Reynolds v. State
| Decision Date | 10 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–16–812,CR–16–812 |
| Citation | 538 S.W.3d 223 |
| Parties | Christopher Scott REYNOLDS, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Christopher Reynolds was convicted by a Clark County jury of one count of first-degree domestic battery and was sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. Reynolds's attorney initially filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and Rule 4–3(k) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. We denied counsel's motion to withdraw, holding that the brief failed to address numerous adverse rulings. Reynolds v. State , 2017 Ark. App. 397, 2017 WL 2672644 ( Reynolds I ). Reynolds subsequently obtained new counsel, who has filed a merit brief in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict and the circuit court's refusal to give a proffered instruction. We affirm.
Reynolds was charged with first-degree domestic battery based on allegations that he broke the leg of his girlfriend's four-year-old son, S.W. (S.W. experienced a severe transverse fracture injury to his left femur.) S.W. reported that Reynolds threw him onto a bed and spanked him, causing his injuries. Reynolds denied having caused the injury but suggested that the child had fallen down the stairs at home. Medical experts, as well as child-abuse experts, testified that such an injury was likely to have been caused by a "fairly high force trauma," like a car accident, or having a large, heavy object apply "a large amount of direct force to that part of the leg," or a fall from many stories high. As noted above, the jury convicted Reynolds of first-degree domestic battery.
In what is actually his second point on appeal, Reynolds challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict.1 Reynolds was charged with first-degree domestic battery pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5–26–303(a)(4) (Repl. 2013). Under that provision, a person commits domestic battery in the first degree if he or she causes serious physical injury to a family or household member under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Reynolds argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to show that he engaged in conduct that "manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life."
We cannot reach the merits of his argument, however, because he failed to preserve it for appellate review. Under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1 (2016), Reynolds was required to state the specific grounds on which his motion for directed verdict relied. At trial, however, counsel moved for directed verdict as follows:
At the conclusion of trial, counsel renewed his motion as follows:
Here, Reynolds's motion for directed verdict did not state the specific grounds as required by Rule 33.1 ; rather, it merely stated that the evidence was insufficient. Our supreme court has held that such a motion does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense. Breeden v. State , 2013 Ark. 145, at 4, 427 S.W.3d 5, 8.
Reynolds argues that a specific directed-verdict motion should not be necessary when making such a motion would not "serve the purpose" of Rule 33.1. We find no merit to this argument. Rule 33.1 is to be strictly construed. Pinell v. State , 364 Ark. 353, 219 S.W.3d 168 (2005) ; Merchant v. State , 2017 Ark. App. 576, 532 S.W.3d 136. Our appellate courts have been "steadfast in our holdings that ... we will not address the merits of an appellant's insufficiency argument where the directed-verdict motion is not specific." Kinsey v. State , 2016 Ark. 393, at 7–8, 503 S.W.3d 772, 777 ; Gillard v. State , 372 Ark. 98, 101, 270 S.W.3d 836, 838–39 (2008) ; Lewis v. State , 2017 Ark. App. 442, at 5, 528 S.W.3d 312, 316 (). Reynolds's directed-verdict motion was thus clearly insufficient to preserve for appeal his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
In what is actually his first point on appeal, Reynolds argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with a modified version of AMI Crim. 2d 2610, which is the jury instruction for domestic battering in the first degree. AMI Crim. 2d 2610 states that in order to prove the offense of domestic battering in the first degree, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "caused serious physical injury to a family or household member under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." The instruction defines "family or household member" and "serious physical injury," but it does not define the phrase "circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."
During trial, Reynolds proffered a modified version of AMI Crim. 2d 2610 that would have included a definition of that phrase, as follows:
The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted the language "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" ( Ark. Code Ann. § 5–13–201(a)(3) ) to require proof of actions by the defendant "which create at least some risk of death and which, therefore, evidence a mental state on the part of the accused to engage in some life-threatening activity against the victim." Tigue v. State , 319 Ark. 147, 151–52, 889 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1994). The fact that the victim receives serious physical injuries does not ipso facto mean that the State has carried its burden of proof.
(Emphasis in original.)
At trial, counsel argued that including this definition in the jury instruction was "necessary for the jury's understanding of that language." He further contended that Tigue , supra , stated The circuit court said that it was taking Reynolds's argument "very seriously" but added that it understood Arkansas law to provide that a circuit court should always defer to the model instructions if the instruction covers the circumstances or the facts that have been presented. It therefore declined to give Reynolds's proffered instruction, concluding that "since the model instructions don't provide it, I'm not going to create it[.]" On appeal, Reynolds assigns error to this ruling.
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