with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property, either without the owner's consent or by means of deceit or coercion. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 570.030. We consider the generic elements of the offense rather than the specific details of how Williams committed the crime. See Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1584. The statutory definition, however, sets forth three distinct offenses with different elements: auto theft without consent, auto theft by deceit, and auto theft by coercion. See, e.g., Mo. Approved...
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